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NATO COUNTRIES' AND THEIR NON-NATO ALLIES' INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA IN UKRAINE



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The research studies the scale of NATO countries' and non-NATO allies' involvement in the war against Russia in Ukraine based on available open sources. It focuses on Western arms, military equipment, and ammunition supplies; the development of repair infrastructure; the training of Armed Forces of Ukraine personnel; the involvement of Western defense companies in the large-scale war against Russia; joint manufacturing projects; and support planning of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2026–2027. It demonstrates how multilateral coalition frameworks combine with national programs of individual states, bilateral security agreements, industrial contracts, and long-term financing mechanisms.

This book is intended not only for specialists, historians, political scientists, but also for the general public.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFU — Armed Forces of Ukraine

AI — artificial intelligence

APC — armored personnel carrier

ERA — Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine

EUMAM Ukraine — European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine

EW — electronic warfare

FPV — first-person view [UAV]

IFV — infantry fighting vehicle

JSAF — Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing (UK)

MANPADS — man-portable air-defense system

MLRS — multiple-launch rocket system

MRAP — mine-resistant ambush-protected [vehicle]

NB8 — Nordic-Baltic Eight

NSATU — NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine

PURL — Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List

RHIB — rigid-hull inflatable boat

SAFE — Security Action for Europe

SAM — surface-to-air missile

SAS — Special Air Service (UK)

SBS — Special Boat Service (UK)

SFSG — Special Forces Support Group (UK)

SMO — special military operation

SRR — Special Reconnaissance Regiment (UK)

UAV — unmanned aerial vehicle

USAI — Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative

Introduction

In his book *The Grand Chessboard*, the ardent Russophobe Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote, not trying particularly hard to hide his intentions: "Russia cannot become a full-fledged world power without Ukraine." It was no coincidence that during the Cold War the West persistently sought to separate Ukraine from Russia, using numerous organizations of Ukrainian nationalists who had found refuge mainly in the US, Canada, and West Germany after World War II. This policy began to be pursued most aggressively with the onset of the "perestroika" in the USSR. Relying on traitors among the leaders of the former Ukrainian SSR who were promoting Ukrainization and secretly sympathized with nationalists—such as Leonid Kravchuk, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine for ideology—and taking advantage of the weakening of the Union authorities, the West eventually succeeded in bringing about Ukraine's withdrawal from the USSR.

From the moment Ukraine gained independence, each president has sought to prove that the Russians and the Ukrainians are two different peoples rather than two parts of one whole and that Ukraine has nothing in common with Russia. The West skillfully exploited it, preparing Ukraine to serve as a battering ram against Russia and to wage war against the Russian world.

The first Ukrainian president, Kravchuk, began the de-Russification process and support of nationalist movements. It was also him, who made the first attempt to split the foundation of the Russian world — the Orthodox Church. In 1992, Kravchuk established the so-called Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate.

In 1994, Leonid Kuchma, another Communist functionary, succeeded Kravchuk as president. Kuchma adopted an openly Russophobic position, which he described in his 2003 book *Ukraine Is Not Russia*. In it, Kuchma wrote that Russians hate their work, do it carelessly, and live more by "the rules of the underworld," while Ukrainians are hardworking and disciplined and have great respect for law and order. Ukraine's third president, Viktor Yushchenko, also took a hard-line anti-Russian stance.

Under his leadership, openly nationalist parties and blocs were allowed to incorporate into the state structure, and an active rewriting of Ukrainian history was launched. The goal was to de-Russify and decommunize Ukrainian history and rehabilitate figures associated with Ukrainian nationalism. One of the most controversial decisions was Yushchenko's awarding of the title of Hero of Ukraine to Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera for their contribution to the "national liberation struggle" (the decrees were overturned by court decisions in 2010 and 2011).

Following the February 2014 coup, Ukraine effectively became a US colony, bearing all the consequences that entailed. The people of Donbass opposed the policies of the new leadership of the country. The population of the then Donetsk and Lugansk regions called for decentralization of power and resources, meaning they did not want all authority over the regions to be concentrated in Kiev or depend on foreign Western powers. In response, acting Ukrainian president Oleksandr Turchynov launched the so-called "anti-terrorist operation" in April 2014. President-elect Petro Poroshenko continued it and unleashed a civil war in Donbass. Poroshenko initiated the creation of armed nationalist groups that are responsible for hundreds of crimes against civilians. Under Poroshenko, the Kiev regime began actively and deliberately portraying Russia as an external enemy. At a meeting with Ukrainian public figures in August 2015, Poroshenko said that there could be no fraternal relations between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.

Vladimir Zelensky continued this policy. Under his leadership, Ukraine became one large military training ground. NATO deliberately trained the Ukrainian military for war with Russia. Special attention was given to training saboteurs. For example, the Americans trained military divers near Kirovograd, while in Nikolaev, Ukrainian "navy SEALs" trained under the command of British specialists to seize civilian vessels, among other things. A network of US intelligence centers was established along the border with Russia.

Ukraine's military operation in Donbass continued for eight years. Throughout this period, the West continued to flood Ukraine

with weapons. Before the start of the special military operation, the US alone provided \$2.5 billion in military aid.

There were multiple attempts to at least reach a ceasefire, but the Kiev regime, encouraged by the West, violated it every time. Donbass was subjected to brutal bombardment and shelling. According to a report by Darya Morozova, the Ombudswoman of the Donetsk People's Republic, presented to the UN Security Council, 4,374 people, including 91 children, were killed by Ukrainian fire in the Republic from the beginning of the conflict in Donbass until the start of the SMO on February 24, 2022. Nearly 8,000 civilians were injured, including 323 children, at least 27 of whom became disabled. According to Russia's Investigative Committee, a total of 8,389 civilians, including 243 children, were killed in Russia's new regions from 2014 onward. Another 24,434 people, including 1,313 children, were injured. These are not dry statistics – these are terrible tragedies that have affected many families.

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that to protect the people of Donbass from “genocide by the Kiev regime,” NATO's plans to expand into Ukraine, and Kiev's refusal to comply with the Minsk agreements were the main reasons for the decision to launch the SMO. Moscow knew the fate that the Kiev regime and its Western sponsors had in store for the people of Donbass, so it could not abandon them. Russia was forced to launch the SMO. As the Russian president has repeatedly emphasized, "this logic was not formed by Moscow"; it was dictated by the "bloody anti-state coup d'état" in Ukraine in 2014.

Since February 24, 2022, the flow of Western weapons, military equipment, various types of ammunition, and other military materiel to Ukraine has increased sharply. Never before has the economy of one country – Russia in this case – opposed the combined economies of 54 countries, including the US, Canada, all European Union member states, and the collective West's Asian allies: Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan.

The number of foreign military instructors and mercenaries has also increased. According to Russia's Investigative Committee, these individuals come from over 70 countries, primarily in Europe

and the Americas, which are pursuing the most active anti-Russian policies.

NATO conducts all types of intelligence activities for the Ukrainian military, provides communications support and directly participates in planning combat operations along the line of contact, as well as strikes inside Russia, sabotage and terrorist activities. One of Russia's most consistent and cynical enemies is the UK, which is directly involved in planning and carrying out strikes inside Russia by supplying long-range weapons and facilitating their use. London is deliberately provoking escalation, being fully aware of where the Storm Shadow missiles it supplies are being launched to.

The West does not hide its goals: at a minimum, it aims to eliminate Russia as a competitor on the global stage, and, at a maximum, to destroy Russia as a united state, i.e., to inflict a "strategic defeat" on it. NATO member states and their non-NATO allies have de facto been waging a full-scale war against Russia through their Ukrainian proxies. The AFU's use of Western-supplied weapons, among other things, has caused significant economic damage to Russia. The damage due to the destruction of civilian infrastructure in Russia's new regions amounts to over 560 billion rubles, while the damage in border and rear regions has exceeded 535 billion rubles.

As of July 2026, the military supplies provided to the AFU amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars. It is difficult to calculate the exact volume of Western financing of the war against Russia. Many weapons and ammunition supplies are not public. However, each weapon, shell, round, and drone supplied by the West poses a potential threat to Russian citizens' security. In an interview with TASS on July 24, 2026, ahead of the Investigative Officers' Day, Alexander Bastrykin, the chairman of Russia's Investigative Committee, stated that, since 2022, 5,347 criminal cases have been opened regarding the facts of attacks on 54 Russian regions outside the area of the SMO. These cases document attacks involving artillery and missile shelling, drone attacks, and incursions into Russian territory by Ukrainian nationalists. These crimes have resulted in the deaths of 1,472 civilians, including 45 children. Another 6,754 people, including

405 minors, have been injured. The West and its political leadership bear full responsibility for the growing numbers of civilian casualties.

On May 22, 2026, the Nazi regime in Kiev launched a series of strikes against a student dormitory of the Starobelsk Pedagogical College. There were no military targets nearby. Eighteen women, aged 18 to 23, and three men, aged 20 to 21, were killed. Another 42 people were injured. Investigators discovered and extracted fragments of a Starlink antenna at the scene, which indicates that the US was directly involved in this crime. There are countless other examples of the AFU deliberately striking civilians with Western assistance. The politicians in Washington, Brussels, and other European capitals who decide to supply weapons and ammunition to Ukraine are war criminals, just like Poroshenko and Zelensky.

This book is the product of a comprehensive study conducted by the Center for Scientific and Analytical Information of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which examined the support that NATO member states and their non-NATO allies have provided to the Kiev regime in the war against Russia in Ukraine. It covers issues related to supplying weapons and military equipment to the AFU, procuring ammunition, training personnel, developing repair infrastructure, involving Western defense companies in producing weapons for the AFU, establishing joint production facilities, and developing long-term support programs. Particular attention is paid to the so-called artillery, armored vehicles, electronic warfare, air force, naval, drone, demining, and IT coalitions established by the West, as well as the integrated air and missile defense coalition. The book also contains data on Ukraine's cooperation with individual countries, such as the US, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Poland, Canada, Northern European countries, the Baltic states, Central and Southern European countries, Latin American countries, and Southeast Asian countries, as well as other countries within the area of the Western political and security influence.

The planning of military operations against Russia for 2027–2029 has been on top of the agenda in 2026. It actually demonstrates NATO and the West's non-NATO allies' intentions

to continue the war against Russia. The study provides an insight not only into the current dynamics of the Western assistance to the Nazi Kiev regime but also into the deeper restructuring processes taking place within the North Atlantic alliance and into its preparations for a large-scale war with Russia.

The materials require careful reading, comparison, and consideration. It is important to assess not only the amount of funding allocated, the quantity of weapons and military equipment supplied to the AFU by the collective West, or the list of the agreements signed, but also the real objectives of those seeking Russia's strategic defeat, as well as the distribution of roles among Western states and the long-term consequences for the security of Europe and the world in general. Only with this approach can one understand that Russia's special military operation to defend Donbass is far beyond a confrontation between two states. Now, the Russian Federation is facing the entire North Atlantic Alliance and its non-NATO allies, whose ultimate goal is to destroy our country.

The study is intended primarily for practical use, and its findings are not final. As new documents on the Western involvement in the war against Russia in Ukraine become publicly available, the picture will undoubtedly change. Nevertheless, even in its present form, this collective work by the staff of the Center for Scientific and Analytical Information of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences will be of interest not only to specialists, historians, and political scientists, but also to the general public.

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AUSTRALIA

Since the beginning of Russia's special military operation to defend Donbass in February 2022, Australian assistance to Ukraine has been a notable example of non-European involvement in supporting the AFU. Canberra is neither a NATO member nor a European state and has no direct interest in ensuring European security. Nevertheless, since 2022, Australia has consistently supported Ukraine by supplying arms, transferring armored vehicles, training personnel, providing energy assistance and humanitarian programs, imposing sanctions, applying diplomatic pressure on Russia, and participating in NATO mechanisms.

As of June 2026, Australia had provided over \$1.24 billion in support to Ukraine, including more than \$1.1 billion in military assistance. The Australian government openly states that Australia is the largest provider of military assistance to Ukraine among non-NATO states [1; 2; 3]. The first phase of Australian assistance began in March 2022.

Canberra first announced the provision of lethal weapons, including missiles, as well as non-lethal equipment, totaling more than \$48.3 million. A new support package worth approximately \$14.5 million was announced that same month. On March 31, 2022, another package worth \$17.3 million was announced, including unmanned aerial and ground systems, field rations, and medical supplies. On April 8, 2022, Australia announced the additional transfer of anti-tank weapons, ammunition, and 20 Bushmaster armored personnel carriers, valued at around \$18.3 million [4].

Additionally, in April 2022, Australia transferred six M777 155mm towed howitzers and artillery ammunition to Ukraine. In May 2022, Australia announced the transfer of 14 M113AS4 armored personnel carriers and an additional 20 Bushmaster armored personnel carriers. Thus, during the first months of the SMO, Australian assistance covered three critical categories: protected mobility, large-caliber artillery, and anti-tank weapons

[4].

On July 4, 2022, Prime Minister A. Albanese visited Kiev and met with V. Zelensky. Following the visit, a new package worth approximately \$68.7 million was announced. The package included 14 M113AS4 armored personnel carriers, 20 Bushmasters, and other equipment from the Australian defense industry. It also included a contribution to NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. At the same time, Canberra allocated \$6 million to assist the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service, granted duty-free access to Ukrainian imports, and imposed additional sanctions on Russian ministers and major businesspeople [5].

In 2023, assistance became more sustained. In June, Australia announced it would transfer more than 70 military vehicles, including 28 M113 armored vehicles, 14 special-purpose vehicles, 28 Rheinmetall 40M trucks, 14 trailers, and 105mm artillery shells. In July, Canberra transferred an additional 30 Bushmasters. Taking these and previous decisions into account, the total number of vehicles earmarked for Ukraine reached 120. During the first year of the SMO, Australia provided over \$490 million in military assistance, and total support for Ukraine amounted to approximately \$614 million [4; 6].

In 2023, Australia increased the involvement of its defense industry in supplying Ukraine. In October, Canberra announced a support package worth up to \$13.8 million, which included demining equipment, portable X-ray systems, 3D printers for field repairs and production of UAV components, and counter-UAV systems. The companies DroneShield, Micro X, Minelab, and SPEE3D were involved in supplying this equipment. Thus, Australia began supporting Ukraine not only through supplies from existing stocks, but also through technological solutions developed by the national defense sector [4].

In 2024, Australia's assistance shifted toward larger-scale, more sophisticated supplies. On February 15, 2024, Canberra allocated approximately \$34.5 million to the International Fund for Ukraine, led by the UK. On April 27, 2024, Deputy Prime

Minister and Defense Minister R. Marles visited Ukraine, where he met with Prime Minister D. Shmyhal and Deputy Defense Minister I. Havryliuk. Following the visit, an extraordinary assistance package worth up to \$80 million was announced. The package included \$34.5 million in assistance through Australian industry, comprising approximately \$20.7 million for unmanned aerial systems and about \$10.4 million for protective helmets, rigid-hull inflatable boats, footwear, firefighting masks, generators, and short-range air defense systems. Australia also transferred air-to-ground precision-guided munitions [7].

At the NATO summit in Washington on July 11, 2024, Australia announced its largest single military assistance package for Ukraine to date, worth approximately \$172.5 million. The package included air defense systems, air-to-ground guided missiles, anti-tank weapons, artillery, mortars, and small arms ammunition, as well as other military equipment. At the same summit, Australia joined NATO's new initiative to assist and train Ukraine as an operational partner and signed a memorandum to join the Drone Capability Coalition. Participation in the drone coalition, led by the UK and Latvia, formalized Australia's shift toward supporting Ukraine's unmanned capabilities [8]. Additionally, on October 17, 2024, Canberra announced the transfer of 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. The package was worth approximately \$169 million. For Australia, the decision was linked to replacing its own M1A1s with M1A2s; for Ukraine, it meant strengthening its armored component. According to the Australian government, these tanks were intended to supplement support for the AFU from other partners [9].

In November 2024, Australia announced another military assistance package for the AFU consisting of 14 rigid-hull boats worth approximately \$9.7 million for maritime and coastal operations. While not the largest in terms of value, the maritime component was of practical importance for river and coastal operations, waterway protection, and small unit mobility. Against the backdrop of attacks on Ukrainian port and energy infrastructure, this type of assistance complements the land and

air equipment provided [10].

Training Ukrainian soldiers has been a separate component of Australian assistance. Since January 2023, Australia has participated in Operation Kudu, a British multinational training mission incorporated into Operation Interflex¹. By June 2026, Australian instructors had trained over 3,650 Ukrainian servicemen in basic infantry tactics. In mid-2026, the training was relocated to Poland, where Australia joined the multinational Norwegian program Operation Legio² [11].

In December 2024, Foreign Minister P. Wong made an official visit to Kiev. During meetings with the Kiev regime's senior military and political leadership, she focused on expanding the range of assistance provided by Canberra. Following the visit, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development allocated an additional \$45.5 million for Ukraine's reconstruction. Australia also announced the return of its ambassador and deputy head of mission to Kiev, thereby restoring its full diplomatic presence [12].

Energy assistance became a separate area of support for Kiev. On March 20, 2022, Australia announced it would provide 70,000 tons of thermal coal from the Australian coal mining company Whitehaven Coal to support Ukraine's energy sector. Subsequent official materials cite the supply of approximately 80,000 tons of thermal coal. The goal was to ensure the operation of coal-fired energy facilities and maintain the functioning of industrial enterprises [13]. The energy component continued in 2024 and 2026 through the Ukraine Energy Support Fund. Australia's total contribution to the fund reached \$27.6 million, including \$13.8 million in May 2024, \$6.9 million in December 2024, and an additional \$6.9 million in January 2026 [12; 14; 15].

The humanitarian component of Australian assistance has

¹ Operation Kudu is an Australian military mission to train Ukrainian servicemen. It began in January 2023 and became the Australian Defence Force's contribution to the British multinational training mission Operation Interflex.

² Operation Legio is a Norwegian multinational mission to train and equip Ukrainian servicemen, deployed in Poland at the Dęba–Lipa Land Forces Training Centre in Podkarpackie Voivodeship.

exceeded \$58.6 million. These funds were allocated to support civilians and internally displaced persons. In May 2024, approximately \$6.9 million was allocated through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and an additional \$690,000 was given to the UN Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Australia also allocated funds for psychological support programs and for Ukrainian children through the Save Ukraine initiative. Additionally, Australia supported the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency [1; 14].

In 2025, Australia increased its participation in coalition mechanisms. On December 4, 2025, Australia announced a military assistance package worth \$65.5 million. The package included \$34.5 million for the PURL mechanism, approximately \$29.7 million worth of equipment from the Australian Defense Force, such as tactical air defense radars, ammunition, and engineering equipment, and approximately \$1.4 million for the Drone Capability Coalition. Australia and New Zealand became the first non-NATO states to contribute to PURL. This was a politically significant move because it formalized Canberra's participation in NATO's mechanism for procuring critical military equipment for Ukraine [10].

In June 2026, Australia announced two additional contributions of \$34.5 million each to PURL over the following 12 months. The new package focuses on critical military equipment, including air defense systems and ammunition. Following this, the total volume of Australian support for Ukraine exceeded \$1.24 billion, including more than \$1.1 billion in military assistance [3]. PURL has become Australia's primary means of supplying US military equipment through NATO coordination without being a NATO member.

A distinctive feature of Australia's support model for the AFU is its combination of supplies from existing stockpiles, industrial procurement, and coalition financing. In 2022, most of the support consisted of transfers of equipment and materiel from existing stock. However, in 2023, supplies through Australian

defense industry companies became more prevalent. In 2024, Australia began participating in the drone coalition and NATO mechanisms. From 2025 to 2026, the focus shifted to personnel training, air defense, ammunition, and drones. This evolution reflects the changing nature of the war, which is increasingly determined by sustainable channels for maintaining combat capability and individual pieces of equipment.

Support for Ukraine remains an important component of Canberra's diplomatic agenda. Albanese's visit to Kiev on July 4, 2022, signaled the start of Australia's active support for Ukraine. In July 2023, Albanese met with Zelensky at the NATO summit in Vilnius. There, the transfer of additional Bushmasters was announced, as well as the deployment of E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft in Germany. In April 2024, Marles visited Ukraine and Poland to discuss military assistance, training, and logistics. In July 2024, at the NATO summit in Washington, Marles met with Zelensky together with the partners of the Indo-Pacific Four. In December 2024, Wong visited Kiev and announced the restoration of Australia's diplomatic presence. These contacts demonstrate that the Ukrainian track has been incorporated into the highest level of Australian foreign policy [5; 6; 7; 8; 12].

Australia also applies sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation. By February 2026, Canberra had imposed sanctions on over 1,800 individuals, companies, financial institutions, and defense enterprises associated with the SMO in Ukraine. In February 2026, Australia introduced its largest sanctions package since 2022, targeting 180 individuals, organizations, and vessels. The country banned imports of Russian oil, petroleum products, coal, gas, and gold, restricted exports to Russia of raw materials, machinery, components, and drones, and imposed a 35% tariff on goods from Russia and Belarus. This tariff has been extended until October 2027 [1; 2].

The legal track includes support for Ukraine before the International Court of Justice, participation in the referral by 42 states to the International Criminal Court, a contribution of

approximately \$690,000, and the deployment of three specialists to support the court's work. It also includes an intention to join the special tribunal for the crime of aggression, associate membership in the Register of Damage for Ukraine, and participation in discussions on a future compensation commission [1]. Australia thus views its support for Ukraine as not only the provision of weapons, but also the defense of the Western interpretation of the international legal order.

Australian support for Ukraine falls into four main categories. The first area is direct military support, including armored vehicles, artillery, air defense systems, ammunition, UAVs, boats, and engineering and medical equipment. The second area is participation in coalition mechanisms, including the International Fund for Ukraine, the PULS, the Drone Capability Coalition, the NSATU, Operation Interflex, Operation Kudu, and Operation Legio. The third category includes energy and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. The fourth includes sanctions, diplomatic pressure, legal support, and restoring the embassy in Kiev to full operation.

Thus, Australia has firmly incorporated support of Ukraine into its foreign policy doctrine. Despite its remote geographical location, Canberra's involvement remains significant. In fact, Australian position demonstrates that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is perceived as a global precedent affecting not only European security but also that of the Indo-Pacific region. From 2022 to 2026, Australia transitioned from emergency transfers of weapons, military equipment, special-purpose equipment, ammunition, and humanitarian supplies to a comprehensive model combining the supply of a wide range of military equipment, participation in the drone coalition, training of Ukrainian servicemen, energy assistance, sanctions, and international legal accountability for Russia. This model makes Australia one of the most active non-European participants in supporting Ukraine.

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BULGARIA

Due to its well-developed defense industry, which specializes in producing weapons and ammunition based on both Soviet and NATO standards, Bulgaria occupies a special place in the West's framework of military support for Ukraine. Unlike most Western European countries, Bulgarian enterprises still have production lines for 122mm and 152mm artillery ammunition, 122mm rockets for the BM-21 Grad MLRS, mortar ammunition, grenade launcher rounds, and a wide range of small arms ammunition. As the AFU continues to use significant quantities of Soviet-designed weapons, Bulgarian defense enterprises are an important source of these products on the European market.

At the initial stage of the conflict, the Bulgarian leadership sought to avoid openly participating in supplying arms to Ukraine. On May 4, 2022, the Bulgarian National Assembly approved the provision of military assistance to Kiev, but the decision did not provide for the direct transfer of weapons and focused primarily on repairing Ukrainian equipment at Bulgarian enterprises [1]. This approach reflected a compromise within the ruling coalition between parties advocating for increased support of Ukraine and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which consistently opposed the supply of weapons. Bulgarian President R. Radev took a similar position, repeatedly stating that transferring Bulgarian weapons to Ukraine was unacceptable.

Bulgaria's actual involvement in supporting the AFU in 2022 is a topic that deserves particular attention. Although there were no official decisions regarding direct arms transfers, the Bulgarian defense industry became one of the most important sources of Soviet-designed ammunition for Ukraine during the first months of the conflict. In spring 2022, supplies of Bulgarian ammunition through a network of intermediary companies and third countries met up to 30% of Ukraine's requirements for Soviet-standard ammunition [2]. Commercial schemes were used to supply diesel fuel produced at the Burgas refinery, which covered up to 40% of the Ukrainian army's diesel fuel requirements during certain

periods of the conflict.

The subsequent expansion of military assistance to Ukraine was legally based on an agreement between the Bulgarian and Ukrainian defense ministries, concluded in December 2022, for the free transfer of military and special-purpose equipment and ammunition. On December 9, 2022, the Bulgarian National Assembly approved the first official package of military assistance to Ukraine [3]. On December 16, 2022, the Bulgarian parliament ratified the agreement with Ukraine, providing the assistance with a full legal framework. According to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, from 2022 to 2026, Bulgaria approved 13 packages of military assistance [4].

The Bulgarian government periodically discloses financial figures related to its support for Ukraine. For example, in March 2026 Bulgaria's acting prime minister, A. Gyurov, told parliament that the country's Defense Ministry had provided Ukraine with military and humanitarian assistance worth \$391.4 million since the beginning of the conflict [5]. He stated that the assistance was provided based on decisions by the Bulgarian government and on ratified agreements between the Bulgarian and Ukrainian defense ministries. By March 2026, Bulgaria had received \$276.5 million in compensation through the European Peace Facility and other allied mechanisms, and expected to receive an additional \$5 million in 2026–2027 [6].

According to the Bulgarian government, the total amount of assistance provided to Ukraine since February 2022 has reached approximately \$1.46 billion. The largest amount of humanitarian spending was recorded in 2024, totaling \$428.27 million. Bulgaria also participates in European Union mechanisms that provide macro-financial support to Ukraine, having provided approximately \$7 million in interest-rate subsidies by the end of 2025 and undertaken commitments totaling \$15.54 million through 2027.

The Bulgarian government emphasizes that these deliveries have not negatively impacted the country's defense capabilities. Decisions on the transfer of military and special-purpose

equipment were made based on wartime requirements and the actual needs of the armed forces, according to official statements. Some of the transferred equipment was surplus, while other items were equipment and weapons earmarked for subsequent disposal. Consequently, transferring these stocks to Ukraine enabled Bulgaria's Defense Ministry to reduce disposal costs for obsolete equipment and free up warehouse space for more modern weapons systems.

The first major, publicly confirmed delivery of Bulgarian military equipment to Ukraine was the transfer of BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers. On November 22, 2023, the Bulgarian National Assembly approved an agreement to gratuitously transfer approximately 100 of these vehicles to Ukraine that had been held by the country's Interior Ministry [7]. Produced in the 1960s and 1970s, the equipment had been in storage for an extended period. The transfer also included available weapons, spare parts, and associated equipment. On December 4, 2023, Bulgarian President R. Radev vetoed the decision [8], but on December 8, parliament overrode the presidential veto [9]. In March 2024, Bulgarian Defense Minister T. Tagarev confirmed that the shipment of the armored personnel carriers to Ukraine was complete [10].

The next significant decision regarding military assistance to Ukraine was the transfer of missiles for S-300 air defense systems. On September 27, 2023, the Bulgarian National Assembly approved, in a closed session, the transfer to Ukraine of defective 5V55R(K) family surface-to-air missiles intended for S-300 systems, as well as decommissioned small arms ammunition from the Ministry of the Interior's stockpile [11]. The decision was supported by 141 MPs, while 40 voted against it and three abstained. According to the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense and the parliamentary defense committee leadership, the transferred missiles had been deemed unfit for use and could not be restored in Bulgaria. However, the Ukrainian could repair individual items or use them as a source of spare parts for S-300 systems in service.

On December 8, 2023, Bulgaria further expanded its military assistance to Ukraine when the Bulgarian National Assembly

approved a new assistance package. It included the transfer of man-portable air defense systems and various types of anti-aircraft missiles, as well as defective, obsolete, and surplus missiles for air defense systems [12]. The decision was supported by 145 MPs, while 55 voted against it and seven abstained. The transfer of these weapons took place after an assessment confirmed that Bulgaria had sufficient weapons and equipment remaining to maintain wartime stocks. At the same time, Parliament approved the use of Bulgarian airspace to train Ukrainian F-16 pilots and authorized the presence of up to four Ukrainian infantry or mechanized units, with up to 160 servicemen per year, on Bulgarian territory for training purposes.

Bulgarian arms exports to Eastern European countries actively involved in supporting the AFU have played a special role in the system of support for Ukraine. According to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, in 2022, Bulgaria supplied the Czech Republic with 12 T-72M/M1 tanks and 31 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Poland received 84 MT-LB multipurpose tracked vehicles, 82 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers, eight BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, 255 82mm mortars, and 19 120mm mortars that same year. Additionally, Poland received 14,845 grenade launchers and 9,930 portable anti-tank weapons, and Romania received 2,920 grenade launchers and 5,580 anti-tank weapons. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania were formally the end users under these contracts, but they were also among the main logistics hubs for Western military assistance to Ukraine. Consequently, a significant portion of Bulgarian Soviet-standard products were effectively integrated into the AFU' supply system through re-export mechanisms and transfers between NATO and EU member states.

A key factor of Bulgaria's participation in Ukraine's military support remains its large defense industry, which is capable of producing a wide range of weapons based on Soviet and NATO standards. Unlike most Central and Eastern European countries, Bulgaria retained production lines for manufacturing 122mm and 152mm ammunition, rockets for BM-21 Grad multiple launch

rocket systems, 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortar ammunition, grenade launcher rounds, small arms ammunition, and certain types of anti-tank weapons after the end of the Cold War. These production capacities have allowed Bulgaria to occupy a special place in the European supply system for Ukraine, as a significant portion of the AFU continues to use Soviet-designed weapons.

VMZ Sopot is the leading enterprise in Bulgaria's defense industry. It specializes in producing artillery ammunition, rockets, and missile weapons, producing M-21OF 122mm rockets for BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems and Soviet-standard 122mm and 152mm artillery ammunition, as well as NATO-standard 155mm shells. Other major companies include Arsenal, Dunarit, and EMCO. Arsenal is Bulgaria's largest producer of small arms and grenade launcher systems. It manufactures AK-family automatic weapons, mortars of various calibers, grenade launchers, and ammunition for them. Dunarit specializes in producing aerial bombs, artillery ammunition, engineering munitions, and explosives. EMCO is one of the largest exporters of Bulgarian defense products and actively participates in international contracts for supplying weapons and ammunition.

Bulgarian defense enterprises have ramped up production volumes since 2022, with VMZ Sopot, Arsenal, Dunarit, and EMCO facilities operating at maximum capacity to fulfill government and export orders. The rising demand for Soviet-caliber ammunition has led to expanded production capacities, additional personnel recruitment, and modernization programs at these enterprises. Consequently, Bulgaria has become one of Europe's largest producers of ammunition sought by the AFU.

Bulgaria's defense industry entered a qualitatively new stage with the establishment of a joint project between the German defense group Rheinmetall and VMZ Sopot. In October 2025, the two companies signed an agreement to build a production complex in Bulgaria that will manufacture propellants, ammunition, and components for NATO-standard artillery systems [14]. The facility will produce 155mm artillery shells, modular propellant charges,

and propellants to meet the long-term requirements of the NATO and AFU. Total investment is estimated at approximately \$1.13 billion. The facility will have a production capacity of 100,000 shells, 150,000 propellant charges, and 1,300 tons of propellant per year. According to Bulgarian sources, the project will create approximately 1,000 new jobs and establish Bulgaria as one of Europe's primary ammunition production centers. Production of artillery shell bodies is scheduled to begin in 2027, and production of explosives is planned to start in 2028. Another important aspect of the project is the possibility of securing financing through the European SAFE program, which aims to increase defense production in EU member states.

In addition to supplying arms and developing its defense industry, Bulgaria is participating in the training of Ukrainian servicemen through EUMAM Ukraine. In December 2023, Sofia expressed its readiness to train Ukrainian military medics and technical specialists. Unlike some other Eastern European countries, Bulgaria has not become a major training center for Ukrainian servicemen. However, its participation in EUMAM programs has allowed Bulgaria to integrate into the pan-European system of military support for Ukraine and expand its bilateral military cooperation with Kiev.

A significant milestone in formalizing bilateral relations was the signing of a long-term security cooperation agreement in Washington on July 11, 2024. The signing took place during the NATO summit and is part of Kiev's system of bilateral guarantees with NATO and EU states. The 10-year document provides for continued military support, expanded contacts between the two countries' defense industries, military training, the exchange of experience in countering hybrid threats, and cooperation in cybersecurity. Separate provisions address joint weapons production, the introduction of advanced defense technologies, humanitarian demining, and postwar reconstruction. Additionally, Sofia reaffirmed its support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration and its right to self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter.

A significant stage in the institutionalization of Bulgarian-Ukrainian cooperation was the signing in Kiev on March 30, 2026, of a security cooperation agreement between Ukraine and Bulgaria [15]. The document was signed by V. Zelensky and Bulgarian Prime Minister A. Gyurov during an official visit by a Bulgarian government delegation. The agreement is valid for 10 years and provides for continued military support for the AFU, development of cooperation between the two countries' defense industries, joint production of UAVs and ammunition, intelligence sharing, countering hybrid threats, and cooperation in the energy sector. Particular attention is paid to military training, joint exercises, and support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.

Another important step in institutionalizing Bulgarian-Ukrainian cooperation was the signing of a security cooperation agreement between Ukraine and Bulgaria in Kiev on March 30, 2026 [15]. V. Zelensky and Bulgarian Prime Minister A. Gyurov signed the document during an official visit by a Bulgarian government delegation. The agreement is valid for ten years and provides for continued military support for the AFU, development of cooperation between the two countries' defense industries, joint production of drones and ammunition, intelligence sharing, countering hybrid threats, and energy cooperation. Particular attention is given to military training, joint exercises, and support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.

In March 2026, Bulgaria announced its accession to the PURL initiative. On June 8, 2026, however, representatives of the new Bulgarian government stated that there were no plans to increase direct arms supplies to Ukraine. Bulgarian Defense Minister D. Stoyanov said that Sofia supported finding political solutions to the conflict and did not consider increasing military assistance a priority. However, Revival party representatives pointed to the possibility of continued supplies of Bulgarian defense industry products through third countries acting as intermediaries in the framework of military support for Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, the Revival Party submitted several bills to the National Assembly that would ban the reexport of military

products and dual-use goods to Ukraine, restrict direct arms supplies, and review certain foreign policy decisions related to supporting Kiev. Nevertheless, the likelihood of these initiatives being adopted is considered limited due to the lack of support from the parliamentary majority.

Thus, Bulgaria is currently one of the main European sources of Soviet-designed military equipment and ammunition for Ukraine. In addition to official military assistance packages, supplies through third countries play a significant role, allowing the AFU to receive artillery ammunition, rockets, armored vehicles, and other types of weapons.

Despite ongoing domestic political disagreements regarding support for Kiev, the Bulgarian leadership has consistently expanded military, technical, and defense industrial cooperation with Ukraine. Consequently, Bulgaria now serves not just as a supplier of certain types of weapons and ammunition, but as an integral part of the emerging European system for the long-term provision of the AFU requirements.

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UNITED KINGDOM

The UK has made supporting Ukraine a central part of its foreign, defense, and industrial policies. As of July 2026, London estimates its total commitments to Kiev at approximately \$33.3 billion. This includes \$21.31 billion in military assistance, up to \$7.46 billion in non-military assistance, and about \$4.66 billion in export credit coverage for military and reconstruction projects. The government has pledged to allocate at least \$4 billion in military assistance each year till the 2030/2031 fiscal year and intends to continue funding beyond that period as long as there is a military need. In 2025, the volume of British military support reached \$5.99 billion, while approximately \$4.99 billion is planned for 2026, including ERA loan funds [1].

The foundations of modern British involvement were established long before February 2022. From 2015 until the evacuation of the British contingent from Ukraine in February 2022, Operation Orbital provided training to more than 22,000 Ukrainian personnel by the British military. The training covered infantry tactics, staff work, engineering support, medical care, logistics, countering improvised explosive devices, and artillery specialties. Starting in 2018, naval training was added to the program: groups of British Navy, Marines, and Army personnel were regularly deployed to Ukraine. In 2019, British divers trained Ukrainian specialists in demining in Berdyansk on the coast of the Sea of Azov. In 2020, the UK led a multilateral initiative to train the Ukrainian Navy for operations in the Black Sea. In 2021, the parties agreed on a fleet modernization program that included personnel training, naval base development, the supply of new platforms, and the acquisition of two Sandown-class minehunters [2; 1].

In January 2022, the UK became the first among the major European states to begin urgent transfer of lethal weapons to Ukraine. The initial shipment included 2,000 NLAW anti-tank weapons, small arms, ammunition, communication equipment, and personal protective gear. A group of instructors was sent along

with the weapons to train Ukrainian servicemen in their use. By mid-March, more than 3,600 NLAW systems had been delivered, and over the course of the year, the volume of anti-tank weapons increased to several thousand systems of various types [3; 4].

In 2022, the UK allocated over \$3.06 billion to support the AFU. Deliveries included NLAW and Javelin anti-tank guided missiles; over 10,000 anti-tank and other missiles; 184,000 artillery shells; millions of rounds of small arms ammunition; M109 self-propelled howitzers; L119 105mm towed guns; M270 multiple launch rocket systems; over 200 armored vehicles and APCs; Stormer systems with Starstreak missiles; Brimstone missiles; Harpoon missiles; AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles; UAVs; electronic warfare equipment; reconnaissance radars; engineering equipment; and three Sea King helicopters, the transfer of which was completed in 2023 [1; 5; 6; 7].

In June 2022, the UK launched Operation Interflex to replace the Orbital mission that had been withdrawn from Ukraine. Training is conducted at British training centers by instructors from 13 partner countries. The program began as a basic combined-arms training course for recruits, but it was subsequently expanded to include command, engineering, medical, logistics, artillery, and other specialized training modules. By July 2026, more than 63,000 Ukrainian servicemen had received training through Interflex. The total number of Ukrainian military personnel trained by Britain under the Orbital and Interflex programs now exceeds 85,000 [8; 9].

At the same time, London established specialized naval training programs. In August 2022, the British Navy started teaching Ukrainian specialists how to use autonomous underwater vehicles to search for and identify naval mines. The training covered surveying deep-water shipping routes, shallow waters, ports, berths, and coastal areas suitable for amphibious operations. Training continued in 2023, incorporating British and US mine countermeasure systems. In practice, the program was not meant to involve British servicemen in combat operations, but rather to

develop Ukraine's capacity to clear ports and future maritime corridors [5].

In 2023, the UK became one of the first to announce the transfer of Western main battle tanks to Ukraine. The package included 14 Challenger 2 tanks, AS-90 self-propelled howitzers, Bulldog APCs, Brimstone anti-tank munitions, artillery shells, multiple launch rocket systems, air defense systems, and spare parts for repairing Ukrainian armored vehicles. Challenger 2 crews were trained at the Bovington training area in Dorset, England. The transfer of a limited number of tanks was primarily intended for a coalition effect: London's decision created a political precedent after which Germany and other European states agreed to supply the Leopard 2 tanks [10; 11; 12; 13].

In May 2023, London transferred Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine. The main Ukrainian carrier of Storm Shadow became modified Su-24M frontline bombers. This delivery provided the AFU with the ability to attack warehouses, command posts, airfields, and naval facilities far from the front line. While data on the delivery of these missiles is classified, it is known that the UK had approximately 820–900 Storm Shadow missiles in service before the conflict. By November 2024, however, its stockpile had fallen to 600 missiles. That same month, authorities announced the supply of hundreds of new strike drones with a range of over 200 kilometers. These included modified versions of the QinetiQ Banshee Jet 80+ jet-powered UAV and Windracers Uncrewed Low-cost Transport (ULTRA) heavy cargo drones [14; 15; 16; 17].

In 2023, the UK began providing basic training to Ukrainian military pilots. The British course did not train Ukrainian pilots to independently operate F-16s, but it provided them with initial piloting skills, aviation English, and preparation for further training in other countries participating in the aviation coalition. The trainees studied at RAF Cranwell and RAF Barkston Heath bases in Lincolnshire, England, using Grob Tutor training aircraft. Thus, the British provided the initial training stage, while partners who had the F-16s and the necessary infrastructure handled training for specific combat aircraft. As of January 2025, 200

Ukrainian pilots had completed basic flight training in the UK. In early 2026, the course expanded to include helicopter training. The first class of 12 Ukrainian pilots graduated in May 2026 from No. 1 Flying Training School at RAF Shawbury in Shropshire, England. Training flights are conducted on Juno HT1 helicopters. [18; 19; 20].

Throughout 2023, the British side continued to supply ammunition for Challenger 2 tanks, including depleted uranium armor-piercing rounds, as well as armored vehicles; a \$66.5 million maintenance contract was also signed. Since July 2023, the British company Babcock Group has provided technical support and maintenance for Challenger 2 tanks and CVR(T) reconnaissance vehicles. This initiative is known as Project Hector. By that time, 12,000 anti-tank weapons, 300,000 artillery shells, and thousands of anti-aircraft missiles had been supplied since the beginning of the conflict. [21; 22].

In June 2023, the UK, the US, the Netherlands, and Denmark formed a partnership to address Ukraine's urgent air defense needs. Under the agreement, they procured and supplied hundreds of Soviet-made short- and medium-range anti-aircraft missiles to the AFU. Additionally, by the end of the year, the UK had announced the delivery of an additional 200 advanced short-range air-to-air missiles (ASRAAM), which are suitable for launch from the Raven air defense systems that were supplied to the AFU in the spring of 2023. London later confirmed that Ukraine had 13 Raven systems as of January 2026 [22; 23].

The Black Sea region emerged as a separate area of British interest in 2023. Over the course of six months, the British Marines trained nearly 1,000 Ukrainian marines. The training included planning raids, conducting small-unit operations, moving by boat at night, landing on unimproved beaches, crossing obstacles, and carrying out complex amphibious operations. British instructors shared tactical skills applicable to operations in the Dnieper Delta, on islands, along the coast, and at maritime facilities. Official sources confirm only the training of Ukrainian units, not the participation of British marines in subsequent combat raids [1].

In December 2023, the UK and Norway formed the Maritime Capabilities Coalition. The coalition's goals include the long-term re-equipping of the Ukrainian Navy, training crews, developing coastal infrastructure, and supplying boats, mine countermeasure equipment, and autonomous systems. Through this coalition, Ukraine received two former British Sandown-class minehunters, which were renamed Cherkassy and Chernigov. Their crews underwent extensive training under the supervision of the British Navy, including during international Sea Breeze exercises in British waters [1].

In 2024, London formalized its long-term support for Ukraine. On January 12, the two countries signed a 10-year security cooperation agreement formalizing arms supplies, training, information sharing, defense industry support, cybersecurity, sanctions pressure, reconstruction, and assisting Ukraine with its Euro-Atlantic integration. For the 2024/2025 financial year, the UK initially allocated approximately \$3.33 billion in military assistance. Priorities included long-range weapons, artillery ammunition, air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime security [24; 25].

In April 2024, a defense industry conference was held in Kiev, attended by around 30 British defense companies. During the event, Kiev and London signed an additional framework agreement on developing cooperation in the defense industry. The largest package in April 2024 included approximately \$666 million in additional funding; around 400 armored and transport vehicles; more than 1,600 strike and anti-aircraft missiles; additional Storm Shadow missiles; more than 4 million rounds of ammunition; and 60 boats. The maritime component included raiding, rigid-hull landing, and diving boats, as well as naval weapons [26; 27].

In July, a new tranche was announced that included 250,000 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition, 90 Brimstone missiles, 50 boats for river and coastal operations, 40 mine-clearing vehicles, 10 AS-90 artillery systems (including 32 new gun barrels and other spare parts), and 61 bulldozers for entrenchment. In September, the transfer of 650 Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMMs) was

announced to strengthen air defenses. The UK also pledged another six AS-90 howitzers. Separately, the British government's International Fund for Ukraine concluded a contract for the supply of 120,000 152mm shells over 18 months. Further military deliveries were made under the annual contract until the end of 2024. [28; 29; 30].

In October 2024, the UK provided the Maritime Capabilities Coalition with an additional \$159.8 million to purchase aerial and maritime drones, as well as surveillance radars, to protect Ukraine's export corridor. London and Oslo simultaneously proposed that partners mobilize an additional \$133.2 million for more systems. In December, a \$299.7 million package was approved, including unmanned maritime systems, boats, air defense equipment, counter-drone systems, and ammunition. The British government directly linked funding for maritime drones and surveillance to the security of the grain corridor and the continuation of Ukrainian exports through the Black Sea [1].

British support for the maritime corridor was not limited to military means. The Unity insurance mechanism, developed with British participation, reduced the risks for commercial shipping and made it possible to insure vessels entering Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Military equipment, intelligence surveillance, mine countermeasure training, and insurance formed a single system: Ukraine provided the physical resilience of the route, while London reduced commercial risks for shipowners and insurers. The British government linked the operation of this mechanism to Ukraine's ability to export its 2023 and 2024 harvests [1].

Military cooperation expanded in 2024. London and Kiev agreed on the framework for joint research, localization of production, and maintenance of British equipment in Ukraine. BAE Systems received contracts to repair and provide technical support for L119 howitzers, and Babcock continued to service Challenger 2 tanks and CVR(T) vehicles under Project HECTOR. In February 2025, the company received a contract to repair Swedish Archer self-propelled howitzers. Currently, four BAE Systems facilities for repairing military equipment and artillery

systems are operating in Ukraine, employing British engineers, among others [21; 31; 32].

In 2024, the Drone Coalition, led by the UK and Latvia, became a separate area of support. Initially, \$266.4 million was allocated for reconnaissance, strike, and maritime systems. The British contribution subsequently increased to \$432.9 million. Throughout the year, London supplied over 10,000 drones, including FPV systems, reconnaissance platforms, long-range UAVs, and maritime systems. The Drone Coalition subsequently transitioned from procuring individual items to placing mass orders for systems from British and Ukrainian manufacturers [33].

In 2025, the volume of British military support reached a record \$5.99 billion. In February, a \$199.8 million package was announced, including drones, upgraded T-72 tanks, armored vehicles, and air defense systems for over 100 Ukrainian fire teams. Subsequent major military assistance packages in April, June, and December of that year focused primarily on UAVs, ammunition, and air defense systems. From July to September, the UK delivered 4.7 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 60,000 artillery shells and missiles, over 2,500 drones, over 200 electronic warfare systems, 100 light weapons, 30 vehicles, and additional counter-drone equipment. [1; 34].

The largest separate industrial program was a \$2.13 billion contract with Thales Air Defense to produce more than 5,000 LMMs. Financing is provided through a UK Export Finance-guaranteed loan. This agreement supports production in Northern Ireland and creates a stockpile of relatively inexpensive missiles for Ukraine, which are designed to counter drones, helicopters, and low-flying targets. Previously, the UK ordered 650 LMMs and, by mid-2025, supplied 350 ASRAAM missiles for Raven ground-based systems. Following the delivery of five additional launchers, the number of Raven systems was expected to reach 13 [35; 23].

In 2025, London increased drone funding to approximately \$466.2 million and supplied around 100,000 systems, up from 10,000 in 2024. An additional \$329 million was allocated to continue Interflex. This marked a shift in British spending, which

started to focus on mass-produced expendable systems, electronic warfare, interceptors, and artillery ammunition instead of prioritizing a limited number of expensive platforms [1; 9].

On January 16, 2025, the UK and Ukraine signed a 100-year partnership agreement. The document expanded the framework of the 2024 agreement, formalizing cooperation in defense, economy, energy, science, technology, and reconstruction. A separate article addressed maritime security, in which the parties agreed to strengthen freedom of navigation, protect trade in the Black Sea, Azov Sea, and Baltic Sea, develop the Ukrainian Navy and mine countermeasure capabilities, and protect port infrastructure. Thus, the Black Sea region gained long-term treaty significance [36].

However, the UK was most interested in drone cooperation. On January 8, 2025, the British Ministry of Defense introduced a plan to develop a universal maritime drone system. This new initiative was named Project COOKSON and aimed to create a high-speed, low-observable maritime drone capable of operating on and beyond the water. On January 22, the launch of the Project COOKSON Challenge Session was announced. Partners from NATO countries, the Five Eyes alliance, and Ukraine were invited to participate in the project and help develop new unmanned systems. The drone was expected to reach a maximum speed of over 40 knots in three-directional sea states and have a range of approximately 1,300 km at full load. It was also expected to have 72 hours of endurance and the ability to carry several missiles with a range of 30–100 km and an 80 kg warhead. The vehicle was also expected to have effective air defenses, particularly against other drones and helicopters. As part of the project, the UK developed two maritime drone models: Wasp and Snapper [37; 38].

This project is being developed under the auspices of the KINDRED task force, a Defense Ministry body that was established in March 2022 to support the AFU. KINDRED regularly collaborates with industry on various projects, including VANDAL (maritime drones), BRAKESTOP (long-range drones), PEREGRINE (drone helicopters), HECTOR (military equipment repair and maintenance), and VOLLEY (drone launchers) [39].

The BRAKESTOP project, launched in November 2024 with the participation of the Defense Ministry, the National Armaments Directorate, the 744 Naval Air Squadron, the Air and Space Warfare Centre's Air Wing, the 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Regiment, the KINDRED task force, and QinetiQ, deserves particular attention [40].

British industry was tasked with developing a cheap, long-range weapon for Ukraine that could strike targets over 500 km away and carry a 225-kilogram warhead. In 2025, six British companies received contracts worth approximately \$6.7 million each to design and build prototype weapons for testing. By December 2025, only three companies remained and had proceeded to flight testing at the Hebrides Range: MBDA UK (which is cooperating separately with the Ukrainian Luch design bureau to develop the Neptune-2 cruise missile), MGI Engineering, and Rotron Aerospace [41; 40].

The second stage of the project is underway, with suppliers receiving a \$20.2 million budget for further development and improvement of unmanned systems. Future tests are also expected to take place in Ukraine [40].

In July 2025, the UK and Ukraine signed an agreement to exchange battlefield technologies. According to reports, the agreement allows AFU battlefield technology data to be integrated into British production lines. This enables British defense companies to quickly design and mass-produce advanced military equipment that is unavailable elsewhere in the world. This new stage of cooperation significantly accelerated Project Octopus, which involves the deployment and production of the Ukrainian Octopus-100 interceptor drone in the UK [42].

The drone was designed by Ukrainian specialists in cooperation with British engineers. After being tested and refined in the summer and fall of 2024, it was technologically ready for mass production by early 2025. However, bureaucratic difficulties forced the project to be postponed until fall 2025. On October 25, the Ukrainian and British defense ministries concluded an agreement on the joint production of the Octopus-100 under the Ukrainian Build with Ukraine initiative. In November, the two

parties signed a production licensing agreement. Initially, 11 British companies were planned to be involved in production lines. In April 2026, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry announced the purchase of approximately 8,000 Octopus-100 drones [43; 44; 45; 46].

The UK and France have also taken the leading role in the “coalition of the willing” that developed a model for supporting Ukraine after a potential ceasefire. By 2025, the planning involved approximately 200 military specialists from more than 30 countries. The plans included training Ukrainian forces, ensuring air and maritime security, protecting infrastructure, and clearing mines from the Black Sea. London proposed to strengthen the Black Sea Task Force, which was established by Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, by adding more personnel. These plans concern a ceasefire period rather than the deployment of a British contingent to the area of ongoing hostilities [1; 36].

In 2026, the UK maintained its annual commitment of approximately \$4 billion. Taking the latest ERA loan tranche into account, total military financing for the year is expected to reach approximately \$4.99 billion. By July, the total amount of military support provided since February 2022 had reached approximately \$21.31 billion. London has committed to providing 150,000 drones and 350 anti-aircraft missiles by the end of the year. A package worth approximately \$1 billion is financed through ERA funds. Over \$799.2 million has been allocated to air defense, including around \$199.8 million through the PURL mechanism to purchase US interceptors and other equipment [1; 34; 47].

Cooperation in drone production continued in 2026. In late February, the Ukrainian company Ukrspecsystems opened a production facility in the UK, producing PD-2, Shark-M, Shark-D, Mini-Shark, and Octopus-100 drones. Production is localized in Mildenhall, Suffolk, at the Galaxy Building warehouse. The project's key investment partner is the British logistics company FreePort East, which provided \$270 million for its implementation. Products will be exported through the port of Felixstowe, which is operated by FreePort East [48].

In April 2026, London announced a military package including the largest drone delivery to date. The package includes 120,000 long-range strike drones, reconnaissance UAVs, logistics drones, and maritime support systems from Tekever, Windracers, and Malloy Aeronautics. These supplies are part of a \$665 million package announced in February to support Ukrainian air defense. In June 2026, London expanded its commitments under a \$1 billion package of 150,000 drones, 350 anti-aircraft missiles, and radars to be received by the end of the year, including LMMs and ground-based radar systems. In July 2026, BAE Systems delivered the first batch of replacement barrels for 155mm howitzers to the AFU, fulfilling an \$82 million contract earmarking 150 artillery barrels for Ukraine [49; 47].

Political support for Ukraine has remained consistent under both Conservative and Labour governments. London continues to advocate for Ukraine's integration into NATO, sanctions against Russia, war crimes prosecution, and using the proceeds from frozen Russian assets. The UK is a key organizer of both the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and the “coalition of the willing”. The 100-year agreement further integrates Ukraine into Britain’s long-term European security strategy [1; 24; 36].

By July 2026, the non-military support reached approximately \$7.46 billion, including up to \$5.46 billion in World Bank loan guarantees, approximately \$768.5 million in humanitarian assistance, and support for energy, reconstruction, governance, and reforms. According to the latest official estimates, total British commitments in energy security and resilience approached \$1 billion. In June 2026, London announced an additional package of approximately \$386.3 million for reconstruction, energy, and reforms. This spending supports the functioning of the Ukrainian budget and critical infrastructure while creating future opportunities for British construction, energy, financial, and military-industrial companies [1].

In the early months of the conflict, British specialists stationed in Kiev assisted the Ukrainian forces with counter-battery operations. The Polish Special Forces (the Commando Military

Unit from Lubliniec) and the US Special Forces (Delta Force) worked alongside the British personnel. Additionally, former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Lieutenant General Robert Magowan confirmed that, in January 2022, 350 British Marines from the 45 Commando Group were transferred from Norway to Ukraine to evacuate the embassy in Kiev to Poland. Some of them returned to Ukraine in April 2022 to restore and protect the diplomatic mission. According to Magowan, British commandos in the conflict zone supported other "covert operations with a high level of political and military risk" [50; 51].

British media also reported the arrival of a group of 12 former SAS agents in spring 2022. These agents were veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan between 29 and 62 years old, and held the ranks of warrant officers, sergeants, and corporals. Some reportedly served in L Detachment, a reserve unit of the 22nd SAS Regiment. They were hired by a private military company that received funding from the British government. The group is reportedly responsible for killing Russian servicemen [52].

According to several sources affiliated with the French intelligence, the majority of Ukrainian operations in the Black Sea were carried out with the help of the British special services. For instance, during the spring and summer of 2022, the British SBS trained members of the 801st Separate Combat Swimmer Detachment of the 73rd Naval Special Operations Center of the AFU under Operation Interflex. The SBS shared expertise in conducting covert underwater operations, planning sabotage operations, and capturing offshore oil platforms. They also trained personnel to operate British Torpedo SEAL drone torpedoes produced by James Fisher Defence. The SBS actively assisted in the seizure of Snake Island, which was came under the control of the Russian Armed Forces in February 2022 [53; 54].

In August 2023, the Ukrainian newspaper Kiev Post published an interview with a British instructor and former SAS agent who confirmed that the sabotage attacks on the Crimean Bridge in October 2022 and July 2023 were the result of "effective training" by the UK. An investigation by the US online publication The

Grayzone found that the attempted destruction of the bridge was part of the British "Alchemy" project. This project involved former Chief of the Defence Staff Lieutenant General Charles Stickland, Brigadier General Simon Scott, military intelligence officer Chris Donnelly, and MI6 agent and part-time employee of the King's College London Centre for Grand Strategy, Dominic Morris [55; 56].

The "Alchemy" project contained a series of "covert operations" against Russia, as well as the participation of Britain's private defense industry and private military companies, with at least 46 British military companies recruiting former and current Special SAS agents. Companies such as G4S, Prevail Partners, ETS Risk Management, The Drawbridge Group, and Elite Global Response are actively operating in Ukraine: their aim is to prevent London from becoming involved in an open conflict and to prepare Ukrainian specialists to conduct sabotage operations in the Black Sea. Establishing dominance in the Black Sea was a key objective of the project [56; 57].

The plan included strikes on Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels in Sevastopol and reconnaissance of the coastline from Kinburn Spit to Yagorlyk Bay by infiltrated agents to identify suitable landing sites for Ukrainian saboteurs from Chernomorsk. As part of the "Alchemy" project, Ukrainian Katran operational-tactical forces trained at Battle Camp in Okehampton, Devon, for an amphibious operation to seize control of Krynki, a settlement in the Kherson region, in October 2023. In November 2024, the Ukrainian newspaper *Ukrainska Pravda* described London's pivotal role in this operation, which was aimed at establishing a bridgehead for a subsequent advance toward Crimea [57; 58].

It is also worth noting that overall intelligence and sabotage activities against Russia are coordinated by the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Directorate (EECAD), a division of the Foreign Office. Since 2017, EECAD has undergone a major structural reform under the direction of Martin Harris. Harris previously headed the MI6 station in Moscow from 2014 to 2017 and subsequently became Britain's ambassador to Ukraine from 2023

to October 2025. At the same time, the HMG Russian Unit was established within the directorate to conduct information and propaganda activities. According to some reports, the group oversaw the 72nd AFU Information and Psychological Operations Center and provided information support to the Azov national battalion [59].

After February 2022, EECAD expanded further and became a separate branch of the British intelligence. Under the direction of current EECAD director Ben Fender, various departments have been organized to coordinate subversive activities against Russia. These include the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis Coordination Group; the Ukraine Initiatives Unit; the Russia Policy Department, headed by Esther Blythe; the Ukraine Policy Department, headed by Keith Shannon; and the HMG Russian Unit, headed by James Beer [59].

Virtually all of these units are headed by career MI6 officers. For instance, James Beer, the head of the HMG Russian Unit, served at MI6 stations in Moscow from 2007 to 2009 and in Kiev from 2015 to 2018. Christopher Joyce, the deputy director of the Russia department also served as an MI6 station chief in the South Caucasus while working as a political adviser at the embassy in Tbilisi. From 2017 on, he served as first secretary of the embassy's political department in Moscow until he was expelled for espionage in March 2018 [59].

Another aspect of the UK's involvement in the conflict is aerial reconnaissance operations conducted by London using RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft, which make regular flights near Russian borders [60].

Thus, the UK is not only a major arms donor, but also one of the primary organizers of long-term military support for Ukraine. From 2022 to 2023, London provided emergency deliveries of anti-tank systems, artillery, armored vehicles, air defense systems, and long-range missiles. From 2024 to 2026, the focus shifted to the mass production of drones and missiles, localizing repairs, export credit financing, technology transfers, and multilateral procurement funds. In the Black Sea, Britain's involvement is evident in the training of marines and divers, the transfer of boats

and minehunters, the financing of maritime drones and radars, the support of mine countermeasure operations, and the insurance of shipping. Taken together, these measures have contributed to Ukraine's transition from an essentially nonexistent conventional fleet to an asymmetric naval warfare model based on small boats, unmanned systems, long-range strikes, and distributed surveillance. London has become one of the main architects of the Kiev regime's war machine, working to increase the risk of an open confrontation with Moscow [1].

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GERMANY

Since the beginning of the special military operation to defend Donbass German assistance to Ukraine has evolved from targeted arms supplies into a formalized strategic partnership.

Since 2025, Germany has been the primary provider of military assistance to Ukraine, surpassing the US [1, 3]. The volume of actual military aid Germany has provided since 2022 is estimated at \$31.8 billion [4].

Germany's approach is based on multi-year budget planning for military support to Ukraine. In 2024, Germany pledged to provide \$8.07 billion in military assistance [5]. The Bundestag Budget Committee approved a long-term military assistance package worth more than \$12.5 billion in 2025, allocating an additional \$3.4 billion for that year and bringing the total assistance to \$7.9 billion. The remaining approximately \$9.09 billion will be allocated through 2029 [6]. In March and April of 2026, Germany allocated an additional \$4.77 billion in military assistance, primarily for air defense systems and drones. The initial 2026 budget proposal was \$9.66 billion, but the final amount could reach \$13 billion [6, 7]. Germany's defense spending will gradually increase through 2029, reaching 3.5% of GDP.

On February 16, 2024, German Chancellor O. Scholz and V. Zelensky signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Security and Long-Term Support. The 10-year document enshrines Germany's commitment to providing Ukraine with military, political, financial, and humanitarian assistance. It also confirms support for Kiev's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including potential NATO membership, and covers cooperation in the defense industry, joint procurement, and other forms of military collaboration. In the event of a future conflict with Russia, the agreement provides for consultations to determine the necessary countermeasures. It also stipulates that Germany will support Ukraine "for as long as necessary" [8, 9].

Germany has been an active member of multilateral procurement mechanisms, having participated four times in the

PURL initiative, which allows allies to finance the purchase of priority US military equipment for Ukraine. In June 2026, Berlin allocated \$300 million through PURL and an additional \$200 million through the JUMPSTART³ program to purchase PAC-3 guided missiles for Patriot systems [10, 11]. At the June 2026 NATO defense ministers' meeting in the "Ramstein" format, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden provided the majority of assistance through PURL. Additionally, Germany participates in the European SAFE⁴ program and actively uses the European Peace Facility [2]. German officials emphasize that such mechanisms are powerful tools for strengthening European collective defense.

Energy security holds an important place in Germany's support model. As of April 2026, Germany was the largest donor to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund, having contributed \$628 million in grant assistance [12–14]. Since 2022, Germany has provided Ukraine with over \$1.2 billion in energy assistance. Over 100 German companies have supplied approximately 22,000 pieces of equipment to repair and maintain Ukraine's critical infrastructure. Germany has also made hundreds of humanitarian equipment deliveries with a total weight of thousands of tons [12]. In 2026, Berlin and its European allies plan to raise approximately \$5.68 billion to cover urgent needs in Ukraine's energy sector [14].

Germany is actively involved in training Ukrainian servicemen. Since mid-2022, approximately 26,000 Ukrainian soldiers have undergone training in Germany under the coordination of the Multinational Special Training Command (ST-C). Germany plans to train up to 9,000 more Ukrainian soldiers by the end of 2026 [15, 16]. As part of the EU's EUMAM Ukraine⁵ mission [3], ST-C

³ JUMPSTART is a US procurement mechanism for the expedited delivery of military equipment, services, training, and components to Ukraine through the Foreign Military Sales system, i.e. intergovernmental procurement from the US Department of Defense.

⁴ SAFE is an EU financial instrument launched in May 2025 for the rapid expansion of European countries' defense capabilities.

⁵ The EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine is a joint EU initiative launched in late 2022 to provide training for Ukrainian soldiers in European countries.

coordinates and plans all training activities for the AFU in Germany. Training includes basic weapons handling, marksmanship, medical training, engineering training, and collective training of units at various levels. Ukrainian crews are being trained in Germany as part of preparations for the transfer of PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers [5].

Another area of German support has been developing defense industry cooperation. In October 2023, the German defense company Rheinmetall and Ukraine's defense industry formed the joint venture Rheinmetall-UDI LLC. By the end of 2026, Rheinmetall plans to open a factory in Ukraine that will produce 155mm artillery shells. Once it reaches its full capacity, the plant will be able to produce a six-figure number of finished shells annually. In June 2026, Rheinmetall launched its first joint workshop in Ukraine for repairing and producing armored vehicles. That same month, a workshop for repairing Marder infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard 1 tanks was established [17]. Rheinmetall plans to begin servicing tanks in Ukraine by the end of August 2026. In the second half of 2026, Rheinmetall and Destinus intend to establish a joint venture, Rheinmetall Destinus Strike Systems, to develop advanced missile systems. In addition, in September 2025, German Defense Minister B. Pistorius announced a new initiative to purchase thousands of long-range drones from Ukraine's defense industry for \$341 million [6].

On June 30, 2026, Rheinmetall received a Ukrainian contract worth tens of millions of dollars to supply 155mm artillery shells and propellant charges. In May of the same year, the company's CEO confirmed that Rheinmetall could supply Ukraine with up to 100,000 shells of that caliber. Production has already begun, and deliveries under the contract are scheduled for completion in the first quarter of 2027 [18–21].

Berlin has provided Kiev with a broad range of weapons, progressively expanding throughout the assistance packages. In 2024, it included 36 tanks and wheeled howitzers from industrial stocks, two additional air defense systems, and IRIS-T missiles [5]. In November 2025, Germany announced a major package that

included 10 Leopard 1A5 tanks, 14 Bandvagn 206 tracked all-terrain vehicles, five Warthog ambulances, 10 Vector reconnaissance drones, 14 GO12 ground surveillance radars, and 1.4 million rounds of small arms ammunition [22]. In 2026, Germany allocated \$4.8 billion in military assistance, primarily for air defense and drones. Several additional assistance packages were announced, including a \$1.5 billion package containing four IRIS-T SLM air defense systems, 20,000 artillery shells, and anti-tank mines [23, 24].

As of mid-2026, three IRIS-T SLM systems have been deployed in Ukraine, and there are plans to deploy two more by the end of the year. Germany has transferred a total of six IRIS-T SLM and six IRIS-T SLS systems to Ukraine. In 2024, it was reported that Germany would finance 12 medium-range IRIS-T SLM systems and 12 more short-range IRIS-T SLS systems. Seven of these systems had been delivered by mid-2026: four SLMs and three SLSs. In June 2026, German Defense Minister B. Pistorius confirmed that an additional IRIS-T system had been transferred and that deliveries of IRIS-T SLS and SLM guided missiles had been accelerated [5, 23, 24].

Additionally, Germany will supply an unspecified number of air-to-air missiles from its own stockpile. The 2026 packages include additional IRIS-T SLS launchers, two Patriot launchers, and a third Patriot system with missiles [23, 24]. Deliveries of Skyranger 35 systems on Leopard 1 chassis, along with ammunition for them, are ongoing, as are deliveries of hundreds of thousands of rounds for Gepard anti-aircraft systems. Two Kinetic Defense Vehicle systems, two TRML-4D radars, and four anti-drone sensors and jammers have been delivered [22].

The most significant artillery program is the supply of 54 RCH 155 self-propelled howitzers, which were ordered in 2022. The first RCH 155 was delivered in January 2025, and full-scale deliveries are expected in 2026. Under a new \$1.3 billion package, Ukraine will receive an additional 18 PzH 2000 and 18 RCH 155 self-propelled howitzers [25]. Earlier, in September 2024, the transfer of an additional 12 PzH 2000 systems was announced (six

in 2024 and six in 2025). Thus, in addition to the 14 PzH 2000 systems transferred in 2022, Germany will supply up to 18 more in 2026–2027 [26].

Additionally, under various packages, Germany has transferred three HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, three Zuzana 2 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 73 MRAP vehicles, and 54 M113 armored personnel carriers. In 2024, 120,000 Soviet-made 122mm artillery shells were delivered [5, 25]. A total of \$3.4 billion has been allocated for artillery ammunition [6].

In 2024, Germany supplied Ukraine with 20 Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles. In June 2026, Germany delivered an additional 20 vehicles. Leopard 1A5 tanks accounted for a significant portion of the country's armored assistance. Ten were delivered in November 2025, and an additional 25 were delivered in two batches in June 2026. Germany and Denmark had previously facilitated the transfer of 58 tanks of this type, and another 77 vehicles are planned to be supplied with the participation of Denmark and the Netherlands [5, 22]. Ukraine also received 120mm shells for Leopard 2 tanks.

In 2026, the range of armored vehicles was expanded to include 30 MRAP vehicles, 50 ATF Dingo 2 armored vehicles, 14 Bandvagn 206 tracked transporters, five Warthogs, and eight Caracals. The engineering component included one Bergepanzer 2 armored recovery vehicle, four WiSENT 1 MC mine-clearance vehicles, two Biber bridge-laying vehicles, two Pionierpanzer 2A1 Dachs armored engineering vehicles, and 12 armored vehicles equipped with kinetic protection systems [22].

A total of \$1.02 billion has been allocated for unmanned systems. In November 2025, 10 Vector drones were delivered. The 2026 packages included 600 HF-1 strike drones, 46 RQ-35 Heidruns, 50 Vectors, 43 Songbirds, and other reconnaissance UAVs, for a total of more than 700 units [6, 22]. Previous supplies included 150 HF-1s, 10 Sonobot maritime drones, 70 Vectors, 12 Hornet XRs, 100 RQ-35 Heidruns, 120 Songbirds, 60 Golden Eagles, and two VT-4 Rochens. Exact quantities for a number of items have not been disclosed.

By 2026, German assistance to Ukraine had evolved from targeted arms supplies into a comprehensive system of strategic support covering the military, financial, energy, and industrial sectors. Berlin established a sustainable mechanism for multi-year budget planning, formalized its commitments through a bilateral agreement, and became the largest provider of military assistance to Ukraine. Focus on air defense, artillery, and unmanned systems; participation in international procurement initiatives; conducting large-scale personnel training; and development of defense-industrial cooperation with Rheinmetall demonstrate a systemic approach.

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GREECE

While it is not a major supplier of heavy equipment to the AFU, it plays a crucial role in supplying weapons, military and special-purpose equipment, and ammunition; training Ukrainian servicemen; and facilitating Western assistance logistics through its territory. Greece's importance stems from obsolete Soviet- and US-made systems it stores, its ability to participate in arms-exchange arrangements with Germany, its control over important logistics facilities in the eastern Mediterranean, and its cautious approach to transferring air defense systems amid continued tensions with Turkey.

On February 26, 2022, Greek Prime Minister K. Mitsotakis held a meeting with Defense Minister N. Panagiotopoulos, after which the dispatch of military equipment to Ukraine was announced [1]. The equipment was delivered by two C-130 military transport aircraft that flew to Poland to transfer the cargo to Ukraine. The first shipment included ammunition, small arms (Kalashnikov assault rifles of various modifications), and anti-tank weapons [2]. At the same time, Athens provided humanitarian assistance, enabling the Greek government to present its support for Ukraine as encompassing military, political, and humanitarian measures.

By mid-2024, Greece had supplied Ukraine with 20,000 155mm artillery shells, Stinger MANPADS, and 40 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles [3]. The transfer of the BMP-1s was formalized on September 18, 2022, under an agreement with Germany. In exchange for 40 Marder infantry fighting vehicles from Berlin, Athens supplied Ukraine with 40 Soviet-made vehicles [4]. This decision had dual significance for Greece, both enabling Athens to provide Kiev with equipment that was compatible with Ukraine's existing maintenance and repair infrastructure and accelerating the modernization of its own mechanized units with German vehicles. However, Athens was particularly cautious regarding air defense systems because the Greek government deemed its S-300 and Patriot systems essential to national security and unavailable for transfer to Ukraine.

In March 2024, Athens notified EU bodies responsible for coordinating assistance to Kiev of its readiness to supply Ukraine with another batch of weapons and ammunition through the Czech Republic without reducing its own stockpiles to critically low levels. The equipment was expected to be sold to the Czech side and then transferred directly to Ukraine [5]. The list included 2,000 127mm Zuni unguided air-to-ground rockets, 180 70mm aircraft rockets, 90,000 90mm rounds, anti-aircraft weapons, four million rounds of small arms ammunition, and 70 US-made M114A1 155mm towed howitzers. The M114A1 howitzers were held in Greek army stockpiles and had long been considered unnecessary for the Greek armed forces' current operational requirements. Using the Czech channel allowed Athens to incorporate the transfer of equipment into the existing European system for supplying Ukraine while also mitigating the risk of directly weakening its own defense capabilities.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms provides additional confirmation of the use of the Czech channel. According to the 2025 report, Greece exported 66 M110A2 203mm self-propelled howitzers, 68 M114 155mm towed howitzers, and 56 M101 105mm towed howitzers to the Czech Republic [6]. The Czech Republic is listed as the end importer in UN documents, and the basis for the supplies is identified as a bilateral agreement between Greece and the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is one of the main intermediaries in the European system of military assistance to Ukraine and does not operate such systems in its own armed forces, so these artillery systems were intended for subsequent transfer to the AFU.

At the same time, however, Greece has consistently limited the transfer to Ukraine of systems considered critical to its own defense capabilities. The most sensitive issue concerned the S-300 and Patriot air defense systems operated by the Greek armed forces. In April 2024, Greek Prime Minister K. Mitsotakis stated that Athens would not transfer either the S-300 or the Patriot systems to Kiev, despite appeals from its EU and NATO allies. According to Mitsotakis, these systems are critical to Greece's deterrence

capabilities and are necessary to protect its national airspace. This position is linked to Athens's continued focus on protecting the Aegean Islands and its eastern flank, as well as its consideration of ongoing disagreements with Turkey regarding maritime borders, airspace, and security in the eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, the Greek government was willing to transfer surplus or replaceable equipment to Ukraine but not air defense systems, the withdrawal of which could weaken national defense.

Nevertheless, Athens' refusal to transfer strategic air defense systems to Ukraine did not mean an end to Greece's assistance to Kiev in this area. In December 2024, the Greek government agreed to transfer 24 RIM-7 Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles from the country's Navy and Air Force stocks [7]. The missiles had been in service for approximately 40 years, and according to the Greek military leadership, they were no longer significant to the armed forces' current operational needs. For Ukraine, the shipment was of practical interest, as it helped replenish interceptor stocks. Ukraine also uses Sea Sparrow missiles in adapted air defense systems, including upgraded Soviet-made Buk systems employed as part of the FrankenSAM hybrid solutions program.

In 2025, Greece continued to participate in supplying Ukraine primarily through the Czech channel. In September 2025, a new package of weapons and ammunition was prepared for subsequent transfer to the AFU [8]. The Greek Ministry of National Defense intended to sell the Czech Republic 60 M110A2 203 mm self-propelled howitzers and 150,000 rounds of ammunition, as well as several thousand 70 mm and 127 mm unguided aircraft rockets, including Zuni rockets. The Greek General Staff classified this equipment as "not operationally necessary" since these systems no longer met the Greek armed forces' current requirements. According to Ukrainian and Greek sources, the package was worth a total of \$226 million. The proceeds were intended to modernize the Greek arsenal.

In 2026, Athens continued supplying the AFU with ammunition and obsolete weapons systems. Meanwhile, NATO allies pressured Greece to increase its support for Kiev. According to NATO

estimates, Athens should allocate approximately \$682 million to assist Ukraine for the remainder of 2026. While the Greek government acknowledges the necessity of supporting Kiev, it deems this sum too high for a single allocation and suggests dispersing it in several tranches of \$150–220 million. Meanwhile, Athens' position on strategic air defense systems has not changed. Greece continues to refuse to transfer Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine.

In addition to supplying weapons and ammunition, Greece participates in training Ukrainian servicemen. Its main assistance in this area is provided through two channels: the European Union Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) and the training of Ukrainian pilots and technical personnel for F-16 fighter aircraft.

In 2022, the training of Ukrainian military personnel was organized at the EU level. On October 17, 2022, the EU Council decided to establish EUMAM Ukraine [9]. The mission provides individual, collective, and specialized training for AFU personnel in EU member states. The mission began operating on November 15, 2022 [10]. Initially, the plan was to train up to 15,000 Ukrainian servicemen.

Greece's participation became more concrete in 2023. On August 21, 2023, following talks with Greek Prime Minister K. Mitsotakis, V. Zelensky said that Athens would join the training of Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighters [11]. This was of practical importance because the Hellenic Air Force has extensive experience operating various F-16 models. In October 2023, the Greek Ministry of National Defense confirmed that Greece continued to support Ukraine, both bilaterally and through EUMAM Ukraine, which included training Ukrainian F-16 pilots.

In November 2024, NATO Secretary General M. Rutte recognized Greece's contribution to training Ukrainian pilots and technicians [12]. At the same time, the EU extended EUMAM Ukraine's mandate for another two years, until November 15, 2026 [13].

According to the EU, more than 86,000 AFU personnel had been trained and equipped under EUMAM Ukraine by early 2026. Twenty-four EU member states participated in the training by providing training modules and instructors.

A significant milestone in formalizing Greek-Ukrainian cooperation was the signing of a security cooperation agreement on October 17, 2024, in Brussels during the European Council summit [14]. K. Mitsotakis and V. Zelensky signed the document, which established Greece's commitment to continuing to provide Ukraine with military, technical, and defense support, as well as participating in the training of Ukrainian servicemen. Athens also expressed its willingness to allocate more resources to expedite the training of Ukrainian pilots and technical personnel for F-16 fighter jets. Additionally, the agreement provides for the development of cooperation in the defense industry, security, and Ukraine's reconstruction.

Greece's geographic location is of great importance to its support of Ukraine. Following the outbreak of the conflict, Greek ports and military infrastructure became crucial for US and NATO logistics in Eastern Europe. The port of Alexandroupolis, located in northern Greece near the borders with Turkey and Bulgaria, occupies a particularly important position [15]. According to the US Department of Defense, access to the port has enabled the US military to continue supporting Ukraine and facilitating the movement of forces and cargo toward the eastern flank. The naval infrastructure in the Souda Bay area of Crete also remains important [16]. The base, which has an airfield, a deep-water pier, and refueling and resupply capabilities, is used by the US and its allies for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

For Greece, the Ukrainian track is linked not only to military logistics but also to the security of the Black Sea and Odesa. On March 6, 2024, Greek Prime Minister K. Mitsotakis visited Odesa, where he held talks with V. Zelensky [17]. The two leaders first toured the Port of Odesa, where the Greek delegation received a briefing on the operation of the grain export corridor through the Black Sea and Danube. During the meeting, Mitsotakis reaffirmed

Greece's support for Ukraine. Athens expressed its readiness to participate in Ukraine's reconstruction, focusing on Odesa. The Ukrainian side also emphasized the need to strengthen Odesa's air defenses and protect its civilian, port, and cultural infrastructure.

In 2025, Greece's importance as a NATO logistics hub remained unchanged. In February 2025, the port of Alexandroupolis was used to deploy NATO forces to Eastern Europe as part of the Steadfast Dart 2025 exercise [18]. According to NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Alexandroupolis was one of the key points for deploying NATO allied rapid-reaction forces.

Ukraine is also important for Greece in terms of the development of transport corridors between the Black Sea, Southeastern Europe (SEE), and the Mediterranean. On June 11, 2025, K. Mitsotakis participated in the fourth Ukraine–Southeastern Europe summit in Odesa. He stated that Athens views southern Ukraine as an important link between the Black Sea, Southeastern Europe, and the Mediterranean.

In August 2025, cooperation between Greece and Ukraine in Odessa gained further momentum. During a telephone conversation with Zelensky, Mitsotakis proposed an initiative for Greece to participate in Ukraine's reconstruction, including the restoration of Odesa's port infrastructure. For Athens, Odessa is part of a broader transportation network connecting Ukraine, the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean.

In 2026, Greece's geographic importance to Ukraine is evident in both military and energy logistics. Following intensified Russian strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, Kiev continued to use gas supply routes through Southeastern European countries [19]. Greek LNG terminals and the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline are considered one of the routes for supplying gas to Ukraine via Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova. In February 2026, the Greek joint venture Atlantic Sea LNG Trade, established by Aktor and DEPA, supplied US LNG to Ukraine via the Revithoussa terminal and the Trans-Balkan route [20]. In March 2026, Naftogaz of

Ukraine expressed interest in increasing LNG and diesel fuel imports through Greece.

Greece also participates in pan-European and NATO mechanisms supporting Ukraine. Through the EU, Athens participates in decisions related to the European Peace Facility (EPF). The EPF finances and reimburses the provision of military assistance to Ukraine, including the supply of weapons, military and special-purpose equipment, ammunition, fuel, and protective gear, as well as the training of Ukrainian servicemen. According to the EU Council, \$7.27 billion was mobilized through the EPF for Ukraine's military support from 2022 to 2026 [21].

At the NATO level, Greece joined the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative. This initiative allows for the purchase of weapons and ammunition for the AFU from US stockpiles using funds provided by allies and partners. Under the PURL initiative, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe regularly determines which weapons Ukraine needs and can receive more quickly from the US than from European states. These primarily include air defense systems, missiles, and ammunition. In December 2025, Athens notified NATO and the US of its readiness to contribute \$22.7 million to the PURL mechanism.

Greece's defense industry is also of particular importance. After 2022, Athens began restoring and expanding its production of NATO-standard artillery shells. The main project is a collaboration between the state-owned company Hellenic Defence Systems and the Czech company Czechoslovak Group. On January 30, 2026, the two companies signed an agreement to establish the joint venture Hellenic Ammunition S.A. at a production facility in Lavrion [22]. This project aims to restore large-caliber ammunition production in Greece, particularly 155mm artillery shells.

The Lavrion facility has already begun producing 155mm ammunition. In the second half of 2026, production of base bleed units for artillery shells is planned to begin, allowing firing range to be increased. Another area of focus is the restoration of TNT production. Its launch is scheduled for the end of 2026. The project

also includes the production of intermediate products required for the full-cycle manufacture of explosives.

The Lavrion project's importance goes beyond Greece itself and covers the European defense industry as a whole. Total long-term investment in the joint venture could reach \$94 million. Currently, the facility employs approximately 120 people, and an additional 180 employees are expected to be hired in 2026, bringing the total staff to around 300. Greece is thus seeking to transition from supplying stockpiled equipment to participating in the long-term production of NATO-standard ammunition in demand among the armed forces of EU and NATO countries, as well as Ukraine.

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DENMARK

Since the beginning of Russia's special military operation to defend Donbass, Danish assistance to Ukraine has evolved from emergency support measures into a formalized strategic security partnership. In terms of military support relative to GDP, Denmark ranks high among the leading countries, with the figure standing at approximately 2.75% [1].

Denmark's approach is founded on the special national "Ukraine Fund" (Ukrainefonden), which was established in March 2023 to ensure continuous support for the Kiev regime. The fund's initial military component for 2023–2028 was set at \$10.65 billion. It has been replenished several times since then. Taking planned increases into account, the fund's total volume, including its military and civilian components, is expected to reach approximately \$11.5 billion. In 2025, additional allocations under the fund amounted to \$1.6 billion; in 2026, \$1.1 billion; and in 2027, \$852 million [2]. Copenhagen initially reserved \$1.46 billion for 2026, but in February, the government allocated an additional \$578 million to the Ukraine Fund. Including the expected \$91.3 million in proceeds from the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Argentina, Denmark's total assistance in 2026 will reach \$2.13 billion [3; 4; 5]. Following the approval of the additional tranche, Denmark's defense spending in 2026 will reach 3.5% of its GDP, enabling the country to meet NATO requirements. Under the fund's military component, approximately \$1.08 billion is planned for 2027 and approximately \$167.3 million for 2028 [2].

On February 23, 2024, Danish Prime Minister M. Frederiksen and V. Zelensky signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Security and Long-Term Support. The 10-year document establishes Denmark's commitment to providing Ukraine with military, financial, and humanitarian assistance; supporting its aviation and air defense; supplying weapons and ammunition; and training its military personnel. The agreement contains standard provisions on supporting Ukraine's future membership in the EU

and NATO, its reform agenda, and cooperation in the defense industry, intelligence, and cybersecurity [6].

Denmark is actively involved in multilateral mechanisms. Through the PURL initiative, which enables allies to finance the procurement of essential US defense equipment, Denmark, alongside Sweden and Norway, financed an initial package that included Patriot air defense system missiles. The 28th military assistance package allocated \$56.6 million to PURL. In June 2026, Denmark and Sweden expressed their readiness to facilitate the supply of US weapons through NATO. Additionally, Denmark is a key architect of the “Danish model,” a mechanism that directly finances arms purchases from Ukrainian manufacturers. Denmark was the first country to adopt this approach in 2024. Together with the EU and other partners, more than \$2.59 billion has been raised through the mechanism. In 2025, \$395.5 million was allocated to the Danish model. Approximately \$152.1 million is planned annually for 2026–2027, while an additional \$304.2 million will be allocated to strengthen Ukraine’s defense industry [7].

Energy security is a key component of Denmark’s support model. Denmark was the first country to contribute to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund [8]. As of November 2025, Denmark’s contribution totaled approximately \$66 million. Most of this funding was allocated to purchasing critical equipment for the Nikolaev region [8; 9]. Nikolaev and the surrounding region are being rebuilt with significant Danish investment, primarily in infrastructure and energy. In 2025, funding for the Ukraine Fund’s civilian component increased to \$258.6 million. Since 2022, the total amount of assistance provided has reached \$1.08 billion. The funds are directed toward reconstruction, anti-corruption efforts, energy infrastructure, and the “green” transition [7]. In January 2026, Denmark allocated an additional \$22.8 million to the energy sector, \$12.2 million of which went to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund [10]. Additionally, the Danish government provided a \$433.5 million state guarantee for Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure development [11].

Copenhagen has provided Kiev with a broad range of weapons. In aviation, these include F-16 fighters (six of which were delivered in 2024, with a total of 19 promised) [12; 13]. In terms of tanks and armored vehicles, Denmark has provided 15 Leopard 1A5 tanks jointly with Germany (with at least 100 planned under the project), an additional 45 tanks (30 Leopard 1s and 15 upgraded T-72s), 14 Leopard 2s jointly with the Netherlands, M113G4DK armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles. In artillery, Denmark has supplied self-propelled artillery systems and 15,000 155mm shells. Denmark has supplied air defense systems, including missiles for Patriot and NASAMS systems (AIM-9 and AIM-120), Tridon Mk2 anti-aircraft systems, and portable air defense systems. Naval equipment includes Harpoon anti-ship missiles, RHIB landing craft, and coastal defense equipment. Additionally, Denmark has supplied anti-tank mines, radars, communications equipment, drones, 21 demining robots, portable mine clearance systems, electronic warfare equipment, 15 generators, 15,000 sets of protective clothing, nine mobile repair stations for heavy equipment, six hangar tents, and large quantities of ammunition, including 5.56mm and 12.7mm rounds, as well as propellant charges for 155mm shells [14; 15]. Exact quantities have not been disclosed for several items.

By 2026, Danish assistance to Ukraine had evolved into systematic strategic support encompassing military, financial, energy, and industrial spheres. Copenhagen developed a sustainable national financing mechanism, formalized its commitments through a bilateral agreement, and pioneered the direct financing of Ukraine's defense industry. Active participation in international procurement initiatives, energy assistance, and the supply of a broad range of weapons demonstrates a comprehensive approach.

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SPAIN

Since the beginning of the conflict, Spain's assistance to Ukraine has gradually evolved from individual deliveries of weapons and materiel into a systematic model of military support. This model encompasses annual funding, the transfer of heavy armored vehicles and air defense systems, the training of AFU personnel, and the involvement of national defense industry enterprises.

In 2022, Spain started providing weapons, military equipment, special-purpose equipment, ammunition, protective gear, and other supplies. The supplies were delivered via military transport aircraft, road transport, and maritime vessels. Most air shipments were transported through Rzeszów Airport in Poland, while maritime shipments were sent from the Spanish ports of Bilbao and Ferrol to the Polish port of Gdynia, followed by onward transfer to Ukraine [1].

Air defense became one of the main areas of assistance. In 2022, Spain transferred the first four HAWK SAM launchers with missiles and auxiliary equipment to Ukraine, as well as one Aspide anti-aircraft battery. The battery included launchers, at least six missiles, and a corresponding radar. At the same time, Ukrainian crews received training in operating the transferred systems. In subsequent years, Spain supplied at least 12 additional HAWK launchers. These were accompanied by at least 36 missiles, four radars, two target illumination stations, three tracked loaders, and trucks for maintaining the systems [1; 2].

Spain also supplied missiles for Mistral MANPADS, BMG-71 anti-tank guided missiles, C-90 anti-tank systems, small arms, ammunition, protective equipment, and medical supplies. In 2022, Spain became the first European country to send more than 77,000 sets of uniforms and cold-weather clothing to Ukraine. The deliveries included at least 5,000 protective helmets, 1,784 body armor vests, 800 CBRN protection kits, dosimeters, portable radios, night-vision devices, and more than 25 tons of food [3].

Medical assistance included a Role 2 Plus field hospital, ambulances, and medical supplies and equipment. In subsequent years, Spain transferred at least 49 ambulances and more than 66 tons of medical supplies.

The first specialized courses for AFU personnel began before the formal launch of the European EUMAM Ukraine mission. On September 19, 2022, 19 Ukrainian servicemen arrived at Zaragoza Air Base for six weeks of Aspide air defense system operation training. From November 8 to 18, an additional 21 servicemen received training on operating OTO Melara M-56 light 105mm howitzers at the Álvarez de Sotomayor Base in Viator, Almería Province. The training was conducted by specialists from the I/32 Field Artillery Group of the Melilla General Command [4].

Following the official launch of EUMAM Ukraine on November 15, 2022, Spain established the Toledo Training Coordination Center under the command of the Operational Command in Burgos. From November 15 to December 16, approximately 70 instructors from the 66th América Mountain Hunter Regiment conducted the first basic military training course for 65 Ukrainian servicemen. The training also involved the 1st Engineer Regiment and the 6th Almogávares Parachute Brigade. The program included the operation of Western weapons and equipment, tactical training, topographical training, firearms training, first aid training, and training in countering improvised explosive devices [4].

Meanwhile, five Ukrainian servicemen received specialized training at the Joint Cyber Command at Retamares Air Base in Madrid. They were trained to operate a deployable cyber defense center provided by Spain. In total, approximately 100 AFU personnel underwent training in four Spanish provinces in 2022 [4].

In 2023, Spain significantly expanded the range of heavy weapons it supplied. Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks formed the core of its armored assistance. The first ten vehicles were delivered in two batches. Before shipping, the tanks were refurbished and repaired at the GDELS–Santa Bárbara Sistemas facility in Alcalá

de Guadaira. The tanks were accompanied by spare parts, tools, repair equipment, ammunition, and technical documentation [5].

Throughout 2023, Spain continued to transfer M113 tracked armored personnel carriers, which are designated as TOAs in Spain. By June, Spain had confirmed the transfer of 40 vehicles and was preparing an additional batch of 20. The supplies included standard armored personnel carriers, command vehicles, ambulance variants, and mortar carrier platforms. Some M113s were equipped with Guardian 1.5 remotely controlled weapon stations. In July 2023, Spain sent another batch of Leopard 2A4 tanks, armored personnel carriers, ambulances, trucks, and ammunition [6].

Ukrainian crews began the first stage of training in the combat use of HAWK SAM systems in 2023. This training took place at the 74th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment at the El Copero Base in Dos Hermanas, Seville Province. Technical training and system maintenance were studied at the Cortijo de Buenavista Base in San Roque, Cádiz Province [7].

The 10th Alcántara Cavalry Regiment from Melilla trained Leopard 2A4 crews at the San Gregorio Training Area in Zaragoza Province. In February and March, 55 Ukrainian tank crews and technical specialists completed the course. The 1st Engineer Regiment conducted engineer training at the Cid Campeador Base in Castrillo del Val, Burgos Province [5; 7].

AFU command personnel underwent four-week urban warfare courses with instructors from Spain's 2nd King Alfonso XIII Brigade of the Spanish Legion in Viator. The 7th Galicia Light Airborne Brigade conducted training in assault operations and combat in wooded terrain at the General Morillo Base in Pontevedra. Military operations planning was studied at the General Albacete y Fuster Marine Infantry School in Tentegorra, Cartagena [7].

By the end of 2023, more than 3,000 AFU personnel had received training in Spain. Training programs included basic combined-arms training, operation of HAWK, Aspide, and Leopard 2A4 systems, engineering, artillery training, urban operations, tactical medicine, and unit operations planning [7].

In early 2024, approximately 100 Ukrainian servicemen completed the 13th basic military training course in Cádiz under the guidance of 40 Marine Corps instructors from the Tercio de Armada. Another 100 personnel completed the 14th course in Toledo. Specialized modules on countering improvised explosive devices and tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) tactical medicine were also conducted. Some classes were organized in cooperation with the British Interflex training mission [8].

The 9th Extremadura Brigade conducted training in Badajoz for M113 armored personnel carrier maintenance specialists. Courses for military engineers were organized in Burgos. The training program also included the operation and maintenance of HAWK, Patriot, and NASAMS systems; underwater mine clearance; armored vehicle repair; ground operations planning; and training for medical service specialists [8].

On February 23, 2024, Spain sent another shipment of M113 armored personnel carriers to Ukraine, including two armored ambulances. They were accompanied by firefighting and snow-clearing vehicles, two light boats, a generator, and a water purification unit [9].

In 2024, Spain prepared and transferred an additional 19 Leopard 2A4 tanks, bringing the total to 29. The tanks were accompanied by spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance equipment. Throughout the year, supplies of M113s, VAMTACs, trucks, ambulances, artillery ammunition, air defense equipment, anti-tank weapons, and unmanned systems continued [10].

On May 27, 2024, Spain and Ukraine signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement. The document provides for military, financial, and humanitarian assistance; the training of Ukrainian servicemen; the development of military-industrial cooperation; support for reforms; cybersecurity; and assistance to Kiev's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. Spain initially earmarked approximately \$1.14 billion in military assistance to implement the agreement; however, the actual value of its commitments for the year reached approximately \$1.22 billion [11].

In May 2024, Spain announced a new assistance package including additional Patriot missiles, HAWK ammunition, counter-drone systems, electro-optical surveillance equipment, remotely controlled weapon stations, armored vehicles, and 155mm artillery ammunition [10].

In September 2024, Madrid confirmed the transfer of additional air defense equipment and ammunition. This assistance included Patriot, HAWK, and Mistral missiles; counter-drone equipment; radar; electro-optical systems; and components for repairing and maintaining previously supplied systems [12].

By September 2024, the number of Ukrainian servicemen trained in Spain had exceeded 6,000. A total of 113 training modules in 21 specialties had been conducted. The training structure gradually shifted from basic combined-arms training toward specialized technical courses on operating Western weapons, maintaining armored vehicles, air defense, engineering, mine clearance, artillery observation, and tactical medicine [8].

In 2025, Spain continued supplying air defense systems, armored vehicles, guided weapons, ammunition, and equipment for operating unmanned systems. The Spanish package included additional HAWK launchers, Mistral MANPADS, C-90 anti-tank systems, guided missiles, night-vision devices, vehicle-mounted mortar systems, armored vehicles, and counter-drone equipment [13].

In November 2025, the Spanish government announced the mobilization of an additional \$699.7 million in military assistance. Of this amount, \$341.3 million was earmarked for purchasing new military equipment, \$113.8 million for acquiring US weapons through the PURL mechanism, and \$244.6 million for producing UAVs, radars, and other equipment under the European SAFE mechanism [13].

The most active phase of Ukrainian servicemen's training took place in 2025. The 26th basic military training course took place in Cádiz, and the 27th course took place in Toledo. Two hundred Ukrainian servicemen participated in each course. Portuguese military instructors were also involved in the training [14].

The 7th HAWK operation and maintenance module was conducted in Seville with the support of US and Romanian servicemen. The 6th and 7th M113 armored personnel carrier maintenance courses were organized in Badajoz; the 13th military engineers' course was organized in Burgos; the 4th counterterrorism module was organized in Logroño; and the 9th geospatial technologies module was organized in Madrid [14].

In April and May, dozens of Ukrainian servicemen completed the 9th Military Operations in Urban Terrain course in Almería, while another 47 personnel completed the eleventh Platoon Commander–Non-Commissioned Officer training program in Girona. The third stage of NASAMS combat-use training took place in Murcia. Simultaneously, the eighth HAWK operations course and the third training module for forward observers of field artillery were conducted in León [14].

From June to August 2025, the 11th specialized ground operations planning course was held in Cartagena, the 12th platoon commanders' course in Girona, the 14th military engineers' course in Burgos, the 4th Patriot combat-use course in Valencia, the 9th HAWK operation course in Seville, and the 8th M113 armored personnel carrier maintenance course in Girona [14].

By August 2025, more than 8,000 Ukrainian servicemen had undergone training through 185 basic, specialized, and advanced modules in over 30 areas. Courses were conducted in 17 provinces across the country. Approximately 6,000 Spanish servicemen from the army, navy, air force, general staff, joint corps, and civil guard participated in organizing the training throughout this period. Spain accounted for approximately 10% of the total number of Ukrainian servicemen trained in Europe, placing the country third among participants in the training mission [14].

On March 18, 2026, the Spanish government announced a new \$1.14 billion military assistance package for Ukraine. Some of the funds will be used for the joint production of missiles and ammunition guidance systems by Spanish and Ukrainian companies. With this decision, the total volume of Spanish military assistance since 2022 has reached \$4.32 billion [15].

On April 22, 2026, Spain's Ministry of Defense announced plans to supply another significant shipment of armored vehicles and 155mm artillery ammunition. According to Ukrainian and Spanish media outlets, the package includes 100 VAMTAC armored vehicles, the first of which were scheduled to arrive in May 2026 [16].

By 2026, more than 9,000 Ukrainian servicemen had been trained in Spain. Refresher courses continued on the operation and maintenance of HAWK, Leopard 2A4, and M113 systems, as well as on firearms training, engineering support, and operations planning. During the first half of the year, more than 50 servicemen spent a month in one module studying the repair and maintenance of M113 armored personnel carriers [17; 18].

Basic training in Spain lasted from five to seven weeks, while specialized training lasted approximately four weeks. Some narrowly focused theoretical courses lasted no more than two weeks, while complex technical and command programs could take six weeks or longer.

The average age of Ukrainian servicemen undergoing training gradually increased. In 2022–2023, it was under 35, while in 2024–2025 it exceeded 40. According to Spanish specialists, later on, more servicemen with limited combat experience or no prior military training arrived at training centers.

According to aggregate open-source data from 2022 to 2026, Spain made at least 153 deliveries to Ukraine, approximately 100 of which were military. Of these, at least 56 were delivered by military transport aircraft, 33 by road, and 12 by sea. The total weight of the delivered equipment reached 16,000 tons [1].

The consolidated list of Spanish air defense assistance included at least 12 HAWK launchers with at least 36 missiles, four radars, two target illumination stations, three tracked loaders, and maintenance trucks. Spain also transferred an Aspide battery with at least six missiles and a radar, more than 12 Patriot missiles, between six and 12 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, missiles for Mistral systems, BMG-71 anti-tank missiles, counter-drone systems, electro-optical equipment, and radar equipment [1; 2; 10; 12].

Armored and automotive equipment included 29 Leopard 2A4 tanks with spare parts and repair equipment; more than 65 M113 armored personnel carriers; at least five mortar-equipped vehicles; and two ambulance variants. Some of the armored personnel carriers were equipped with Guardian 1.5 remotely controlled weapon stations. Additionally, Spain provided approximately 11 VAMTAC vehicles, including six platforms equipped with Alakran mortars, five VAMTAC ST5 vehicles, 12 Toyota Land Cruiser off-road vehicles with Alakran mortars, eight Aníbal vehicles, one multipurpose vehicle, 19 trucks, and a new batch of 100 VAMTACs announced in April 2026 [1; 6; 16].

Additionally, Spain supplied at least 2,000 tons of diesel fuel, vehicle tires, spare parts, nine mobile heavy equipment repair stations, and six hangar tents.

The artillery and small arms included 10-18 Italian-made OTO Melara M-56 105mm light howitzers; self-propelled artillery systems; EMOc naval mortars; Alakran mortar systems; and hundreds of Guardian 1.5 and 30 remotely controlled weapon stations. Spain supplied over 2,663 anti-tank rocket launchers (primarily C-90s), over 128 machine guns and heavy machine guns, at least 30 MK-19 automatic grenade launchers, CETME L assault rifles, and other small arms [1; 2].

The ammunition included over 135,000 155mm shells, around 45,000 120mm shells, a substantial amount of 105mm ammunition, propellant charges, over 6 million rounds of 7.62mm and 12.7mm ammunition, and over 700,000 rounds for CETME L rifles. The country also supplied C-3-B and C-3-A anti-tank mines, mine-detection equipment, and mine-clearance equipment [1; 2].

The naval component included Harpoon anti-ship missiles, eight light rigid- and semi-rigid boats, at least three diving compressors, naval mortars, communications equipment, and coastal defense equipment. This equipment was intended for patrol, search, and diving operations; coastal defense; and restricting the operations of Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels in the northwestern Black Sea [2; 13].

Protective and clothing supplies included at least 5,000 protective helmets, 1,784 body armor vests, 800 CBRN protection kits, dosimeters, portable radios, night-vision devices, more than 77,000 sets of uniforms and cold-weather clothing, and more than 25 tons of food [3].

The medical assistance included a Role 2 Plus field hospital, at least 49 ambulances, and over 66 tons of medical supplies. The engineering and energy equipment included backhoe loaders, auxiliary firefighting vehicles, snowplows, water purification stations, 95 generators, and 163 high-voltage units. Spain also transferred a deployable cyber defense operations center and equipment for potential backup satellite coverage [1; 3; 9].

Thus, Spain has established a significant position in the European system of support for Ukraine by providing large-scale supplies of weapons, military and special-purpose equipment, and ammunition; an extensive training program; and a gradual transition toward long-term military-industrial cooperation. The most significant transfers have included HAWK, Aspide, Patriot, and Mistral systems; Leopard 2A4 tanks; M113 armored personnel carriers; VAMTAC vehicles; and artillery systems and ammunition. Training activities have been conducted across the country with Spanish, US, British, Portuguese, and Romanian instructors involved. The main focus has been training AFU command personnel, as well as training Ukrainian soldiers to operate and maintain sophisticated Western weapons, air defense systems, engineering equipment, and armored vehicles.

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ITALY

Italy has been a staunch supporter of the Kiev regime since the very beginning of the special military operation to defend Donbass. According to Italian Chief of Defense Staff Luciano Portolano, Rome has spent about \$3 billion procuring weapons and military and special-purpose equipment. On February 25, 2026, the Senate approved a bill authorizing the transfer of military equipment, supplies, and materials to Ukrainian authorities. This authorization has been extended till December 31, 2026. Priority is given to protection against air and missile strikes, logistics, medical supplies, and civilian equipment [1].

The Italian authorities have pursued a two-stage strategy. First, they have joined multilateral financial assistance mechanisms through the EU, World Bank, and NATO. Second, they have developed legislation to guarantee military support for Ukraine until 2027. Economically, Italy's approach is integrated into European and NATO frameworks, as confirmed by its \$443 million contribution to the European Peace Facility (EPF) and participation in World Bank financial assistance packages [2].

According to Italian experts, the total value of equipment supplied to the AFU does not include the costs of dozens of Italian Air Force cargo flights from Pratica di Mare to Rzeszów Airport in Poland. Italian experts also note that Rome's contribution to the EPF for Ukraine has not been included [3].

Direct financial support for the defense industry is provided through several channels. In particular, \$16.5 million was allocated to the Defense Industry Agency under Article 33 of the 2023 Labor Decree to "strengthen ammunition production to ensure supplies to the AFU" [4].

At the same time, Rome launched several programs to replenish and modernize its arsenals with the intention of supplying them to Kiev. One key initiative is a \$918.6 million program to purchase portable and vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft missile systems and launchers from MBDA Italia. These systems are intended to replace aging US -made Stinger missiles. Additionally, the second

phase of procuring Israeli Spike anti-tank missiles is underway. These missiles were sent to Ukraine at the beginning of the conflict, along with older Milan and Panzerfaust anti-tank missiles. Following an initial \$58 million decree submitted by the Defense Ministry in the summer of 2022, a second \$114 million decree was initiated in April 2024. Even before the conflict began, a new large-scale \$2.05 billion program was launched to procure RCH-155 self-propelled wheeled howitzers from the German Army, as well as five next-generation SAMP/T air defense systems, costing approximately \$568 million each, and the corresponding Aster 30 missiles, at approximately \$2 million each [5]. Two of the Italian Army's five older SAMP/T batteries were sent to Ukraine.

Unlike other Western countries, Rome does not publicly disclose the types of weapons provided in direct arms deliveries. However, according to Italian media reports, Ukraine received Iveco military trucks, FH-70 155mm towed howitzers, approximately 20 M109 self-propelled howitzers, and six PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers. The reports also mention a small number of VTML "Lince" light tactical vehicles; two M270A1 multiple launch rocket systems; MG 42/59 machine guns; 120mm mortars; Milan anti-tank guided missiles; Panzerfaust anti-tank grenades; Stinger MANPADS; and Browning M2 heavy machine guns. According to Italian observers, the conflict has provided a significant boost to the national defense industry. In the first year alone, defense company Leonardo's profits increased by 58%.

Additionally, Italian media report that Ukrainian servicemen are undergoing training in Italy. Despite Italy's Defense Ministry's initial denials in late 2022, Defense Minister Guido Crosetto acknowledged the training during a January 25, 2023, hearing before the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (Copasir). As *Corriere della Sera* reported, the previous cabinet headed by Mario Draghi initiated the training of Ukrainian servicemen [6].

Thus, Italy's policy regarding Ukraine is integrated into the broader Western approach, with Rome providing active military support to Ukraine. However, unlike other European countries,

Italy does not publish open data on assistance to the Kiev regime, deliberately creating an impression of a lower level of involvement in the conflict.

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CANADA

Canada has been one of the most vocal proponents of assistance to Ukraine since 2014. In 2015, Ottawa launched Operation UNIFIER, which aimed at reforming and training the AFU to NATO standards. This laid the foundation for a long-term partnership between the two countries. From February 2022 to October 2023, Canadian instructors trained more than 16,000 Ukrainian servicemen under the program [1]. On February 24, 2026, Canada announced an extension of the program through 2029. As of mid-June 2026, approximately 300 Canadian specialists were involved in Operation UNIFIER. These specialists train AFU personnel in engineering skills, such as detecting and neutralizing explosive devices, overcoming obstacles, military medicine, and surviving in combat conditions.

Canadian leaders, including Prime Ministers J. Trudeau and M. Carney, have repeatedly stated their commitment to supporting Ukraine "for as long as it takes" to "restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity." These commitments are enshrined in the February 24, 2024 security agreement, which provides 10 years of assistance with the possibility of extension. The agreement also includes provisions for intelligence sharing, joint defense industry projects, and an emergency response mechanism.

Canada views its assistance to Ukraine as an investment in European and global security and emphasizes the importance of integrating Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic structures. Ukrainian officials regularly highlight the timeliness and effectiveness of the assistance and Canada's contribution to enhancing the combat capabilities of the AFU. Although European media and analysts at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy highly rate Canada's assistance, they sometimes criticize it for excessive bureaucracy and relatively smaller volumes compared with the US or Germany.

Taking into account the latest \$190.6 million assistance package announced in May 2026, total financial support since 2022 has reached \$17.6 billion [2]. This sum consists primarily of \$9.17 billion in direct financial assistance. Of this amount, \$8.15 billion

was provided through a special account established by the IMF in April 2022; \$1.37 billion was provided through multilateral development banks; and \$352.9 million was provided through direct bilateral loans. Additionally, in October 2025, Canada allocated approximately \$3.4 billion to Ukraine through the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) mechanism, which uses proceeds from frozen Russian assets. The funds are intended to support Ukraine's macroeconomic stability, pay pensions and public-sector salaries, and provide other basic services [2]. More than \$523.2 million was additionally allocated for infrastructure reconstruction, including energy facilities and agricultural equipment.

Military assistance is estimated at \$6 billion [3]. The Department of National Defense handles military coordination through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and direct bilateral contacts with Ukrainian officials. In the area of air defense, on September 17, 2023, Canada announced the allocation of \$23.29 million under a partnership to provide Ukraine with priority equipment [4]. From March 2023 to December 2025, Canada will provide 12 AIM-120 AMRAAM advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, 43 AIM-9 missiles, 250 AIM-7 missiles, 233 AIM-9M rocket motors, and 125 AIM-7 missile components. On November 20, 2024, a mobile NASAMS air defense system arrived in Ukraine. On May 10, 2024, Ottawa allocated \$53.65 million to Germany's Enhanced Air Defense Action (EAAD) initiative in support of Ukraine. Launched in April 2024, the initiative aims to pool financial resources to quickly identify and deliver air defense systems to Ukraine.

In January–February 2023, the AFU received eight Leopard 2A4 tanks, including spare parts and ammunition [5]. The tanks were supplied from storage facilities in Edmonton, Alberta, and the 5th Canadian Division Support Base in Gagetown, New Brunswick. The Canadian Air Force transported all eight tanks by CC-177 Globemaster III aircraft. From February to October 2023, Canadian Armed Forces personnel, along with multinational partners, trained approximately 190 Ukrainian soldiers in the

fundamentals of operating Leopard 2 tanks. In June of that year, Canada allocated \$21.1 million to establish a maintenance center for these tanks in Poland. In July 2025, Ottawa announced an additional \$14.1 million to support the center [6].

A significant portion of the military assistance consists of ammunition supplies. From April 2022 to January 2025, Canada supplied approximately 40,000 155mm shells worth about \$221.46 million [6]. From March to June 2023, more than 10,000 105mm shells were delivered to Ukraine, including approximately 1,800 rounds for Leopard 1 tanks [7]. In September 2023, Ottawa supplied 955 smoke rounds for 155mm artillery and more than 2,000 smoke rounds for 81mm mortars [8]. On October 11, 2023, various types of 76mm naval ammunition were transferred. On the same day, Canada transferred 277 aerial bombs and the corresponding fuze kits. In September 2024, more than 130,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were supplied. On January 9, 2025, Canada announced the transfer of 30mm and 155mm shells worth \$63.6 million [3]. On June 4, 2025, it was revealed that Canada had transferred 40mm to 84mm rounds, various fuzes, solid propellant, and underwater charges [3]. On August 24, 2025, \$70.6 million was allocated under the Czech ammunition procurement initiative [9].

Artillery also plays an important role in military supplies. From April to June of 2022, for example, Canada transferred four M777 howitzers and 10 replacement barrels to Ukraine at a cost of \$6.4 million. In spring 2022, Canadian military specialists trained AFU personnel to operate these guns [3].

Particular attention is being paid to cooperation in the air domain. As part of the fighter coalition, Canada has allocated \$10.5 million to provide instructors, aircraft, and support personnel hired from the Montreal-based company Top Aces Inc. These efforts support Denmark and France in training Ukrainian pilots and technical personnel to operate F-16 fighter aircraft. On July 11, 2024, an additional \$274.6 million was allocated to enhance F-16 pilot training under the coalition, further building the capabilities of the Ukrainian Air Force. On February 24, 2025, four F-16 flight

simulators, developed by the Canadian aerospace company CAE, arrived in Ukraine to improve the effectiveness of the AFU's pilot training. Additionally, Ukrainian servicemen received English-language training at the Canadian Armed Forces Language School. From January 2024 to May 2025, 34 servicemen completed the training [3].

Of separate note is UAV cooperation. On March 7, 2024, Canada joined the Drone Capability Coalition led by Latvia and the UK within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group [11]. On October 18, 2024, Canada announced the allocation of \$3.53 million to the Drone Capability Development Fund [12]. Two days earlier, an additional \$8.4 million was allocated to the coalition's general fund [13]. Based on the innovative "Danish Model" defense procurement financing mechanism, Ottawa allocated \$98.8 million from January to February 2025 to support military drone production and provide the AFU with the necessary equipment.

On May 8, 2022, Ottawa transferred 18 drone cameras to Kiev, along with technical support and repair services from L3 Wescam, a leading manufacturer of advanced electro-optical and infrared surveillance and targeting systems [14]. By September 2023, a total of \$78.5 million had been allocated for UAV optical equipment. On January 9, 2025, 16 MX-15s and 13 MX-20s were delivered [15]. According to the Canadian government, 140 optical and infrared surveillance systems had been supplied to Ukraine since 2022. On February 19, 2024, Canadian Minister of National Defense Bill Blair announced the transfer of over 900 Canadian-made SkyRanger R70 multipurpose UAVs to Ukraine [16]. As of June 2025, 890 of these drones had been supplied to Europe. On April 26, 2024, Ottawa and London jointly allocated \$2.11 million to Kiev for local drone production. This was notably the first time Canada had directly participated in the production of military drones in Ukraine since the beginning of Russia's SMO.

Alongside UAVs, Ottawa has paid particular attention to developing cooperation in high technology. On October 18, 2024, Ottawa announced the allocation of \$1.4 million for participation

in an alliance to develop information technology and support Ukraine in strengthening its cyber capabilities [12].

In May 2022, eight armored vehicles purchased from the Canadian defense manufacturer Roshel arrived in Ukraine [3]. Then, on June 30, 2022, 39 Armored Combat Support Vehicles (ACSVs), valued at \$172.9 million, were shipped from Ontario via Europe [17]. The initial batch of ten ACSV vehicles consisted of medical evacuation variants equipped with a full set of medical equipment for safely evacuating and treating wounded personnel. Developed by General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada, the ACSV series is built on the LAV 6.0 light armored vehicle chassis and is designed to provide a wide range of tactical support on the battlefield. In addition to offering high mobility and reliable protection in high-risk environments, the vehicles are equipped with advanced communication systems and modern ballistic protection to ensure the safety of crews and transported equipment. On October 10, 2022, alongside the supplies, Canadian military specialists began training AFU operators and technical personnel. By the end of 2025, 89 vehicles had been delivered. On January 18, 2023, the transfer of an additional 200 commercial-model Senator armored vehicles, valued at over \$64.9 million, was announced [18]. These vehicles enable the safe transportation of personnel and equipment, as well as medical evacuations. Delivery was completed in the summer of 2023.

In the summer of 2025, Ukraine received another shipment of Coyote and Bison armored vehicles, supplementing the initial delivery of 64 vehicles that entered AFU service in December 2024 [19].

Canada also transferred approximately 100 Carl Gustaf M2 anti-tank grenade launchers and more than 3,000 84mm rounds. In March 2022, the AFU received 4,200 M72A5-C1 rocket launchers and 7,000 C13 hand grenades [20].

On September 6, 2024, the phased transfer of more than 80,000 CRV-7 rocket motors and warheads to Ukraine was reported [3]. The first 2,160 warheads, which were announced in June of that year, arrived in Ukraine in September. The remaining 1,280

warheads were supplied in December 2024. The full delivery of the CRV-7 rocket motors was completed in April 2025. In October 2025, Canada supplied Ukraine with 38 LAU-7A rocket launchers [13].

Small arms and ammunition account for a substantial share of the supplies. In 2022, Canada sent 78 medium- and large-caliber sniper rifles; more than 200 machine guns, including light C9 and medium C6 machine guns, from Canadian Armed Forces stocks; 600 Glock pistols; 7,000 anti-tank rockets; 700 carbines; and 1.5 million rounds of ammunition [21]. In April 2023, Colt Canada announced a small-arms assistance package worth approximately \$41.6 million [22]. This package included 21,000 5.56mm assault rifles, 38 7.62mm machine guns, and over 2.4 million rounds of ammunition for these weapons [22]. At the same time, Ukraine received 40 .50-caliber sniper systems with ammunition and spare parts from Prairie Gun Works Defence Technologies worth \$1.76 million [3]. On November 14, 2025, Ottawa announced its readiness to allocate an additional \$71 million to supply small arms and ammunition from Canadian industrial partners. In June 2024, Canada announced the transfer of 29 Nanuk remotely controlled weapon systems, manufactured by Rheinmetall Canada and used on light armored vehicles, to Ukraine [23].

Canada has been actively supplying Ukraine with various types of military equipment. From February 2022 to October 16, 2025, Kiev received 2,260 gas masks, 140 Moskito thermal imaging devices, and 10,800 pieces of personal protective equipment, as well as medicine and radiation protection equipment, all of which was valued at over \$10.5 million [24]. In November 2022, Canadian state-owned Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), together with the country's armed forces, provided the AFU with portable heaters, thermal blankets, warm socks, and sleeping bags worth \$7 million [25]. On October 18, 2022, the supply of \$14.1 million worth of personal protective equipment and military uniforms for female AFU personnel was announced. The uniforms were reported to be sufficient for 30,000 personnel. Additionally, 400,000 items of winter clothing were allocated [26]. Another

batch of winter clothing was delivered in October 2025, including 19,691 pairs of winter boots, 34,231 sleeping bags, 5,179 winter jackets, 9,302 other insulated clothing items, and 78,351 pairs of waterproof winter boots.

Satellite intelligence assistance amounts to \$14.8 million. This includes funding for acquiring high-resolution commercial satellites and advanced imaging systems. On October 12, 2022, approximately \$1.4 million was allocated to a joint project involving the Department of National Defense, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Communications Security Establishment (a security and intelligence agency under the Department of National Defense responsible for foreign signals intelligence, protecting government electronic information and communications networks, and cryptography), and the Canadian satellite operator Telesat [26]. The project provided Kiev with satellite communications services for critical infrastructure.

On March 1, 2022, Canada transferred more than 640,000 field rations to the AFU. In 2025, the transfer of 400,000 field rations and 25,000 ration-heating kits was reported [3].

On January 23, 2024, the supply to Kiev of 10 multipurpose boats manufactured by Zodiac Hurricane worth approximately \$14.1 million was announced [27]. Each boat is equipped with sensor, navigation, and communications systems.

In April 2023, Canada contributed \$24.4 million to the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) Ukraine Trust Fund. The funds will be used to implement a fuel supply project under the Partnership for Peace program and the Advanced Ribbon Bridge project. The latter is a modern, modular pontoon bridge system developed by the Spanish company GDELS to rapidly cross water obstacles with heavy armored vehicles. Implementing this project will provide Ukraine with modular floating bridge structures for crossing water obstacles.

Since January 2022, Canada has allocated over \$300.7 million in humanitarian assistance. Over \$521 million has been allocated for reconstruction and recovery efforts. This includes \$152.6 million for Ukraine's recovery through the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and \$80.7 million for repairs to Kiev's energy system through the Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTRF) of the World Bank [28].

Ottawa has also allocated nearly \$161.9 million to Ukraine through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP), the Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Reduction Program (WTRP), and the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP) [28].

Therefore, Canada is one of the Kiev regime's key sponsors, actively participating in the provision of military assistance to the AFU.

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LATVIA

Since the beginning of Russia's special military operation to defend Donbass, Latvia has become one of the leading donors of military assistance to Ukraine relative to its own GDP. The total amount of support provided exceeds \$1.28 billion, equivalent to approximately 0.6% of its GDP. Direct military assistance for 2022–2025 is estimated at \$756 million [1;2].

Even before the escalation began, the Latvian government authorized the transfer of FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS. These were delivered on February 23, 2022 [3;4].

Initially, assistance was primarily emergency-related and included equipment from the Latvian Armed Forces' stockpiles, as well as donations from companies. On February 26, 2022, 30 trucks carrying individual equipment, protective helmets, field rations, medical equipment, and medicine were supplied. In March 2022, 90 UAVs donated by Latvian companies were transferred, primarily tactical reconnaissance and multipurpose commercial/adapted drones. In August 2022, Ukraine received several Mi-8 and Mi-2 transport helicopters, as well as six M109 self-propelled howitzers. In November 2022, 28 multipurpose high-mobility HMMWV armored vehicles were delivered (eight of which were intended to serve as a source of spare parts), along with 20 M2 Browning heavy machine guns [1;5;6;7].

Additionally, 102 NLAW man-portable anti-tank missile systems were transferred in March 2022. Also in March, seven Jeep Wrangler off-road vehicles were provided. Four pickup trucks with four trailers (for a unit operating Primoco One 150 UAVs) and one Mercedes Sprinter L4 van were delivered in August 2022. In December 2022, eight ambulances were provided [8].

Assistance became more systematic in 2023–2024. In January 2023, additional Stinger MANPADS, two Mi-17 helicopters, machine guns with ammunition, dozens of UAVs, and spare parts for M109 howitzers were transferred. Starting in March 2023, 30 armored ambulances were supplied [9;10;11;12].

In January 2024, a major assistance package was announced, including howitzers, 155mm shells, anti-tank missile systems, helicopters, drones, communications equipment, generators, and other equipment [13].

In the category of armored weapons and equipment, Latvia supplied 42 Patria 6x6 wheeled armored personnel carriers, which were manufactured domestically under a licensing agreement. Approval to transfer the vehicles was granted in July 2025, and transportation from the Ādaži military base (25 km northeast of Riga) was completed by November 2025. The vehicles entered service with Ukraine's Special Operations Forces. An additional 26 light, tracked, armored vehicles of the CVR(T) family were transferred as part of the 2026 assistance package, including a final batch of nine vehicles [14;15;16;17;18].

Vehicle supplies number in the hundreds and include:

- Humanitarian and civil initiatives. A total of 285 passenger and special-purpose vehicles worth approximately \$1.13 million (as of January 2023) were transferred as part of a large-scale campaign led by Latvian public figure Reinis Pozņaks;
- Additional government packages. Successive transfers were organized consisting of 20 vehicles in August 2024, 31 vehicles in March 2025, and 38 vehicles throughout 2026;
- Institutional support. In September 2023, the Latvian State Border Guard transferred 32 specialized vehicles to meet Ukrainian demands.

From 2025 to 2026, the assistance became strategic as part of long-term commitments. In April 2024, Latvia signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement committing to provide annual military assistance worth at least 0.25% of its GDP (\$127 million in 2024). This commitment remains in force in 2026 [19].

Since February 2024, Latvia has co-led the Drone Capability Coalition with the UK. The country's contribution amounts to tens of millions of dollars, including \$51 million for the period of 2024–2025. The coalition has supplied hundreds of UAVs, including over 500 in a package delivered in 2024. Latvia actively procures

products from its own defense industry, including various types of tactical and operational UAVs [20].

On June 29, 2026, Latvian Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs officially announced plans to establish a Ukrainian-Latvian joint venture to produce UAVs. Latgale was chosen as the location of the facility (it borders Russia's Pskov Region to the east and Belarus's Vitebsk Region to the southeast) [21]. This initiative is being implemented under a bilateral agreement on cooperation in unmanned systems known as the Drone Deal.

According to the project documentation, the planned plant will serve as a logistical base for the rapid deployment of interceptor drone systems intended to patrol and protect Latvia's eastern borders. Experts note that the technological specifics of such production lines allow for the quick adaptation to assemble long-range strike UAVs.

Latvia provides significant funding to support Ukraine through NATO-targeted funds and programs as part of a multiyear strategy to allocate at least 0.25% of its GDP. The PURL program plays a significant role in this effort. As part of its commitments, the Latvian government approved a \$11.3 million tranche for 2026. Previously, between \$5.2 million and \$8.1 million had been invested in the same mechanism under earlier financial assistance packages [22].

At the same time, systematic contributions are being made to the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine. The program aims to achieve interoperability between Ukrainian defense structures and Alliance standards, as well as the long-term modernization of the defense sector.

Through government procurement and direct contracts, Latvian companies manufacture and supply Ukraine with tactical and operational UAVs, communications components, generators, optical equipment, and other dual-use products. These supplies are part of military assistance and commercial agreements, including those made through Ukraine's public procurement platform, ProZorro. Specific volumes and product ranges are often classified or aggregated into broader packages. Latvia supports EU export

credit guarantee mechanisms for trade with Ukraine and the participation of Latvian companies in reconstruction projects.

While state allocations remain the primary source of support, a significant amount of resources is accumulated through non-governmental and public donations via specialized mechanisms:

- Official dedicated account of the diplomatic mission. The Embassy of Ukraine in Latvia administers a dedicated account to collect funds for military and humanitarian needs. Financial transactions are conducted in euros and US dollars using the following account details: IBAN (International Bank Account Number) LV14HABA0551054837260, recipient bank Swedbank Riga.

- Latvian NGOs. Specialized assistance in the areas of humanitarian aid and accommodation for displaced persons is provided by national organizations such as the Latvian Red Cross, the centralized charity platform Ziedot.lv, the organization “I Want to Help Refugees,” and the Latvian Samaritan Association;

- International and Ukrainian charitable organizations. Specialized funds such as “Come Back Alive,” the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation, and the global fundraising platform UNITED24 enjoy a high level of trust among Latvian residents. These organizations publish detailed banking information, including international account numbers for Ukrainian hryvnia and convertible foreign-currency accounts, on their verified websites.

- Targeted civilian initiatives. Private volunteer projects, including the large-scale campaign led by Reinis Pozņaks, ensure a continuous logistical supply cycle involving the collection, preparation, and transfer of hundreds of vehicles [23].

Latvia has consistently shown a high level of support for the AFU. Annual assistance amounting to 0.25–0.3% of the country’s GDP places Latvia among the leaders among international donors in relative terms. Support has evolved from light weapons and Soviet-made equipment, such as Mi-8 and Mi-2 helicopters, M109 howitzers, and CVR(T) vehicles, to modern armored vehicles, such as Patria 6x6 armored personnel carriers, unmanned systems, and

participation in international coalitions. Apart from strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities, this also contributes to the development of Latvian military-industrial complex.

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LITHUANIA

Since the beginning of Russia's special military operation to defend Donbass, Lithuania has become a leading country in terms of assistance provided relative to its national economy. According to official statements by Lithuanian leaders and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense representatives, the total amount of support provided to Ukraine exceeded \$2.1 billion by June 2026. Of this amount, approximately \$1.13 billion was military assistance, corresponding to Vilnius's commitment to allocate at least 0.25% of its GDP to Kiev annually, or about \$216 million per year [1, 2].

The assistance is systematic and long-term. It includes transferring equipment from Lithuanian army stocks, procuring new equipment, and contributing to international initiatives, particularly the Czech ammunition procurement initiative and UAV, demining, and air defense coalitions. Additionally, Lithuania finances weapons production in Ukraine and provides training for Ukrainian servicemen. The support program covers the supply of dual-use products, as well as humanitarian and financial assistance, medical rehabilitation, and infrastructure reconstruction assistance.

Lithuania began supporting the AFU before to the start of the SMO. In January 2022, it transferred Stinger MANPADS, missiles, and auxiliary equipment. After February 24, 2022, the volume of supplies increased substantially. This equipment included Panzerfaust 3 and M72 LAW anti-tank grenade launchers; Barrett M82 and M99 heavy-caliber sniper rifles; Accuracy International AX308 sniper rifles; Glock 17 pistols; Heckler & Koch HK416 assault rifles; ammunition; protective helmets and body armor; mine detectors; generators; field kitchens; tents; fuel and lubricants; medical equipment; and explosives for demining. Radar systems were also supplied, including mobile AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder counter-battery radars, Thales Squire short-range surveillance radars, and SeaFox autonomous underwater vehicles, which are designed to locate and destroy mines. From 2022 to 2023,

Lithuania donated two Mi-8 helicopters to Kiev. The total value of military assistance during this initial period was estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars [3;4].

From 2023 to 2024, the volume and organization of assistance increased. Military supplies approached \$568 million in 2023, while total assistance exceeded \$1.13 billion, accounting for over 1.2% of the country's GDP. In January 2024, the Lithuanian State Defense Council approved a \$227 million assistance package for the years 2024–2026. Key deliveries included 36 Bofors L70 anti-aircraft guns with ammunition, additional Stinger MANPADS, armored vehicles (M577 command-and-staff vehicles and M113 armored personnel carriers), counter-UAV systems, anti-tank weapons, remote detonation systems, and 155mm artillery shells. The latter included a \$113 million financial contribution to the Czech ammunition procurement initiative, followed by an additional \$308 million. Lithuania also provided computer and logistics equipment, radar systems, and electronic warfare systems for countering UAVs [5;6].

In September 2024, another package of materiel was transferred, including ammunition, computer equipment, and logistics equipment. Lithuania officially joined the UAV and demining coalitions and serves as a co-chairing state in the latter, alongside Iceland. It provided funding to procure various types of UAVs, including FPV drones, reconnaissance UAVs, and unmanned surface vehicles, as well as radar and electronic warfare systems. Significant financial resources were allocated to support the Ukrainian defense industry. Notably, \$11.1 million was earmarked for Palanytsia missile-drone system production, and an additional \$22 million was allocated for other domestically manufactured weapons. By the end of 2024, the total volume of Lithuanian military assistance had exceeded \$819 million, reaching approximately \$874 million by early 2025 [7; 8; 9].

From 2025 to 2026, the focus of assistance shifted toward high-tech systems and long-term strategic cooperation. By 2025, annual allocations for these purposes had reached 0.28% of the country's GDP. Priority areas included air defense, with financial

contributions toward procuring and maintaining Patriot and NASAMS air defense systems, as well as 5,000 UAVs, which were delivered in 2025 along with investments of hundreds of millions of dollars in production capacity through specialized coalitions. Other priority areas included 155mm and medium-caliber artillery ammunition, electronic warfare systems, and demining equipment. The Lithuanian government specifically allocated \$39.8 million for radar stations and demining equipment, \$11.3 million for the Palianytsia project, and \$170–340 million for air-launched weapons for F-16 multirole fighters as part of international cooperation [10; 11].

A substantial portion of the total support, amounting to approximately \$900 million–\$1 billion, in addition to direct military allocations, is directed toward financial and energy assistance, infrastructure projects, and the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure. This includes \$341,000 allocated for the reconstruction of a theater in Dnipro in 2024. Support also includes medical assistance and the development of trade relations. As part of international cooperation, Lithuania has provided field hospitals, mobile medical units for the border service, and a wide range of medical equipment. Interregional cooperation is also developing, particularly with the Dnepropetrovsk region. Dual-use products include radars, diesel generators, logistics equipment [12; 13].

Despite its limited demographic potential — the country's population is only about 2.9 million — Lithuania's contributions per capita and as a percentage of its GDP are among the highest among NATO and European Union member states. The assistance strategy has evolved from donating equipment from the armed forces' own stockpiles to directly financing production capacity in Ukraine and participating in multilateral international initiatives. This has substantially increased the sustainability and continuity of supplies. The main challenge remains finding additional sources of funding amid an overall decline in activity among donor countries. In this context, Lithuania is shifting its priorities toward long-term economic instruments, such as targeted loans and establishing joint production enterprises.

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THE NETHERLANDS

Since 2022, the Netherlands has steadily increased its military support for Ukraine, gradually shifting from the transfer of weapons and equipment from its own armed forces' stocks to financing large-scale procurement from European, US, Dutch, and Ukrainian manufacturers. As of February 2, 2026, the Dutch government estimated that the value of military assistance actually delivered was approximately \$13.34 billion. Of this, approximately \$3.42 billion is allocated for 2026, and the government has reserved a similar amount for each year from 2027 to 2029. Part of the budget funds the replacement of equipment previously withdrawn from the country's armed forces' stocks [1].

In 2022, the Netherlands allocated approximately \$1.14 billion for military support. Initial deliveries included small arms and anti-tank weapons, ammunition, armored vehicles, air defense systems, vehicles, demining equipment, medical supplies, communications equipment, night-vision devices, and engineering equipment. The Netherlands also began financing weapons procurement from industry through the International Fund for Ukraine and NATO programs [2].

By September 29, 2024, the official Dutch summary included 60 T-72 tanks, 353 YPR tracked armored personnel carriers of various modifications, Fennek wheeled reconnaissance vehicles, Viking tracked carriers, at least 100 Leopard 1A5 tanks, and 14 Leopard 2A4 tanks. Some of the armored vehicles were procured jointly by the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark, while others were transferred from national armed forces' stocks [3].

The artillery component of Dutch assistance included eight PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers, M109 howitzers, 120mm mortars, small- and large-caliber ammunition, LAW and Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons, as well as large batches of 155mm artillery shells [3].

The air defense systems included five Patriot launchers with missiles and one Patriot radar. These were individual launchers and components rather than complete batteries. Additionally, the

Netherlands transferred 100 MR-2 mobile anti-aircraft systems, 20 Bofors 40L70 40mm anti-aircraft guns, several hundred Stinger MANPADS, and other missiles and air defense system components. The reconnaissance component included four VERANG passive electronic intelligence systems, radars, detection equipment, night-vision devices, and 557 UAVs with associated equipment [3].

The engineering equipment included 37 Bailey modular bridges, six M3 self-propelled amphibious bridge systems, and five Leopard 1-based tank bridge layers. For demining, one Scanjack vehicle, three Bozena machines, portable line charges, nine mine plows, and nine mine rollers for infantry fighting vehicles were supplied, along with sets of engineer equipment, protective suits, and helmets for explosive ordnance disposal specialists [3].

The fleet of transport and support vehicles numbered 1,320 units and included trucks, road trains, ambulances, Volkswagen Amaroks, off-road vehicles, motorcycles, and quad bikes. Logistics equipment included 25 cranes, 25 forklifts, 20 front-end loaders, 25 side loaders, and 16 trailers. Additionally, 33 field hospitals, 31 field kitchens, 10,350 tents with accessories, 4,455 computers and information systems, 818 generators, fuel, spare parts, medical equipment, protective clothing, body armor, protective helmets, and sleeping bags were transferred [3].

The maritime component included two Alkmaar-class minehunters and 116 other vessels. The crews of the future Ukrainian minesweepers underwent training in operating the vessels and using mine countermeasure equipment. The Ministry of Defense's official list is publicly available but not exhaustive: some items and quantities are not disclosed for operational security reasons [3].

In February 2023, the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark announced plans to procure at least 100 Leopard 1A5 tanks from the German defense industry. The program included refurbishing the vehicles, supplying spare parts and ammunition, and training Ukrainian crews and technical personnel. The actual number of

vehicles suitable for refurbishment was determined based on the results of technical inspections of industrial stocks [4].

In April 2023, the Netherlands and Denmark jointly purchased 14 Leopard 2A4 tanks for approximately \$188.2 million. After undergoing major overhauls, the vehicles were prepared for transfer to Ukraine. Simultaneously, the Netherlands allocated \$148.2 million each to two joint procurement programs for 155mm artillery ammunition, which were implemented by the European Defense Agency and Germany. The total contribution to the two artillery programs amounted to approximately \$296.5 million [5].

On March 1, 2024, the Netherlands and Ukraine signed a 10-year security cooperation agreement. The document formalized Amsterdam's commitment to providing long-term military assistance and supporting the development of Ukraine's armed forces, defense industry, and cybersecurity systems, as well as reconstruction and international crimes prosecution [6].

By June 2024, the value of military assistance actually provided by the Netherlands had exceeded \$3.54 billion. Since December 2023, approximately \$536 million worth of weapons and equipment had been transferred, including armored vehicles, fire support systems, ammunition, radars, trucks, field hospitals, tents, and logistics equipment. As part of a new phase of assistance, the Netherlands contributed approximately \$456.1 million to a joint fund with Denmark and Sweden to produce CV90 infantry fighting vehicles for Ukraine. A significant portion of the vehicles and components will be manufactured at Dutch industrial facilities. Another \$68.4 million was allocated for the development of strike UAV systems [7].

In October 2024, the Netherlands confirmed the transfer of the first of 24 promised F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. At the same time, the country announced a program to develop and produce air, ground, and maritime unmanned systems worth approximately \$456.1 million. Nearly half of these funds were earmarked for Dutch companies. To support the operation of the F-16s, Amsterdam allocated \$513.2 million for aircraft munitions and \$91.2 million for spare parts and maintenance. By that time, the

total value of military assistance actually provided had reached approximately \$4.29 billion [8].

In January 2025, the Netherlands reported that the total value of the 155mm artillery ammunition procured for Ukraine exceeded \$1.14 billion. In the fourth quarter of 2024 alone, approximately \$2.28 billion worth of military programs were implemented, including the supply of F-16s, munitions, and funding for unmanned systems. The total value of military equipment delivered and financed approached \$6.84 billion [9].

The final batch of F-16 fighter jets destined for Ukraine departed from the Netherlands in May 2025. Amsterdam transferred a total of 24 aircraft to Kiev. This included the aircraft, ammunition, spare parts, maintenance, training for flight and technical personnel, and participation in establishing European training infrastructure [10].

The following month, in June 2025, the Netherlands announced the transfer of an additional 100 UAV detection radars and 20 partially unmanned Ermine CASEVAC medical evacuation vehicles. The package was worth approximately \$199.6 million. An additional \$91.2 million was allocated to the international drone coalition, in addition to the previously allocated \$22.8 million [11].

Simultaneously, the Netherlands signed contracts with Ukrainian companies to produce 600,000 UAVs, valued at around \$570.2 million, as part of the Drone Line Initiative. A separate maritime security package worth approximately \$456.1 million was also established. These decisions demonstrate Amsterdam's shift from procuring relatively small batches of reconnaissance UAVs to financing the mass production of expendable systems by Ukrainian industry [11].

In August 2025, the Netherlands became the first NATO member state to fully finance a weapons package for Ukraine under the US PURL mechanism. The contribution amounted to approximately \$570.2 million. The funds were intended to procure air defense systems, missiles, ammunition, and other equipment

from US stocks that the Ukrainian government identified as priorities [12].

In February 2026, the Netherlands, along with the UK, Norway, and Sweden, financed an additional \$500 million package of US weapons. Amsterdam's contribution was approximately \$102.6 million from a previously allocated reserve of \$855.3 million. The package included weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and F-16 simulators. The package was also intended to include the procurement of Patriot missiles, artillery ammunition, aircraft weapons, and spare parts [13].

In June 2026, the Netherlands announced a new package worth approximately \$570.2 million. Half of this amount, or about \$285.1 million, was earmarked for procuring UAVs from Dutch manufacturers. The remaining \$285.1 million was allocated to PURL. Following this decision, the Netherlands' total contribution to the US mechanism reached approximately \$1.14 billion. PURL packages include air defense systems and missiles, F-16 ammunition, and unmanned systems [14].

By 2026, the Netherlands had begun reducing its direct transfers of weapons from its armed forces' stocks and shifting toward financing procurement from Dutch, European, US, and Ukrainian manufacturers. The main instruments of further support became bilateral industrial contracts, the PURL mechanism, international coalitions, and joint procurement programs. Amsterdam allocated approximately \$3.42 billion in military assistance for 2026 and reserved approximately \$3.42 billion annually for 2027–2029 [1].

The second major area of support involves training AFU personnel. Since October 2022, Dutch instructors have participated in the British Interflex operation. This five-week program includes tactical training, live fire exercises, weapons familiarization, explosive handling, and basic combat skills. Through EUMAM Ukraine, the Netherlands has provided instructors to train Ukrainian units in Germany and sent two officers to the mission headquarters in Brussels, six servicemen to the Special Training Command in Strausberg, and one officer to the Combined Arms Training Command in Żagań, Poland [15].

From mid-January to mid-May 2024, the Dutch Marine Corps trained 300 Ukrainian marines in the Netherlands. The training included amphibious operations, urban operations, and trench warfare. Instructors from Norway, the UK, the US, and Sweden participated in the training [16].

The Netherlands and Denmark played a leading role in establishing the European aviation coalition. Eighteen Dutch aircraft were provided to the European F-16 Training Center in Romania, where Ukrainian and Romanian pilots are trained. Dutch servicemen work at the center's headquarters. In 2025, the Netherlands also participated in training 26 Ukrainian aviation technicians in F-16 maintenance. Separate training was organized for the future crews of two Alkmaar-class minehunters [17].

Financial and civilian assistance supplemented military supplies, though on a smaller scale. In 2022, the Netherlands provided \$1.14 billion in military assistance, as well as approximately \$68.4 million for humanitarian programs, a \$228.1 million loan from the International Monetary Fund, a \$114 million guarantee from the World Bank, and \$31.4 million through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Approximately \$205.3 million was allocated for energy recovery and preparations for winter [2].

In 2023, the Dutch government allocated approximately \$2.85 billion in overall support for Ukraine, \$1.82 billion of which was earmarked for military supplies. The initial civilian and financial assistance package totaled \$312.5 million and covered infrastructure reconstruction, humanitarian projects, demining, food security, and law enforcement support. Additional packages were allocated for gas procurement, power grid repairs, insurance for Dutch companies' projects, and support for reforms [2].

In 2024, approximately \$2.28 billion was allocated for military assistance. Additionally, the Netherlands provided a guarantee of approximately \$1.21 billion to the EU budget for macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, as well as \$188.2 million to cover interest on European loans. Non-military assistance increased by \$456.1 million, with \$168.8 million allocated for 2024 and \$287.4 million

for 2025. A separate package for preparing the energy system for winter amounted to approximately \$238.9 million [2].

The government allocated approximately \$287.4 million in non-military assistance annually for 2025 and 2026. Of these funds, approximately \$342.1 million over the two years is allocated to reconstruction and economic development, including \$59.3 million for repairs to energy networks and drinking water systems. Funding is also provided for hospital reconstruction, private-sector support, humanitarian demining, healthcare, and public administration reforms [18].

In January 2026, the Netherlands allocated an additional \$26.2 million for gas procurement, emergency repairs to power plants, and the purchase of generators, cables, and other equipment from Dutch companies. Following this decision, energy support for 2026 totaled approximately \$151.7 million [19].

By the end of 2025, the Netherlands' actual expenditures under official development assistance, excluding military support, totaled approximately \$1.48 billion. They were focused on energy, water supply, housing and hospital reconstruction, humanitarian programs, healthcare, demining, and private-sector support [20].

Thus, the Netherlands has developed a multi-level model of support for Ukraine dominated by the military component. Initially, Amsterdam transferred tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, Patriot components, small arms, and engineering and mine-clearance equipment. From 2023 to 2024, the focus shifted to Leopard 1A5 and Leopard 2A4 tanks, CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, F-16s, artillery ammunition, and air defense systems. From 2025 to 2026, the priority shifted toward mass UAV production, detection systems, the US PURL mechanism, and direct contracts with the Ukrainian defense industry. The long-term allocation of approximately \$3.42 billion annually from 2027 to 2029 is transforming Dutch support from individual packages into a sustainable budgetary and military-industrial program.

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NORWAY

Since the beginning of Russia's special military operation to defend Donbass, Norwegian assistance to Ukraine has evolved from crisis-driven, one-off support into a formalized strategic security partnership. Initially, Oslo acted in emergency-response mode, providing anti-tank weapons, protective equipment, artillery, and humanitarian supplies. By 2026, this model had changed, with assistance becoming systematic, multi-year, and technologically advanced [1; 2].

The Nansen Support Program for Ukraine, launched in 2023, is the key financial mechanism behind Norway's support. Its total funding for 2023–2030 amounts to \$28.57 billion [1]. For 2026, Norway approved \$8.85 billion in assistance to Ukraine, of which \$7.29 billion is allocated to military support and \$1.56 billion to civilian, humanitarian, and other purposes [2]. This demonstrates that the Ukrainian issue has become a central element of national and European security policy for Norway, not an episodic foreign-policy matter.

On May 31, 2024, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and V. Zelensky signed a bilateral agreement on security cooperation and long-term support [3]. The agreement is valid for 10 years. It formalized military, political, financial, and humanitarian support, as well as support for Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic course [3]. The document laid the foundation for the subsequent transition from assistance to partnership.

On June 10, 2024, Norway and Ukraine signed an energy cooperation agreement. The Norwegian government's official statement was published on June 11, 2024 [4]. The document covers gas, renewable energy, power grids, energy efficiency, digital solutions, and the reconstruction of energy infrastructure [4]. Since then, energy assumed a special place in Norway's assistance model.

In 2025, Norway strengthened its production capabilities. In April of that year, Oslo increased its support for Ukraine by \$5.2 billion, bringing the total assistance for 2025 to \$8.85 billion [5].

These additional funds were allocated for military support via international initiatives and procurement from Ukrainian defense companies. Priorities included air defense, artillery ammunition, drones, and maritime capabilities [5]. Norway allocated \$520.4 million for artillery ammunition, including \$416.3 million to the Czech initiative and \$104.1 million to the European Peace Facility [6]. Norway also announced \$364.3 million for the procurement of military equipment from Ukrainian defense companies and \$62.4 million for drones and the development of drone technologies [7]. Norway also participated in preparing a Ukrainian brigade, allocating \$1.04 billion for its equipment and training [8].

In 2026, more than \$1.25 billion was earmarked for drones and autonomous systems. Approximately \$936.7 million was allocated for air defense and F-16 aircraft. Approximately \$624.5 million was earmarked for maritime security. Approximately \$364.3 million was allocated to the Nordic-Baltic-Polish initiative. Approximately \$520.4 million was allocated for training Ukrainian personnel. More than \$832.6 million was earmarked for participation in international mechanisms and strategic projects. Another \$1.56 billion was retained as a flexible reserve to respond to Ukraine's current needs [2; 9].

On February 24–25, 2026, Støre made an official visit to Kiev. There, he announced the 2026 assistance plan and held a bilateral meeting with Zelensky [2;10]. The two leaders agreed to develop a strategic partnership focused primarily on defense and energy [10]. During that time, the leaders of Ukraine and the Nordic Baltic Eight (NB8) issued a joint statement. The statement reaffirmed support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the need to pressure Russia, efforts to counter the shadow fleet, support for Kiev's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and the continuation of military, financial, and energy assistance [11].

Energy assistance received separate funding in 2026. Norway allocated \$499.6 million to ensure Ukraine's energy security and to support energy supplies, nuclear safety, and gas procurement [12]. Norway has consistently financed gas procurement, repairs to energy facilities, decentralized generation, grid protection, and

preparations for winter since 2022 [4; 12; 13]. In August 2022, \$208.2 million was allocated for gas procurement. In 2023, \$156.1 million was disbursed to support gas supplies and electricity. In January 2026, Norway announced an additional \$388.1 million emergency package to support the energy sector and Ukraine's state administration operations [13].

On April 14, 2026, Zelensky visited Oslo. Following talks with Støre, the two sides signed a joint declaration on enhanced cooperation in defense and security [14; 15]. The document expanded upon the strategic partnership agreement reached in Kiev. It covers air defense, UAVs, autonomous systems, maritime capabilities, logistics, electronic warfare, joint production and development, technology exchange, and leveraging Ukrainian combat experience for the benefit of the Norwegian Armed Forces [16].

The issue of UAVs received particular focus during the meeting. Zelensky described the April agreements as the beginning of work on a UAV agreement, also known as the Drone Deal [15]. They discussed producing and using drones, protecting against Geran-type UAVs, exchanging experience with Norway's private sector, and establishing Ukrainian UAV production in Norway [14; 15; 17; 18]. Representatives from the Norwegian defense companies Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace and Nammo participated in the working dinner [14; 19; 20]. However, the specific companies and production facilities involved in manufacturing Ukrainian drones in Norway have not been officially disclosed for security reasons [17].

On May 3, 2026, Støre and Zelensky met in Yerevan on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit. They discussed the strategic partnership, the Drone Deal, air defense, joint production, Ukraine's preparations for the winter, and cooperation between the private and public sectors [21]. Yerevan effectively marked another stage in translating previously adopted decisions into practical measures.

The range of supplied and financed weapons deserves separate attention. In 2022 alone, Ukraine received 4,000 M72 anti-tank

weapons, 1,500 body armor vests, 5,000 protective helmets, 15,000 field rations, 1,000 protective masks with filters, 2,000 sleeping bags, 10,000 field mats, approximately 100 Mistral missiles with launchers, 23 M109 self-propelled howitzers, at least 10,000 155mm artillery shells, and 14 IVECO LMV armored vehicles. It also received approximately 160 Hellfire missiles, launchers, guidance units, and night-vision devices [13; 22; 23; 24]. That same year, Norway and the UK financed Black Hornet micro-drones and Nightfighter counter-UAV systems through a British fund. The Black Hornet package was valued at up to \$9.4 million, while the Nightfighter system was procured for approximately \$10.4 million [25].

In 2023, the range of military equipment expanded. In January, Ukraine received eight Leopard 2A4 tanks, four specialized vehicles based on the tank chassis, and additional artillery ammunition, including at least 10,000 shells under the Norwegian-Danish arrangement and another 9,000 rounds subsequently [13; 26; 27]. Norway participated in transferring two NASAMS fire units with the US and trained Ukrainian personnel to operate them [28]. Additionally, the transfer of approximately 50 M548/NM199 tracked transport vehicles was announced. These vehicles are designed to transport ammunition, water, food, and supplies over challenging terrain [29].

In 2024, an additional 5,000 M72s, artillery shells for M109 self-propelled howitzers, three Leopard 1-based mine-clearing vehicles, and 81mm mortar ammunition worth approximately \$50 million were transferred. The transfer of six F-16 fighter jets was also announced [30; 31; 32]. The maritime component included 130 small boats and Sea King helicopter spare parts being transferred to Ukraine by Germany [33; 34; 35]. Air defense was supported by funding additional systems and missiles, as well as allied transfers and participation in procurement through Germany and other multilateral mechanisms [5; 36; 37].

In 2025, the focus shifted toward procurement and production. Norway allocated \$520.4 million for artillery ammunition, \$62.4 million for drones and their components, \$364.3 million for the

Ukrainian defense industry, and approximately \$728.5 million for air defense systems from Germany. Additionally, Norway contributed \$1.03 billion through the JUMPSTART mechanism [6; 7; 37; 38]. The JUMPSTART mechanism included F-16 weapons, missiles, air defense systems, upgrades to legacy Hawk missiles, integration of Soviet- and NATO-made weapons, and production of air defense missiles in Ukraine [38]. In December 2025, Norway contributed an additional \$500 million to PURL packages [39].

In May 2026, Norway allocated an additional \$291.4 million through PURL [40]. This brought the country's total contribution to the mechanism to more than \$1 billion, including previously announced contributions [21; 39; 40]. This channel is important for Norway because it allows the country to support the supply of systems that are not always available through its domestic industrial base [39; 40].

Thus, Norwegian assistance to Ukraine covers four main areas. The first involves direct supply of weapons and equipment. The second covers procurement through allied mechanisms, including PURL, JUMPSTART, the International Fund for Ukraine, the Czech initiative, and the European Peace Facility. The third area focuses on Ukraine's energy resilience. The fourth area encompasses military-industrial cooperation, including Ukrainian production, joint drone projects, the development of maritime unmanned systems, and the participation of Norwegian defense companies.

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POLAND

Since the beginning of Russia's special military operation to defend Donbass, Poland has become a key supplier of weapons and military equipment to Kiev. According to the Ukraine Support Tracker, Warsaw has provided Kiev with \$6.66 billion in assistance, \$5.06 billion of which was allocated for military purposes. In terms of the overall volume of military support provided, Warsaw ranks 11th among all donor states. It ranks 8th in terms of assistance relative to its own GDP. Total Polish assistance amounts to 1.021% of the country's GDP, while military assistance accounts for 0.775% of GDP [1].

Poland's importance is determined less by the absolute figures than by its role as the main logistics hub. Up to 90% of all Western military assistance to Ukraine passes through Rzeszów-Jasionka International Airport. In December 2024, Norway deployed NASAMS air defense systems in Rzeszów, underscoring the strategic importance of this hub for the entire international support system [2].

Since the beginning of 2022, Poland has provided 48 military assistance packages [3]. Additionally, Poland is the leading provider of armored support. Of the nearly 800 tanks received by Ukraine, more than 350 were provided free of charge [4]. Initially, deliveries consisted primarily of Soviet-designed weapons remaining in Polish army storage facilities. In 2022, Poland transferred 240 T-72M/M1 and upgraded T-72M1R tanks, 82 artillery systems, 287 air defense systems and self-propelled platforms, including Piorun MANPADS, S-125 Neva, Osa-AKM, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka systems, as well as approximately 70 million rounds of ammunition [5].

Alongside free deliveries, Warsaw launched full-scale exports of military products. From 2022 to 2023, exports of military products amounted to \$2.5 billion. Of that amount, approximately \$0.6 billion represented the partial fulfillment of a contract with Huta Stalowa Wola for the delivery of 54 Krab self-propelled howitzers and 24 M120K Rak self-propelled mortar systems.

Under commercial contracts, Poland supplied 10,000 MSBS Grot assault rifles, Tor heavy-caliber sniper rifles, wz.1988 Tantal carbines, UKM-2000 machine guns, RGP-40 revolver grenade launchers, 60 MT-LB vehicles, 49 Oncilla armored vehicles, one SCOT P-3M armored personnel carrier, one Curt Spartan armored vehicle, 22 120mm mortars, 92 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers, 89 82mm mortars, including 2B9M Vasilek mortars, 22 M74 120mm mortars, four BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, 19 AMZ DZIK armored vehicles, one BRDM-2, 60 MT-LBs, 39,280 S-8 unguided rockets, and 34 Piorun MANPADS [6, 7].

In 2023, S-125 NEWA-SC air defense systems were supplied, along with ZU-23-2 and S-60 anti-aircraft guns and 70,000 rounds of ammunition [8].

In January 2023, Poland formed a "tank coalition," breaking the international deadlock over supplying Western Leopard 2A4 tanks. During the first months of 2023, 60 tanks were transferred, including upgraded PT-91s, 14 Leopard 2 tanks, and 42 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Beginning in February 2023, Polish instructors from the 10th Armored Cavalry Brigade began training 105 Ukrainian servicemen at the Leopard Training Center in Świętoszów, Lower Silesian Voivodeship.

In April 2023, Bumar-Łabędy, a mechanical plant in Gliwice, Silesian Voivodeship and part of the Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) holding company, opened a service center for Ukrainian T-64 tanks. In July of the same year, the plant began servicing Ukrainian Leopard 2 tanks [9]. Also in April 2023, a contract was signed to supply 200 Rosomak armored personnel carriers (BWP-1). The first batches were transferred to the 44th Mechanized Brigade of the AFU [10].

By the end of 2023, the National Research Institute—National Institute of Telecommunications (IŁ-PIB) had purchased 19,500 Starlink terminals for the AFU. This accounted for nearly half of the 47,000 terminals owned by Ukraine at the time. An additional 5,000 terminals were purchased in 2024. The total amount spent on

Starlink services for Ukraine from 2022 to 2024 reached approximately \$86 million [11].

In 2024, Ukraine imported \$2.8 billion worth of military products from Poland. These purchases included 78 M74 light mortars, 18 Krab self-propelled howitzers, 10 D-44 85mm guns, 1,100 heavy machine guns, 15,145 grenade launchers, 100 recoilless guns, 28,526 anti-tank guided missile systems, and two 75mm mortars, among other equipment [12].

From 2023 to 2024, Ukraine received a total of 78 tanks, 502 armored vehicles, 55 artillery systems, 10 Mi-24 helicopters, 10 MiG-29 aircraft, two Mi-8 transport helicopters, one Mi-2AM-1 medical evacuation helicopter, one Bell 412HP transport helicopter, 118 MANPADS, over 31 million rounds of ammunition, 44 air-to-air missiles, and over 16,000 spare parts for various systems [13].

Additionally, Poland secretly supplied S-200 Vega surface-to-air missile systems, 100 Oncilla armored vehicles (200 of which were in Ukraine as of 2024), and between 30 and 60 PT-91 Twardy tanks to the AFU's 22nd Mechanized Brigade and 117th Separate Mechanized Brigade [16].

In 2025, assistance shifted toward ammunition. According to UN international trade statistics, Poland exported \$1.4 billion worth of weapons, ammunition, and components to Ukraine. The majority of this (\$1.24 billion) fell under the category of "bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, and similar munitions." The second largest category was "military weapons other than revolvers and pistols" at \$142 million. Particular attention was paid to the supply of 155mm shells [17, 18]. According to Polish sources, deliveries during that period included three Leopard 2A4 tanks, 120 armored vehicles, and 296 various types of UAVs [19].

UAV cooperation deserves separate attention. Ukrainian forces have been using Matrice, Warmate, and FlyEye drones, produced by the Polish company WB Electronics (WB Group), since the beginning of the conflict, procuring them through the "Army of Drones" initiative. In response to the AFU's growing demand, the WB Group began producing FlyEye drones in Ukraine in 2025 [20].

According to some reports, the company also tested its latest GLADIUS reconnaissance-strike system during the conflict [21]. By 2030, the company plans to expand its cooperation with Ukraine in the fields of unmanned systems, missile technologies, jet engines, electronic warfare systems, and radars [22].

Notably, as early as September 2025, the defense ministers of Ukraine and Poland signed a memorandum establishing a Joint Working Group on Unmanned Aerial Systems. This group facilitates the exchange of operational knowledge and experience regarding UAVs; develops and tests methods for using and countering drones; integrates innovative technologies and strengthens interoperability between the Ukrainian and Polish armed forces; ensures compatibility with NATO standards. Then, in April 2026, the prime ministers of Poland and Ukraine announced a joint project to create a "drone armada" combining Ukrainian combat experience with Polish and European financial and production capabilities [23].

Industrial cooperation has developed in parallel. As early as 2023, PGZ and the Ukrainian company ARTeM agreed to produce 125mm tank shells together in Poland [24]. In July 2025, PGZ announced its plan to produce Krab howitzer barrels in Ukraine [25]. In September 2025, Ukroboronprom signed a contract with a PGZ-affiliated Polish company for the supply of ammunition components and reached an agreement with Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr 1 SA for equipment repairs. Negotiations were also held on a project to produce components for the Ukrainian side [26]. In March 2026, it was reported that the Polish-Ukrainian company PK MIL SA, formed by Ponar Wadowice and the Kramatorsk Heavy Machine Tool Plant, was preparing to manufacture the Ukrainian Bohdana self-propelled howitzer in Poland [27].

Alongside supplying weapons and providing access to its production facilities, Warsaw has become a major center for training Ukrainian servicemen. In 2022, Ukrainian artillerymen began training at Polish training grounds to operate Krab howitzers, alongside sappers, medical personnel, and other specialists. Poland

subsequently joined the EU's EUMAM Ukraine mission, becoming a primary host of training for AFU personnel in the Lubusz Voivodeship. According to the Polish Ministry of National Defense, 38,000 Ukrainian service members have received training under EUMAM in Poland since 2022. The European External Action Service reports that this figure accounts for over 60% of the 63,000 servicemen trained under the program as of early 2025 [28]. Additionally, the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center (JATEC) began operating in Bydgoszcz, Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship, in February 2025. The center's primary responsibilities include analyzing and synthesizing defense and security experiences, enhancing military training and education, fostering greater interoperability between the AFU and NATO, and bolstering the capabilities of the AFU [29].

Thus, Poland plays a comprehensive role in the system of military support for Ukraine, serving as a major logistics hub, arms donor, personnel training center, and platform for joint defense production. This enables Ukraine to receive military equipment and ammunition while Poland develops its military-industrial complex and deepens military integration. However, political, economic, and historical disagreements persist between Kiev and Warsaw, which may limit further increases in military assistance despite the high level of defense cooperation.

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PORTUGAL

Since 2022, Portugal has gradually shifted from transferring weapons from its national armed forces' stockpiles to financing international procurement, training Ukrainian servicemen, and placing orders with its defense industry. Limited stocks of heavy equipment have prevented Lisbon from establishing an independent, large-scale supply channel for the AFU. Thus, the Portuguese model is based on a combination of small batches of weapons and annual financial contributions to EU and NATO coalition mechanisms.

In 2022, Portugal supplied Ukraine with automatic rifles, heavy machine guns, 7.62mm, 60mm, and 120mm ammunition, grenade launchers, protective helmets, body armor, night vision devices, radios, medical equipment, and six UAVs. The most significant delivery consisted of 14 M113 armored personnel carriers [1; 2]. The range of equipment provided during the first year indicates that the assistance focused on equipping infantry, increasing tactical mobility, and addressing shortages of individual equipment. The transfer of 14 M113s was insufficient to equip an independent mechanized unit, but it increased the overall fleet of similar vehicles supplied to Ukraine by several NATO countries [4].

In May 2022, Lisbon announced that it would provide Ukraine with \$284.4 million in financial assistance, including \$113.8 million over the course of the year and \$170.6 million over the subsequent three-year period [5]. However, the initial bilateral scheme was not implemented as announced. Following the creation of the pan-European macro-financial assistance mechanism, Portugal's commitments were shifted to EU instruments [6]. Therefore, the announced \$284.4 million cannot be treated as fully disbursed bilateral assistance while also being added to Portugal's subsequent contributions to European programs.

In 2023, Portugal increased its deliveries of armored vehicles. Ukraine received three Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks, 14 additional M113 armored personnel carriers, three more vehicles

from the same series, and two M577 command and medical evacuation vehicles. The list also included 60mm mortars, 105mm and 120mm ammunition, eight electric generators, medical and communications equipment, and winter clothing [1; 2]. The delivery of the three Leopard 2A6 tanks was significant for the coalition: the vehicles were added to the shared fleet of this tank type assembled by Germany, Poland, Canada, Spain, and other countries. At the same time, the transfer reduced the already limited tank fleet of the Portuguese Army further.

In June 2023, Lisbon announced plans to transfer another 14 M113 armored personnel carriers, nine 105mm towed howitzers, six Ka-32A11BC helicopters, three fast boats, 10 generators, and 25,000 items of winter clothing [2]. Some of the equipment arrived in Ukraine later. By March 2024, Portuguese authorities reported the transfer of more than 40 M113 and M577 vehicles [8]. Subsequent batches were recorded in official lists for 2024 and 2025, but their numbers were not disclosed. Thus, the total number of armored vehicles transferred exceeded 40, though the final figure cannot be reliably determined from open sources.

Portugal also joined efforts to train Ukrainian servicemen. As part of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, Portuguese instructors provided combined arms training, as well as training in mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, radiation, chemical, and biological defense, and military medicine. Lisbon participated in training Leopard 2 crews of all variants and personnel for F-16 operations, though Portugal did not transfer its own F-16 aircraft to Ukraine [1; 2].

In 2024, Portugal shifted its focus from transferring equipment to financing international procurement. Throughout the year, Ukraine received grenade launchers, mine-detection equipment, clothing, generators, additional M113s, fast boats, nine 105mm howitzers, and helicopters, as previously announced. Official lists also recorded the transfer of Kamov-family helicopters and eight multipurpose Pumas [1; 22].

The largest financial decision of 2024 was the allocation of \$113.8 million to the Czech initiative for the procurement of

artillery ammunition [8]. Portugal did not purchase or transfer a separate national batch of shells but rather financed the common mechanism through which 155mm ammunition was primarily procured. Another \$59.2 million was allocated for the procurement of Portuguese-made UAVs under a mechanism coordinated by the UK [9]. This decision ensured deliveries to Ukraine and created guaranteed demand for domestic defense companies. The Czech initiative and the UAV production program together amounted to approximately \$172.9 million, representing the bulk of Portugal's military financing in 2024. This shift demonstrates a transition from depleting military reserves to a model where aid to Ukraine supports domestic industry and finances the most critical categories of weapons.

On May 28, 2024, Portugal and Ukraine signed a 10-year security cooperation agreement [10]. The document formalized Lisbon's participation in the delivery of weapons, military training, aviation and maritime coalitions, the procurement of ammunition, the development of unmanned systems, cybersecurity, and the sharing of intelligence. The initial volume of military assistance for 2024 was set at no less than \$143.3 million; however, the overall financial contribution was subsequently increased to approximately \$258.8 million. The agreement does not obligate automatic military intervention nor establish a fixed annual delivery volume. Its purpose is to formalize long-term political and financial support.

For 2025, Portugal announced military assistance worth approximately \$252.1 million. At the same time, a separate government decision capped expenditures and equipment transfers at \$233.4 million [11]. These figures represent different financial and legal categories and should not be added together. The former reflects the overall political objective, while the latter represents a specific spending limit for designated areas.

In the first quarter of 2025, Portugal transferred 155mm howitzers to Ukraine, though the model and quantity were not disclosed. In the second quarter, additional M113s and M577s were delivered, and in the third quarter, motorboats were delivered

[1]. After 2024, official documents increasingly record only the category of equipment without disclosing the quantity, technical condition, or value of each batch.

Meanwhile, \$56.9 million was allocated to the PURL mechanism to purchase US weapons and ammunition, and \$11.4 million was allocated to a British program to produce UAVs with Portuguese companies [12]. An additional \$1.1 million was allocated for training Ukrainian F-16 pilots and \$23.3 million for providing optical satellite imagery and synthetic-aperture radar data [13]. The space component provides surveillance regardless of cloud cover or time of day. It can be used to identify position changes, monitor equipment movement, and support operational planning. In December 2025, Portugal allocated an additional \$3.4 million to NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine and \$1.1 million to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine fund [14; 15].

For 2026, Portugal maintained its military support target of \$252.1 million. At the same time, the government authorized expenditures and equipment transfers of up to \$148.4 million [16]. The discrepancy between these figures means that some financial decisions must be formalized through separate acts or implemented through other budgetary instruments. Current priorities include the aviation, armored vehicle, and maritime coalitions; space-based intelligence; communications; unmanned systems; ballistic protection; individual equipment; and cooperation between defense companies.

Lisbon's political position has remained unchanged despite changes in government. Portugal supports Ukraine's territorial integrity within its 1991 borders, continued sanctions pressure on Russia, using the proceeds from frozen Russian assets, and Ukraine's integration into the EU. Lisbon links NATO membership to a decision by the allies and Ukraine's fulfillment of established requirements [10]. Portugal does not pursue an independent diplomatic line, operating primarily through the EU, NATO, the UN, and coalition mechanisms.

Economic support is mainly provided through EU institutions and international banks. The initial bilateral budget financing program was replaced by participation in pan-European macrofinancial assistance. In 2025, Portugal approved an increase in the capital of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, linking the decision to the financing of Ukraine's economy and future reconstruction [21].

The humanitarian component is auxiliary in nature. As of May 2024, Portugal had provided more than \$3.4 million in direct humanitarian assistance [17]. Additional funds were provided through the Grain from Ukraine and Food from Ukraine programs. Portuguese contributions were used to purchase Ukrainian grain and deliver it to countries in need, including Portuguese-speaking African countries [18, 19]. This mechanism supported Ukraine's export revenues while allowing Portugal to link its assistance to Kiev with its African policy.

Overall, Portugal's most significant material deliveries included over 40 M113 armored personnel carriers, M577 vehicles, three Leopard 2A6 tanks, nine 105mm howitzers, mortars, ammunition, UAVs, boats, generators, and helicopters. From 2022 to 2023, the armed forces' stockpiles were the main source of assistance. Since 2024, however, the predominant model has been financial and industrial. For example, \$113.8 million was allocated to artillery ammunition and \$59.2 million to Portuguese UAVs. In 2025, funds were distributed among PURL, space-based intelligence, pilot training, and NATO funds.

Thus, while Portugal is not among the largest suppliers of heavy weapons to Ukraine, it has established a sustainable support model combining the transfer of armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation equipment with the financing of ammunition, unmanned systems, military training, and space-based intelligence. Since 2024, the main focus has shifted from drawing down national stocks to participating in coalition procurement and placing orders with the Portuguese defense industry. Political and economic support is provided primarily through EU and NATO mechanisms, allowing

Lisbon to maintain an annual contribution despite its limited domestic military and technical resources.

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ROMANIA

Romania occupies a special place in the system of military, logistical, and humanitarian support for Ukraine. Unlike Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states, Bucharest has long avoided disclosing the full list of weapons and military equipment transferred to Kiev. Romania supplies certain types of weapons and military materiel, facilitates the transit of Western assistance, provides port and railway infrastructure, participates in training Ukrainian F-16 pilots, supports navigation security in the Black Sea, and develops military-industrial cooperation with Kiev. Yet, the country's importance is determined not only by direct arms deliveries, but also by its geographic position. Romania shares approximately 650 kilometers of border with Ukraine, has access to the Black Sea, and is home to the Port of Constanța. After 2022, the port became one of the key alternative routes for Ukrainian exports and supplies.

Since February 2022, the Romanian government has considered supporting Ukraine to be integral to its national security and to strengthening NATO's eastern flank. Romanian assistance to Ukraine is primarily operational and includes ammunition, personal protective equipment, fuel, and other materiel.

As of October 2023, Romanian-Ukrainian cooperation had become more politically stable. On October 10, 2023, V. Zelensky made his first official visit to Bucharest since the beginning of the SMO. There, he held talks with Romanian President K. Iohannis [1]. They discussed security in the Black Sea, economic cooperation, developing shared infrastructure, Ukraine's requests for military support, and plans to establish an F-16 training center in Romania for Ukrainian pilots. Ukraine publicly thanked Romania for its military and humanitarian assistance, though Bucharest did not disclose the full list of weapons and materiel packages already transferred.

On June 20, 2024, Romania's Supreme Council of National Defense approved the transfer of a Patriot surface-to-air missile system to Ukraine. On September 2, the government approved the

corresponding draft law, which was then approved by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on September 3. At the time of the decision, Romania had received four Patriot systems under a \$4 billion contract with the US, two of which were operational. The transfer of the system was conditional upon replacing it with a new system. The associated taxes and fees for acquiring the new system were estimated at approximately \$60 million.

In addition to the Patriot system, since February 2022 Romania has transferred 2,000 protective helmets, 2,000 body armor sets, ammunition, fuel, and individual examples of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, including TAB-71M armored personnel carriers, APR-40 122mm multiple launch rocket systems, M1981 152mm howitzers, DShKM heavy machine guns, 12.7mm ammunition, PG-7(V)M and PG-9V rounds, 73mm rounds, O-832-MC 82mm mortar rounds, and 9M22U-S 122mm rockets [2].

According to data from the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2022, Romania's armed forces had 338 T-55 tanks, 226 TR-85 tanks, 54 TR-85M1 Bizonul tanks, 211 TAB-71 armored personnel carriers, 155 TAB-77s, 402 TABC-79s, 69 TAB Zimbru vehicles, 135 APR-40 multiple launch rocket systems, 54 LAROM systems, 202 M-30 122mm howitzers, 320 M1981 152mm howitzers, 1,351 M1977 mortars, 315 M1982 mortars, and 288 CA-94 man-portable air-defense systems [3]. Romania's significant stockpile of Soviet- and Eastern European-designed weapons has enabled it to provide military support to Ukraine without transferring modern systems from its own armed forces.

Another aspect of Romanian support has been training Ukrainian pilots and technical personnel to operate and maintain F-16 aircraft. This training program began at the European F-16 Training Center in Fetești. Romania provided the infrastructure and airspace, the Netherlands provided the F-16 aircraft, and Lockheed Martin Corporation and its contractors provided the instructional and technical components. By April 2024, the Netherlands had transferred eight of the planned 18 F-16 aircraft to the training center. Afterwards, it announced that another three aircraft would be sent [4].

On July 11, 2024, Romania and Ukraine signed a 10-year security cooperation agreement [5]. The document outlines Romania's contribution to training Ukrainian F-16 pilots, assisting with demining the Black Sea, and implementing specific measures to bolster security in the Black Sea region.

On March 12, 2026, Romanian-Ukrainian military-industrial cooperation developed further when the presidents of Romania and Ukraine signed a declaration of intent in Bucharest regarding the production of Ukrainian defense systems, including UAVs, in Romania. This agreement followed negotiations on joint UAV production under the European SAFE mechanism.

In addition to providing military assistance, Romania has become one of the main host countries for Ukrainian refugees. According to the UNHCR, 208,306 refugees from Ukraine had been registered in Romania as of March 31, 2026 [6].

Transportation and logistics infrastructure have become key elements of Romania's support for Ukraine. In 2022, the Port of Constanta handled approximately 75.5 million tons of cargo. Amid growing Ukrainian transit, this figure increased to 92.5 million tons in 2023, a 22.5% increase. Approximately 14 million tons of Ukrainian grain were exported through the port in 2023, accounting for roughly 30% of all Ukrainian grain exports.

To expand the capacity of the Romanian route, the government approved the allocation of more than \$162.5 million in October 2024 to modernize the railway infrastructure at the Port of Constanta and create a second railway connection. Additionally, DP World implemented projects worth approximately \$147.8 million in Constanța, increasing container capacity from 700,000 TEU to 1.5 million TEU.

By April 2025, approximately 29 million tons of Ukrainian grain had been exported through the Romanian port [7]. In 2026, the main burden fell again on the Ukrainian ports of the Odessa hub, through which more than 90% of Ukraine's agricultural exports passed. At the same time, Russian strikes on port infrastructure continued, maintaining the importance of the Danube and Romanian routes as reserve channels.

Another area of Romanian involvement has been ensuring the safety of navigation in the Black Sea. On January 11, 2024, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria signed an agreement to establish a mine-countermeasures group in the Black Sea [8]. The group's mission is to detect and neutralize drifting sea mines that threaten port infrastructure, commercial shipping, and Ukrainian export routes. The group was formed in response to the growing mine threat that emerged with the outbreak of the conflict.

On August 13, 2024, the Romanian Navy carried out a controlled detonation of a YARM-type naval mine discovered off the coast near Grindul Chituc in southeastern Romania [9]. Since the beginning of the conflict, more than 100 drifting mines have been detected and neutralized in the Black Sea.

In August 2025, Romania proposed expanding the scope of the trilateral mine countermeasures group [10], advocating for the group's transformation into a broader patrol mechanism to protect energy infrastructure, maritime trade, and navigation routes from potential Russian threats.

Romania's defense industry primarily supports Ukraine by producing ammunition and Soviet- and NATO-standard weapons. There are also plans to expand the production of propellants and artillery ammunition components. ROMARM, a state-owned company comprising 15 enterprises and one branch, occupies a central place in the sector [11]. Its product range includes small arms, small-, medium-, and large-caliber ammunition, mortar and artillery ammunition, rockets, missiles, propellants, and explosives.

In August 2025, Romania signed a framework agreement with the German conglomerate Rheinmetall to build a propellant plant. The project was valued at \$626 million [12]. Construction is expected to begin in 2026 and take approximately three years. The plant is intended to produce propellants for Romania's needs as well as those of other countries in the region.

In April 2026, the Romanian parliament approved defense contracts worth \$9.47 billion to be financed under the European SAFE mechanism [13]. Through 2030, Romania's total available funding under the program amounts to \$18.8 billion. These funds

will be allocated toward defense procurement and expanding domestic production, including a propellant plant, infantry fighting vehicles, Skynex air defense systems, tanks, radar systems, counter-UAV systems, helicopters, and transportation links with Ukraine and Moldova. Rheinmetall is expected to be the largest contractor under Romania's SAFE contracts, with projects worth approximately \$5.6 billion.

Joint production of unmanned systems with Ukraine may potentially become a separate area of cooperation. Since September 2025, Romania has been negotiating with Kiev on UAV production under the EU-funded SAFE program [14]. The Romanian side views Ukrainian technologies as combat-tested, though Bucharest believes that establishing a fully integrated, multilayered air and counter-UAV defense system could take at least seven years.

Thus, Romania comprehensively participates in supporting Ukraine. While Bucharest avoids disclosing the full range of military deliveries, its contribution goes beyond the transfer of individual weapons and includes training Ukrainian servicemen, facilitating transit, using port and railway infrastructure, participating in efforts to ensure security in the Black Sea, and developing military-industrial cooperation. Romania's future role will depend on its ability to balance assisting Kiev with maintaining its own defense capabilities, domestic political stability, and using European mechanisms to finance military-industrial production.

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LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

The assistance model provided by Latin American countries differs fundamentally from those previously discussed and primarily involves the enrollment of Latin American nationals as mercenaries in the AFU.

According to the department responsible for coordinating the military service of foreign nationals in the AFU, more than 10,000 combatants from 75 countries have participated or are participating on Kiev's side in the conflict since 2022. According to several foreign media outlets, the actual number of foreign mercenaries may exceed 20,000, accounting for approximately 2% of the total personnel [1]. It is reported that while an average of 100–150 foreign nationals signed contracts with the AFU each month in 2022, by February 2026 the figure had reached approximately 600 [2].

At the initial stage of the conflict, two separate structures were established for foreigners wishing to fight for the Kiev regime: the International Legion of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the 1st International Legion of Territorial Defense of the AFU, under the Ground Forces command. On March 1, 2022, the authorities announced the introduction of a temporary visa-free regime for all foreigners wishing to join the legion [3]. The first 50 foreigners crossed the border on March 3, 2022 [4]. In the first few months, several thousand people from 55 countries signed contracts. Most of the legion's personnel came from the US, the UK, Canada, Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland [5].

Members of the 1st International Legion were assigned to the 1st and 2nd Infantry Battalions of the International Legion, the 3rd Special Operations Battalion of the International Legion, and the Medical Service of the International Legion (the 4th International Legion Training Battalion was formed in May 2023) [6].

From March 2022 onward, members of the unit gained combat experience near Kiev and were subsequently redeployed to the Lugansk region, where they participated in the battles for

Severodonetsk and Lisichansk, as well as operations in the Kharkov region [7].

There was significant engagement with foreigners, with recruitment conducted through the Ukrainian diaspora and Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad, which accepted applications from individuals with military or medical skills [8]. Information about opportunities to serve for high pay was circulated on social media to attract potential recruits. Mercenaries were offered \$480 in rear areas, \$1,200 in the combat zone, and \$3,000 on the front line [9].

The structure and composition of the International Legion continued to expand during its first years. Various national units were formed. The most notable were The Chosen Company, Task Force Yankee, Black Maple Company, Norman Brigade, Canadian Brigade, I.C.E. (Dark Angels), Mozart Group, Georgian National Legion, Caucasian Legion, Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion, Polish Volunteer Corps, Kastus Kalinouski Regiment, and Russian Volunteer Corps. Similar formations also existed within other AFU brigades.

However, by 2024–2025, a significant portion of the foreign combatants who had joined the Legion in 2022 had been killed or had left Ukrainian territory. According to available data, only about 10% of the foreigners who arrived during the first months of the conflict remained [10]. The reasons for the mass exodus include the lack of clear legal status for foreign servicemen in the AFU and a significant decline in overall standards. The six-week training period was reduced to seven to ten days before deployment to the front line. Physical fitness tests and psychological assessments were minimized.

Although contracts allow legion personnel to leave the service after six months, many soldiers have left the country without authorization because they were effectively used as expendable manpower. Additionally, no legion member can hold an officer position; the entire officer corps consists of Ukrainians, who often harbor prejudices against foreigners, particularly those from non-Western countries. There have also been reports of numerous cases

of delayed salaries, poor-quality medical care, and inadequate evacuation of the wounded [11].

To compensate for the shortage of personnel, Ukraine began actively recruiting mercenaries from Latin America. In 2024, Ukraine launched an intensified campaign to recruit Latin American mercenaries because they were viewed as less demanding and a “cheaper labor force”. By summer 2025, Latin Americans accounted for about 40% of all foreign volunteers in the AFU [12]. Separate companies composed entirely of Latin Americans emerged. In 2025, the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade "Magura" publicly announced the creation of the first such company and recruited approximately 2,000 foreign combatants from Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and Mexico [13]. Recruitment was particularly active within the 2nd Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine "Khartia" and the 49th "Carpathian Sich" Battalion. Some units paid for prospective combatants' flights themselves [14].

The biggest problem when working with Latin Americans has been the language barrier. Ukrainian brigades have had to hire Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking interpreters. In the International Legion, combat operations are coordinated in three languages: Ukrainian, English, and Spanish. According to the Ukrainian recruitment platform LobbyX, interpreters are needed in approximately 50 AFU units, including the International Legion of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense, the 12th Special Operations Brigade "Azov," the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine "Azov," the 2nd Recruitment Center of the Air Assault Forces, the 34th Separate Marine Brigade, and others [15]. The "Dominion of Melchizedek" integration project has been established for Latin Americans, which provides a one-month language course for new recruits [16].

Colombian nationals currently comprise the largest group of foreign combatants in the AFU. Various estimates suggest that between 1,000 and 2,000 Colombians are currently serving in the Ukrainian army. In total, approximately 7,000 Colombians have served in the AFU. The focus on Colombians is explained by Colombia's large military and its relatively low salaries for

servicemen. More than 10,000 Colombian military personnel retire each year. For many of them, military service is the only way to support their families. For most, participation in the conflict in Ukraine is primarily financially motivated. According to official data from Colombia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at least 670 Colombians are listed as missing, and 173 have been killed [19].

Recruitment is conducted not only among former military personnel but also among ordinary citizens facing severe economic hardship. There have been reports of Ukrainian schemes to recruit low-skilled workers, supposedly for construction and reconstruction work. Colombians travel through Panama, Turkey (Istanbul), and Moldova. Then, they are illegally trafficked to Ukraine, where they are forced to sign contracts with the AFU. Their phones are confiscated, their contacts and email accounts are deleted, and they are required to install Signal, a messaging app that makes it more difficult to track personal data [20].

The AFU do not hide the fact that they primarily use Latin Americans as "cannon fodder," allowing Ukrainians to avoid assault operations while assigning foreigners to reconnaissance, drone strikes, fire support, command, and logistical support [21]. Some Mexican and Colombian mercenaries, however, view service as an opportunity to gain modern combat experience and learn to operate kamikaze drones and electronic warfare systems. They then transfer these skills to criminal organizations in their home countries. For instance, reports have surfaced that combatants associated with the Mexican Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) have leveraged their expertise to establish a "Drone Operators" unit within the organization. This unit operates UAV models, including the DJI Matrice 300 RTK and DJI Mini 3, which are capable of carrying explosives [22].

To increase the influx of foreign combatants, the Ukrainian authorities intend to change the mechanism for recruiting foreign nationals, as announced in early July 2026. In particular, they approved a procedure establishing the rules for all logistics associated with such volunteers, from their arrival in Ukraine to signing a military service contract.

Under the new system, private companies will provide organizational, documentation, and logistical support to candidates for soldier and NCO positions. These companies will handle logistics, paperwork, insurance, accommodations, food, and other aspects of supporting foreign recruits until they sign a contract. Regardless of which company accompanies them, all foreigners will be screened by Ukrainian security services. After signing a contract, they will undergo combat coordination training [23].

According to Ukrainian authorities, the main goal is to fill 30–50% of assault and infantry positions with foreigners [24]. This process began in late 2025 when International Legion units were integrated into the Ground Forces' assault troops. The 1st and 3rd battalions merged to form the 475th Assault Regiment, and personnel from the 2nd Battalion were distributed among the 475th and 253rd Assault Regiments and the 129th Territorial Defense Brigade. The 4th Training Battalion transformed into the 157th International Training Center [25].

Despite attempts to streamline the recruitment process through private companies and integrate international units into regular assault formations, Kiev has failed to turn foreign combatants into a genuinely reliable and combat-effective component of its army. By summer 2026, the experiment with the “internationalization” of the AFU, launched in spring 2022, had effectively run its course. It became clear that money and an established recruitment system could not compensate for the lack of high-quality, motivated reinforcements. Consequently, foreign formations remain more of a temporary solution than a strategic one, calling into question Ukraine’s ability to continue compensating for its shortage of troops with external resources.

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UNITED STATES

Since the start of the special military operation to defend Donbass in February 2022, the United States has been the undisputed leader in military assistance allocated to the Kiev regime. In total funding, Washington is far ahead of all its NATO and European Union allies, having effectively assumed the role of the Ukrainian army's main logistical and technological partner.

According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which has tracked military assistance flows to Ukraine since before the start of large-scale hostilities, the US remained the undisputed leader among suppliers of weapons and military equipment, with military assistance amounting to approximately \$73.64 billion as of early June 2026. At the same time, total support, including both financial and humanitarian assistance, amounted to roughly \$131.5 billion [1].

US government agencies report significantly higher figures. According to the inspectors general of the Pentagon, State Department, and US Agency for International Development (USAID) submitted to Congress in February 2026, the US allocated a total of \$183.58 billion for military and financial assistance programs for Ukraine between 2022 and 2024 [2]. At the same time, the agencies' report states that during the entire period of the SMO, Congress approved \$187.8 billion in assistance to Kiev, of which, as of the time the report was prepared, only \$64.5 billion had been allocated but not yet obligated for their intended purpose. Notably, the latest major military assistance package for Ukraine, worth approximately \$60.8 billion, was approved by Congress in April 2024. By comparison, roughly \$3.92 billion was approved for fiscal year 2025 and about \$220 million for 2026 [3].

Several factors explain the discrepancy between the Kiel Institute's figures and those reported by US government agencies. US government agencies include funding for Operation Atlantic

Resolve⁶ in their reports, which covers military support not only for Ukraine but also for a number of Eastern European countries. In addition, US agencies include funds allocated to replenish their own stocks of weapons and military equipment previously transferred to Kiev. Associated expenses, including administrative and logistical costs, are also included, whereas the Kiel Institute for the World Economy does not count them.

It is noteworthy that US military assistance to Kiev began long before the SMO. The legal basis for the support was the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, adopted in December 2014 by former US President B. Obama. The law authorized the free transfer of weapons to the Kiev regime and the training of Ukrainian servicemen, and also laid the groundwork for systematic assistance in the future. In 2014–2016, the US provided Ukraine with sovereign loan guarantees three times, each worth \$1 billion [4]. In addition, since the passage of the Act, the US State Department has allocated more than \$2 billion for programs supporting Ukraine's development. In the early years of US support, according to official sources, the US administration mainly supplied non-lethal weapons, including body armor, protective helmets, communications equipment, armored vehicles, and other equipment [5]. However, after D. Trump was elected president, the White House approved deliveries of lethal weapons, in particular FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile systems and FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS. According to various estimates, from 2014 to early 2022, the US supplied approximately \$15.5 billion worth of weapons and military equipment [6].

One of the main areas of US-Ukrainian cooperation was military personnel training. Since 2014, the Joint Multinational Training Group — Ukraine (JMTG-U), launched at the initiative of the US Army Europe Command, had operated as an official program. Initially, the group consisted of instructors from the US,

⁶ “Atlantic Resolve” — a US military initiative aimed at strengthening NATO's eastern flank and supporting allies and partners in Europe. It was launched in 2014 following Crimea's reunification with Russia. The program's activities expanded after the start of the SMO.

Canada, and Lithuania; specialists from the UK, Poland, and Denmark subsequently joined them. Under the US initiative, representatives of participating countries trained Ukrainian servicemen in NATO-standard combat tactics. Training was conducted at the Yavoriv Training Center (International Peacekeeping and Security Center). According to various estimates, more than 27,000 Ukrainian servicemen were trained under the JMTG-U program from 2015 to early 2022. In parallel, CIA specialists and special operations forces trained Ukrainian Special Operations Forces personnel to conduct reconnaissance and subversive activities [7].

US military assistance to Ukraine is distributed through several mechanisms. One of them is the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA)⁷. The main document governing PDA is Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It allows the US president to authorize the withdrawal of defense articles and services from the stocks of government agencies, primarily the Department of Defense. Under US law, the standard annual PDA limit is \$100 million in aggregate. However, Congress significantly increased the limit for support to Ukraine: to \$11 billion in 2022, \$14.5 billion in 2023, and \$7.8 billion in 2024 [8]. The increases were approved under the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, signed by former US President J. Biden on May 21, 2022. The PDA mechanism was used for Ukraine 55 times from August 2021, with the total value of weapons and services transferred estimated at approximately \$31.7 billion [9]. A distinctive feature of the mechanism is the clear list of weapons transferred under PDA.

Since D. Trump took office as the 47th president of the US, no new packages of military assistance to Ukraine have been allocated under the PDA mechanism.

⁷ Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) — a special US foreign-policy instrument that allows the president to rapidly transfer weapons and military services from the stocks of US government agencies to foreign countries. Its distinguishing feature is that it does not require waiting for new appropriations from Congress.

After the start of the SMO, the US allocated a large package of military and technical assistance to the Kiev regime under the PDA program in several stages in 2022:

- June–August: ammunition for HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, 75,000 155mm artillery shells, 20 120mm mortar systems, 20,000 120mm mortar rounds, 16 M119 105mm howitzers, 36,000 105mm shells, ammunition for NASAMS air defense systems, 1,000 FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile systems, 15 ScanEagle reconnaissance UAVs, 40 MaxxPro heavy armored vehicles, 50 HMMWV (Humvee) high-mobility vehicles, as well as communications equipment, anti-personnel mines, and medical supplies, for a total of roughly \$1 billion [10];

- October: four HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, ammunition for HIMARS, 16 M777 155mm howitzers, up to 100,000 155mm shells, 500 M982 Excalibur 155mm precision-guided artillery shells, 1,000 RAAM 155mm artillery-delivered remote anti-armor mine systems, 16 M119 105mm howitzers, 30,000 120mm mortar rounds, 200 MaxxPro heavy armored vehicles, small arms and ammunition for them, worth roughly \$625 million [11];

- December: 120 HMMWV (Humvee) high-mobility vehicles, 37 Cougar heavy armored vehicles, 120mm, 82mm, and 60mm mortar systems, 10,000 120mm mortar rounds, ammunition for HIMARS, JDAM precision-guided aerial bombs, as well as anti-personnel mines and auxiliary equipment worth up to \$1 billion [12].

In 2023, the US Congress significantly increased the financial limit under the PDA program to \$14.5 billion, while the largest military assistance package under the presidential initiative that year, totaling up to \$2.85 billion, was delivered in January. It included 50 M2A2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 500 BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missile systems, 100 M113 armored personnel carriers, 55 MRAP vehicles, 138 HMMWV (Humvee) high-mobility vehicles, 18 M109 Paladin 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 36 M119 105mm howitzers, 70,000 155mm shells, 1,200 RAAM 155mm artillery-delivered remote anti-armor mine

systems, 95,000 105mm shells, 2,000 anti-tank missiles, 4,000 Zuni air-to-ground rockets, and auxiliary equipment [13]. By the end of the year, the main US deliveries to the AFU, totaling up to \$3 billion, consisted of replenishing ammunition stocks for previously supplied weapons and equipment, as well as providing new types of missiles.

The PDA limit for fiscal year 2024 was set at \$7.8 billion. However, due to bureaucratic problems, the first aid packages were approved with delays. The key development was the decision by the J. Biden administration in September 2024 to allocate a record \$5.55 billion to Ukraine. The funds constituted an additional tranche of assistance that made it possible to prevent previously approved but unused authorities from expiring at the end of the fiscal year. During the year, Washington supplied Kiev with missiles for HAWK Phase III, NASAMS, Stinger, and Patriot air defense systems, 155mm and 105mm shells, ammunition for BGM-71 TOW and FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile systems, as well as several Stryker and M1117 armored personnel carriers, HMMWV (Humvee) high-mobility vehicles, and counter-UAV systems [14].

In 2025, with the arrival of the new US administration, the PDA program was effectively suspended, and its use was limited to transferring remaining stocks approved under J. Biden. The military assistance package included additional air defense missiles, air-to-ground munitions, and equipment to support F-16 multirole fighters. According to various estimates, approximately \$3.8 billion remained available to the US under the PDA program when the White House changed hands [15].

The new White House administration placed its emphasis on the PURL program. The initiative was launched on July 14, 2025, by US President D. Trump and NATO Secretary General M. Rutte. The first purchases began in August 2025. The process involves determining requirements, coordinating priority supply areas between the US and European sides, funding from European countries, and subsequent deliveries from US stocks once funding is received. A notable feature is that participating countries can

transfer funds to a special NATO account in the US, allowing them to bypass lengthy bureaucratic procedures for procuring weapons under standard programs.

The PURL initiative has demonstrated strong momentum. By June 2026, 26 countries had joined the program: Australia, Belgium, the UK, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Finland, Croatia, Montenegro, Sweden, Estonia, and Japan. The initiative's priority is the procurement of weapons not produced in Europe. The key focus is the supply of air defense systems and missiles for them. By the end of December 2025, PURL was supplying approximately 75% of all missiles for the US MIM-104 Patriot air defense system and nearly 90% of missiles for other air defense systems previously delivered to the AFU [16]. In addition, the program made it possible to rapidly replenish shortages of missiles for M142 HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, artillery ammunition, as well as spare parts and components required to maintain and repair US-made weapons. According to various estimates, Ukraine received approximately \$5 billion worth of weapons and military equipment under the program in 2025.

One of the main advantages of the PURL program is the speed of deliveries, as supplies are made directly from existing US stocks, significantly reducing the time between identifying the current needs of the AFU and receiving the equipment. In addition, centralized coordination through NATO specialists on the ground simplifies administration and creates a direct line of communication with PURL leadership through specialists directly involved in combat operations on Ukraine's side. Another important factor that significantly enhances Ukraine's military capabilities and strengthens the US position is the ability of European countries to directly finance the US defense industry, maintaining supplies even as direct US budgetary funding is reduced.

The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) operates in parallel. Under the initiative, the Pentagon concludes contracts with US defense-industry companies for the production and supply of weapons, ammunition, and equipment, as well as for training and logistical support for the AFU. The initiative was established by Congress as early as 2015 with the aim of building up the AFU's military capabilities and combat readiness over the long term following the events in Crimea in 2014. Under the J. Biden administration, Congress allocated \$33 billion to the initiative. By the end of 2025, \$18.2 billion worth of military assistance under USAI had actually been delivered, while another approximately \$15 billion was awaiting fulfillment of contractual obligations.

Assistance under the USAI program covers a wide range of weapons and military equipment. Its main components include air defense, artillery and missile systems, anti-tank weapons, UAVs, small arms and ammunition, and logistics. A distinctive feature of the US initiative is that it is not a one-off measure but an ongoing process of concluding contracts. The final list of equipment delivered is constantly expanding, while deliveries are spread over a specified period. Many military assistance packages are described generically in the media. A significant portion of the funds officially confirmed by both parties to the agreement represents only an allocated amount and does not necessarily mean that the funds have already been used or paid out to fulfill contractual obligations.

In 2022, Ukraine and the US announced agreements totaling approximately \$1.1 billion involving the procurement of HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, HMMWV high-mobility vehicles, UAV equipment, and communications equipment [17]. The following year, contracts worth approximately \$1.3 billion were announced, under which Kiev would acquire NASAMS and HAWK air defense systems and missiles for them, BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missile systems, Phoenix Ghost, Switchblade, and PUMA UAVs, artillery shells, and satellite communications equipment [18]. In 2024, record agreements worth approximately \$13 billion were concluded under the USAI program. They

included several military assistance packages (April, September, and December) for the acquisition of counter-UAV systems, equipment for integrating air defense systems adopted by NATO countries, HIMARS ammunition, artillery ammunition, various UAVs, as well as equipment and spare parts for repairing previously supplied weapons and equipment [19].

An analysis of the fulfillment of USAI commitments demonstrates a clear trend: manufacturers completed 62% of the 2022 contracts, 36% of the 2023 contracts, and 18% of the 2024 contracts. According to Pentagon estimates, as of the end of 2025, approximately 33% of the total amount planned under the USAI initiative had been delivered to Ukraine. In March 2026, the figure stood at 57%. The remaining deliveries are expected to be spread over several years.

After D. Trump took office, new funding for the program was sharply reduced. In June 2026, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved its own proposed USAI funding level of \$750 million [20]. However, this amount is only a Senate proposal and requires agreement with and final approval by the House of Representatives.

The Foreign Military Financing ⁸ program occupies an important place in US military assistance to Ukraine. The initiative is a key platform under which Kiev receives funding in the form of grants or direct loans to purchase US weapons and military equipment, services, and training. The FMF program is part of the security mechanisms authorized by the US Arms Export Control Act⁹, which are in turn governed by the International Traffic in

⁸ Foreign Military Financing (FMF) — a US initiative designed to provide grants and loans to foreign governments to finance the procurement of US weapons, services, and training. The program was established under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and is overseen by the Office of Security Assistance in the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, while being implemented by the Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

⁹ US Arms Export Control Act (AECA) — a federal law granting the president authority to control the import and export of defense articles and services. It regulates government military sales and commercial arms transfers abroad and requires purchasers to obtain US authorization before transferring US weapons to third parties.

Arms Regulations (ITAR)¹⁰. Unlike the PDA initiative, the FMF program involves the procurement of new weapons and military equipment, services, and maintenance directly from US defense corporations.

In the process of providing military assistance under the FMF program, the US legislative and executive branches, Department of Defense structures, and the US defense industry are involved. The decision-making mechanism is intended to ensure transparency in the use of budget funds and guarantee that financing is directed toward strengthening the defense capabilities of the recipient country. As part of the annual budget approval process or the adoption of emergency appropriations, the US Congress allocates a specific amount of funding for Ukraine through FMF. The amount serves as a kind of “ceiling,” subject to specific conditions and deadlines for using the funds. After the budget is approved, the allocated funds are transferred to the account of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which operates on behalf of the US Department of Defense. The Ukrainian side then submits a request specifying the required weapons and military equipment, and spare parts. Once approved by both sides, deliveries are made.

The process of fulfilling FMF commitments can normally take a considerable amount of time depending on the complexity of the order. However, in the case of Ukraine, the Pentagon and State Department have shortened standard procedures, allowing commitments to be fulfilled within significantly shorter timeframes.

In September 2022, the US announced a large-scale long-term assistance package worth \$2.2 billion for Ukraine and a number of other countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Greece, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, North Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, and Estonia) under FMF, with \$1 billion of the total allocated to Kiev. Unlike the emergency military assistance package, the funds were intended for long-term

¹⁰ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) — US regulations controlling the export, import, and transfer of defense articles, technologies, and services.

procurement of US weapons systems, modernization of the AFU and their transition to NATO standards, as well as replenishment of stocks and strengthening the state's defense capabilities over the long term. The specific list of weapons and military equipment for Kiev under this package was not fixed; it was determined as the Ukrainian side formulated requests and concluded contracts with US defense contractors [21].

In 2023, two assistance packages were allocated under FMF. In January 2023, the first support program, totaling \$225 million, was announced to cover Ukraine's current military needs, including the maintenance and restoration of previously supplied weapons and equipment [22]. In September 2023, during a visit to Kiev by former US Secretary of State E. Blinken, a new \$100 million assistance package was announced to support the long-term military needs of the AFU [23].

In 2024, the format of FMF assistance to Ukraine changed. While previous years had focused primarily on the procurement of new weapons and equipment, the program was subsequently reoriented toward maintaining the combat readiness of weapons already transferred. In November 2024, the US State Department approved \$100 million for Ukraine for maintenance. Under the package, Kiev received repair and restoration services for weapons and military equipment, as well as personnel training [24]. Meanwhile, other funds worth \$266.4 million, approved by the State Department in December 2024, were intended to maintain F-16 multirole fighters, specifically spare parts and equipment, software tools for coordinating combat sorties (a joint mission-planning system), and training for personnel in piloting and maintenance [25].

In 2025, the geographic scope of financing and the range of weapons and equipment expanded. The central focus of US initiatives was strengthening air defense and providing new offensive capabilities to the AFU. In July 2025, the State Department approved \$322 million in funding [26]. The package was notable in that it consisted of two separate but complementary components. The first involved \$172 million for maintenance of

HAWK Phase III air defense systems. Kiev received authorization to purchase spare parts and equipment to keep the system operational, repair and modernization services for launchers and radar modules, as well as maintenance and logistical support. The Pentagon noted that the assistance package was intended to meet the AFU's need to strengthen local repair and maintenance capabilities for 20 HAWK Phase III batteries, which is critical for protecting Ukrainian airspace. The second component, worth \$150 million in FMF assistance, was intended to maintain and develop the technical capabilities of M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Ukraine received the opportunity to purchase restoration and technical support services, as well as training for servicemen.

Notably, in August 2025, the US State Department also approved the largest amount of funding under the FMF program for Ukraine to date — \$825 million. The assistance package was not intended to maintain or modernize existing weapons and equipment but to procure air munitions, which would significantly strengthen the capabilities of the Ukrainian Air Force. In accordance with Ukrainian requirements, Kiev requested 3,350 ERAM long-range guided missiles, associated equipment, including missile containers, spare parts, auxiliary equipment, navigation systems, software, technical documentation, as well as training for servicemen to operate the new type of weapon. A distinctive feature was that the deal was financed with support from Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, constituting a direct inflow of European funds into the US defense industry for Ukraine's needs [27].

In 2026, the FMF program reached a fundamentally new level, focusing on two key areas: equipping Ukrainian aviation with next-generation precision-guided weapons and modernizing ground-based air defense systems. In May 2026, the US State Department allocated \$373.6 million for the sale of JDAM-ER extended-range guided aerial bombs to Ukraine, intended for use by tactical aircraft, particularly F-16 fighters. The military assistance package also included 1,200 KMU-572 guidance tail kits, 323 KMU-556 kits, and associated software [28]. During the same period, \$108.1

million was approved for the modernization of MIM-23 HAWK air defense systems [29]. The current year demonstrates a gradual US transition from emergency response to systematic strategic rearmament of the AFU under the FMF program.

In addition to supplying weapons and military equipment, Washington actively provides Kiev with intelligence and technological support not only to assist the AFU but, above all, to test the results of its own developments under conditions of direct combat. The nature of the assistance has gradually changed from limited cooperation to deep integration, encompassing not only the transfer of intelligence but also access to advanced technologies, satellite systems, and US-made analytical platforms. US technological capabilities are crucial to maintaining the AFU's high state of combat readiness. No Ukrainian operation is conducted without US technology. Analysts identify several levels of US intelligence support: targeting, intelligence processing, and analysis. The US side has a strategic interest in supporting Ukraine with intelligence: the US is deeply concerned about the development of Russian and Chinese satellite systems and is prepared to further deepen cooperation with the Kiev regime in order to develop its own space capabilities.

A key element of US support is the provision of satellite intelligence. According to Ukrainian military experts, Kiev is critically dependent on satellite reconnaissance, both optical and radar. Access to satellite data has two components: free access, provided as part of military assistance, and commercial access, obtained through contracts with US aerospace companies (Maxar Technologies, Planet Labs, BlackSky, ICEYE, and Capella Space) [30]. According to former head of Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence K. Budanov, the loss of free access would reduce capabilities by approximately 15%. The most sensitive dependency is on radar imagery, which provides surveillance at any time of day. Losing this capability would reduce Ukraine's intelligence-gathering capabilities by almost half. But the biggest setback would be a decision to block agreements with US corporations, which would make it impossible for the Main

Directorate of Intelligence to conduct intelligence activities using space-based assets.

Another area of US support is the ballistic threat early-warning system. Washington provides Kiev with information through its space infrastructure using the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). Losing space-based support in this area would leave Ukraine highly vulnerable to missile strikes against military and critical infrastructure [31].

Particular attention should be paid to the acceleration of intelligence-data transmission through commercial satellites operated by US company Vantor. The technology, jointly developed by the US, the Netherlands, and Ukraine, makes it possible to transmit satellite imagery directly to a device within minutes of acquisition. The method has significantly reduced the time between target detection and decision-making on the ground. In addition, using the system together with AI makes it possible to identify changes in terrain in greater detail through rapid data analysis and construct three-dimensional routes for UAV operations.

Beyond traditional satellite reconnaissance, the US provides Ukraine with unprecedented technological support through leading US corporations. Kiev effectively serves as a major reference customer for AI projects, while Ukrainian territory has become a testing ground for US military technologies based on new solutions in the information and communications environment. Palantir Technologies has operated in Ukraine since June 2022. According to Palantir CEO A. Karp, the company's software is responsible for "most of the targeting in Ukraine" [32]. The US company enables analysis of Russian air strikes against Ukrainian military and critical infrastructure through the Brave1 Dataroom platform¹¹. In addition, the corporation's technologies can process satellite imagery and open-source data using AI, machine learning, and

¹¹ Brave1 Dataroom — an information and communications environment for training and testing AI models on real-world data obtained during AFU activities. It was jointly developed by Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Digital Transformation, a military intelligence research institute, and Palantir.

large language models to analyze and visualize information, significantly reducing the human resources required for data analysis. Since March 2026, the General Staff of the AFU has also been using Palantir systems to plan long-range strikes against targets on Russian territory.

In 2023, former Google CEO E. Schmidt, following a series of meetings with Ukrainian officials and military experts and an analysis of the AFU's needs, decided to establish Project Eagle (later Perennial Autonomy), whose main activity is the development of UAVs. The US initiative's development team includes engineers from Apple, SpaceX, and Google, as well as former Pentagon innovation chief W. Roper [33]. One of the main results of the specialists' work was the production of Hornet UAVs, which use AI to identify, classify, and prioritize targets. Since April 2026, the AFU have been using this type of UAV, which has undergone NATO standardization, enabling European NATO member-state operators located outside Ukraine to control the unmanned systems. According to several foreign publications, Hornet UAVs are actively used to strike fuel infrastructure in Crimea and other military and critical infrastructure facilities [34].

The most critical vulnerability stemming from Kiev's dependence on US technologies is its complete reliance on the Starlink satellite system owned by I. Musk's company. According to military experts, Starlink provides up to 90% of stable communications and combat command and control for the AFU. In addition, without the US satellite constellation, the Kiev regime would lose the ability to coordinate attacks and control UAVs. In August 2025, the US State Department approved the sale to Ukraine of Starlink satellite communications services and associated equipment worth a total of \$150 million. The main contractor is Starlink Services, while the agreement also includes engineering, technical, and logistical services from the US government [35].

US corporation Microsoft also provides technological support to Ukraine. Its main assistance consists of providing free cloud services, transferring data to secure data centers in European

countries, and involving the Ukrainian side in cybersecurity projects. According to various estimates, in 2022–2025 the US company provided Kiev with services worth approximately \$700–800 million and plans to assist the Kiev regime at least through 2027 [36].

Despite its effectiveness, US support creates a critical dependency for Ukraine on decisions made by the US. According to experts, Kiev receives up to 80% of its intelligence from Western partners, with Washington serving as the main source [37]. As noted by the US think tank Global Security, if the US decides to limit intelligence support for Ukraine, Ukrainian military capabilities will be critically reduced [38]. Despite the Kiev regime's efforts to diversify its sources of intelligence, including by using the capabilities of France, the UK, and Canada, a complete replacement for US capabilities is currently impossible, particularly in the fields of radar reconnaissance and satellite communications.

The further development of US-Ukrainian military and technical cooperation will likely be determined by the struggle among three key forces: the administration of President D. Trump, which seeks to reduce direct funding for Kiev; the US Congress, which insists on continued support; and European countries, which are assuming an increasing share of the budgetary burden of meeting the Kiev regime's needs. At the same time, a possible reduction in direct funding would not mean an end to support. In such a case, the focus would shift toward mechanisms under which the US would act as a weapons supplier financed by other sources, as is currently the case under the PURL program. In addition, the White House administration will seek to expand ties with Ukraine under the FMF program, with European countries acting as creditors to Ukraine. US corporations and defense companies receive enormous financial resources to deploy their experimental weapons and equipment and technological developments under combat conditions in order to identify shortcomings and further improve technical characteristics. The US will retain its role as the

main technological and logistical partner, while the financial burden will be shifted to European countries supporting Ukraine.

The US has created and maintains Ukraine's critical dependence on US military technologies, intelligence, and communications systems. Despite the trend toward lower direct financial expenditures on supporting the AFU under the current White House administration, Washington's position could change dramatically following the congressional elections in November 2026.

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TURKEY

Turkish assistance to Ukraine has a more complex structure than the support from other NATO countries. Unlike its European counterparts, Ankara has not developed a single public program with a multiyear budget. The Turkish model instead consists of several parallel areas: political support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, military and military-industrial cooperation, maritime projects, mediation diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and limited economic support.

Turkey's main distinguishing feature is that it combines support for Ukraine with the preservation of engagement channels with Russia. Ankara condemned the launch of the special military operation to defend Donbass, calling it unacceptable and contrary to international law [1]. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has also repeatedly stated that it does not recognize Crimea's incorporation into Russia and supports Ukraine's sovereignty, while paying particular attention to the situation of the Crimean Tatars [2]. However, Turkey did not fully join the Western sanctions regime. As a result, its approach cannot be described as conventional Western-style allied support. Rather, it represents a pragmatic model in which military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine is combined with a mediating role, control over the Black Sea straits, and the preservation of beneficial economic ties with Russia.

Military-political cooperation between Ankara and Kiev began long before February 2022. Ukraine participated in cooperation mechanisms with Turkey through NATO and regional Black Sea formats, including the NATO-Ukraine Commission and naval cooperation initiatives in the Black Sea. Following the events of 2014, Turkey's recognition of Ukraine's territorial integrity with regard to Crimea created a political foundation for the further expansion of bilateral dialogue. At the same time, Ukraine became a lucrative market for Turkey's defense industry and a source of certain technologies, engines, and components needed for Turkish aviation, drone, and missile programs.

The agreements concluded in 2021 and early 2022 were of particular importance. In September 2021, Ukraine's Defense Ministry and Baykar signed a memorandum for the construction of a training and testing center in Ukraine to service Turkish drones and train personnel [3]. In November 2021, the two sides discussed joint projects in the aviation and missile sectors, leveraging Ukrainian technological expertise in aircraft engine manufacturing, military transport aviation, and missile systems. In July 2023, Ukraine's Defense Ministry and Baykar Makina signed an agreement to establish a UAV repair and maintenance center. Concurrently, Baykar began construction of a plant near Kiev, designed to employ approximately 500 people and potentially produce up to 120 Bayraktar TB2 or TB3 drones per year [4]. By the end of 2024, construction of the facility was estimated to be roughly 80% complete; however, in 2025 the facility was targeted by Russian Aerospace Forces strikes, which delayed the transition to sustainable serial production. Currently, the project is only partially implemented: service and production infrastructure has been established or is in the process of being restored, but publicly available data confirming full-scale serial production of Bayraktar drones on Ukrainian territory is lacking. Nevertheless, cooperation in aviation and engine manufacturing has remained important for Turkey, as Ukrainian engines have been used in the Akıncı and Kızılelma programs, while Baykar has continued its cooperation with the Ukrainian company Ivchenko-Progress.

On February 3, 2022, Turkey and Ukraine signed a free trade agreement [5]. It was concluded just weeks before the start of the SMO and was subsequently viewed as a tool for expanding economic and industrial cooperation.

From the first days of the SMO, Turkey made an important foreign-policy decision as part of its broader stance on Ukraine. Ankara classified the conflict as a war and invoked the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, restricting the passage of warships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles [3]. This had a significant impact on the operational situation in the Black Sea. Specifically, Turkey blocked the possibility of reinforcing Russia's

Black Sea Fleet with ships from other fleets while maintaining formal legal neutrality. For Ukraine, this move was crucial as a means of limiting Russia's naval capabilities.

The humanitarian component was the first openly declared area of Turkish support. As early as late February 2022, Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) began sending humanitarian supplies to Ukraine, with the volume of deliveries increasing rapidly in March and April 2022. According to Turkish government reports, by mid-April AFAD had sent 67 trucks carrying humanitarian aid and one mobile kitchen unit to Ukraine [8]. The deliveries included food, essential supplies, blankets, tents, medical materials, and emergency response equipment. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) also played an important role. In 2022, the agency provided vehicles, generators, and other equipment [9; 10], while individual TİKA projects were aimed at supporting local administrations, hospitals, and humanitarian organizations. The Turkish Red Crescent also participated in the humanitarian response [11]. Overall, Turkey's humanitarian assistance was not as large in financial terms as EU programs, but it was of considerable importance during the first months of the SMO.

Turkey's military assistance to Ukraine is the most sensitive and least transparent area. Unlike many NATO countries, Ankara does not publish a comprehensive government list of deliveries. The most well-known element of Turkish military support has been the Bayraktar TB2 drones. Ukraine purchased Turkish UAVs even before the start of the SMO. In 2019, Kiev had already received six Bayraktar TB2s and three ground control stations, while in 2020 plans were reported to purchase another five systems [14]. In 2021, Ukrainian forces used Bayraktar TB2s to target Donbass for the first time, confirming the practical importance of Turkish unmanned technology for the Ukrainian army even before February 2022. After the outbreak of hostilities, TB2s were actively used by the AFU against Russian forces. In the first weeks, they were used to strike armored vehicles, air defense systems, supply columns, and other Russian military targets.

According to open-source data, the number of Bayraktar TB2s in AFU units reached up to 30 aircraft delivered or transferred to Ukraine during the initial stage of the war. Some deliveries were made overland through Poland, while others followed maritime and combined logistics routes. The growth in Turkish arms exports to Ukraine during the first three months of 2022 was estimated to be several times higher than during the same period in 2021. This reflected Ukraine's rapid transformation from an important partner of the Turkish defense industry into one of its main markets.

Baykar's role was of particular importance. In June 2022, following the "People's Bayraktar"¹² campaign in Ukraine, Baykar announced that it would provide three Bayraktar TB2s free of charge and would not accept the funds raised by citizens [12]. The company adopted a similar approach to crowdfunding campaigns in other countries where money was raised to purchase drones for Ukraine. Thus, the assistance acquired not only military but also political and symbolic significance.

In January 2023, an intergovernmental agreement between Ukraine and Turkey on cooperation in high technology, aviation, and space entered into force, strengthening the legal framework for military cooperation. For Ukraine, this provided an opportunity to develop joint projects involving UAVs, aviation, engines, control systems, and repairs. For Turkey, the agreement was important as a channel for accessing Ukrainian technological expertise, particularly in areas where the Turkish defense industry remains dependent on external suppliers.

The second major area of military assistance was armored vehicles. In August 2022, reports emerged that Turkey had transferred BMC Kirpi armored vehicles to Ukraine. The first batch included 50 mine-resistant vehicles, with the delivery carried out under intergovernmental agreements [16]. Additionally, Turkish armored vehicles spotted with Ukrainian units have also included Cobra II armored cars [14]. The appearance of these

¹² The "People's Bayraktar" campaign was a public crowdfunding effort to purchase Bayraktar TB2 strike-reconnaissance UAVs for Ukraine.

armored vehicles with the AFU demonstrates that cooperation was not limited to drones.

In 2022–2023, Turkey supplied Ukraine with Roketsan TRLG 230 guided missiles with a range from 20 to 70 km [18; 19]. These missiles can engage ground targets using laser designation. Turkey also supplied Sungur MANPADS to the AFU [19]. Experts estimate that several dozen TRLG 230 missiles and around 100 Sungur missiles were delivered.

There are also reports of deliveries to Kiev of Turkish-made cluster artillery munitions dating from the Cold War period that warrant particular attention. Turkey and Ukraine are not parties to the 2010 Convention on Cluster Munitions, which formally distinguishes their legal status from that of countries that have acceded to the treaty.

Given the Turkish government's selective approach in the Russia-Turkey-Ukraine triangle, official data on military deliveries to the AFU are classified. Despite this opacity, it became known in April 2023 that a batch of M2F twin-barrel machine guns had been supplied, while in October 2023 Canik supplied Ukraine with more than 600 Canik M2 heavy machine guns [17]. The unit was estimated at \$15,000–20,000. According to available data, Turkish deliveries to Ukraine in 2023 included Bayraktar TB2s, Bayraktar mini-UAVs, Kirpi armored vehicles, rocket systems, ammunition, and other types of military equipment [21].

Reports from late 2025 also indicate a broader range of Turkish deliveries, including T-300 Kasırga rocket systems, 300mm rockets, 155mm artillery shells, T-155 Fırtına self-propelled howitzers, and decommissioned artillery systems of earlier generations.

In summer 2026, reports emerged that Turkey had signed a contract with Ukraine to supply Bayraktar KIZILELMA UAVs and JET-230 supersonic air-to-surface aeroballistic missiles to accompany them. The drone is equipped with a turbofan engine capable of a cruising speed of 735 km/h and a maximum speed of 1,102 km/h. The JET-230 missile has a range of 120 km. One of KIZILELMA's key features is its ability to operate autonomously

in various modes. The number of drones purchased is unknown, but the batch is reportedly large.

The maritime dimension is particularly noteworthy. Even before the start of the SMO, Turkey and Ukraine agreed to build Ada-class corvettes under the MILGEM program. In December 2020, Turkey began constructing these corvettes for the Ukrainian Navy. The first ship, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, was built at the RMK Marine shipyard in the Tuzla district of Istanbul and launched on October 2, 2022 [23]. In spring 2024, it underwent its first sea trials in the Sea of Marmara [24]. The second corvette, Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi, was laid down in 2023 and launched in August 2024 [25]. These deliveries became one of the main elements of Turkey's contribution to restoring Ukraine's naval capabilities.

Turkey's diplomatic contribution was no less significant than its military one. The best-known example was the Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed in Istanbul on July 22, 2022, with the participation of Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, and the UN [4]. A Joint Coordination Centre was established in Istanbul to inspect vessels and facilitate the export of Ukrainian grain from Black Sea ports. According to the UN, nearly 33 million tons of grain and food products were exported to 45 countries across three continents during the initiative's operation [5]. For Ukraine, this meant the partial restoration of an export channel, foreign-currency revenues, and food logistics. For Turkey, the initiative became a tool for positioning itself internationally as a mediator.

Turkey also participated in prisoner exchanges [6; 7]. Notably, in 2025, negotiations were held in Istanbul, resulting in an agreement to exchange prisoners on a 1,000-for-1,000 basis, while the sides also discussed draft documents on a ceasefire and future settlement terms [26; 27].

In 2026, the Turkish-Ukrainian agenda continued to encompass both military and energy dimensions. On April 4, R.T. Erdoğan and V. Zelensky met in Istanbul to discuss security, energy, the development of gas infrastructure, safe navigation in the Black Sea, and further cooperation [28; 29]. The Ukrainian side emphasized its readiness to expand security cooperation. Turkey, for its part,

continued to position itself as a country capable of both supporting Ukraine and acting as a mediator in negotiations.

Turkey's energy assistance was not on the same scale as Norway's gas and energy support or Australia's coal deliveries. However, energy remained part of the political dialogue. For Ukraine, this was linked to restoring its energy system and finding new supply routes. For Turkey, the energy issue fit into a broader policy of turning the country into a regional energy hub between the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Europe.

According to some estimates, Turkey is involved in more than 260 projects to rebuild various facilities in Ukraine, with a total value of around \$9.3 billion. A significant share of these projects focuses on infrastructure, construction, transportation, industrial facilities, and technical restoration. For Ankara, this area has a dual significance. On the one hand, it demonstrates Turkey's long-term involvement in the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine. On the other, it gives Turkish construction, engineering, and defense companies access to a major reconstruction market, where infrastructure projects may be linked to military logistics, the industrial base, and critical facilities.

Thus, Turkish assistance to Ukraine represents not merely a conventional donor-support model but a hybrid system. It combines military-industrial cooperation, commercial deliveries, humanitarian assistance, individual donor decisions by private companies, naval projects, reconstruction initiatives, and mediation diplomacy. For Ukraine, Turkey is important not only as a supplier of specific types of weapons but also as a production base, Black Sea regulator, negotiating platform, and participant in future reconstruction. For Turkey, its engagement with Ukraine has become a tool for strengthening its regional role and promoting defense-industry products and infrastructure projects.

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FINLAND

Since February 2022, Finland has allocated more than \$5.23 billion to support Ukraine, covering the delivery of weapons, military and special-purpose equipment, the training of AFU units, the financing of ammunition production, participation in international procurement mechanisms, the provision of intelligence capabilities, and humanitarian assistance. Of this amount, approximately \$3.87 billion has gone toward military assistance and around \$1.37 billion toward humanitarian measures [1].

In 2022, Finland's military assistance was provided primarily in a confidential format. The Finnish government officially confirmed the transfer of weapons to Ukraine but declined to disclose the types of systems supplied, their quantities, delivery routes, or timelines.

In August 2022, Ukrainian Marine Corps units began using Krh 85/92 120mm mortars manufactured by the Finnish company Vammis [2]. Helsinki did not officially announce the transfer of these systems, but the mortars were identified in photographs and video footage from the combat zone. Ukrainian forces also received 23mm 23 ItK 61 anti-aircraft guns, a Finnish modification of the Soviet ZU-23-2 system. This transfer demonstrated that Finland was supplying not only Western weapons but also Soviet-made systems that had previously been kept in storage or modernized to support Ukraine.

In autumn 2022, reports revealed that more than 20 Sisu XA-180/185 wheeled armored personnel carriers adapted for difficult climatic and road conditions had been supplied to Ukraine [3]. The delivery of these vehicles was particularly significant because Ukrainian servicemen already had experience operating similar vehicles previously supplied by other European countries.

In August 2022, Finland participated in the training of Ukrainian servicemen by sending a group of instructors to the UK. Finnish specialists were involved in the Interflex program, under which AFU units received basic military training to British armed forces standards [3]. The main areas of instruction included

marksmanship, small-unit tactics, operations in forested and marshy terrain, engineering support, and first aid in combat conditions.

Finland's humanitarian assistance in 2022 included 19 ambulances, two fire engines, a field kitchen, two shower tents, five multipurpose tents, personal protective equipment, stretchers, defibrillators, first-aid kits, and four trucks carrying medical supplies [4]. Additional deliveries also included radiation safety equipment, five buses, water purification materials, and small generators.

In 2023, Finland continued supplying heavy weapons. The AFU received 152mm 152 K89 towed guns, the Finnish designation for the Soviet 2A36 Giatsint-B gun, as well as 130mm M-46 guns [3]. These weapons have a considerable range and are designed to engage artillery batteries, command posts, ammunition depots, engineering structures, and other targets in the operational and tactical depth. Alongside artillery systems, Finland supplied ammunition, small arms, personal protective equipment, communications equipment, and other military equipment. The transfer of weapons of Soviet calibers was facilitated by the AFU's existing inventory of equipment, ammunition stocks, and trained personnel.

In March 2023, Helsinki officially confirmed the transfer to Ukraine of Leopard 2R mine-clearing engineering vehicles manufactured by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. The initial delivery consisted of three vehicles, but this was subsequently increased to six [3].

Throughout 2023, Finnish support gradually shifted from transferring equipment from the armed forces' existing stocks to placing orders with national defense-industry companies. In 2022 and the early part of 2023, national military reserves were the main source of assistance. As these reserves depleted, Helsinki began expanding the production of new military equipment and signing long-term contracts with Finnish companies.

In December 2023, F. Peltonen, a senior specialist in the Finnish Defense Ministry's logistics department, announced an increase in the production of 155mm artillery ammunition as well as 81mm and 120mm mortar rounds for subsequent transfer to Ukraine [5].

The contract was awarded to the Finnish ammunition manufacturer Nammo Lapua Oy [3].

This model enabled Finland to meet the needs of the AFU while replenishing national reserves and maintaining the output of Finnish defense-industry production lines. The prolonged nature of the conflict demonstrated the limited stockpiles of European countries and the limited output of existing production lines. Helsinki therefore began viewing military support for Ukraine as a long-term industrial task.

Humanitarian assistance in 2023 included three mobile heating units, firefighting suits, warm clothing, 70,000 food packages, hospital supplies, electric motors, a lifting platform, communications equipment, and IT equipment [4]. Nine rescue vehicles, firefighting foam cylinders, operating tables, ultrasound equipment, and infusion pumps were also included in the deliveries.

On December 21, 2023, Finland's National Plan for the Reconstruction of Ukraine was published [6]. The document outlined the involvement of Finnish companies in infrastructure and investment projects, market research, partner identification, the development of export financing, and the use of Team Finland mechanisms. Team Finland includes Finnpartnership, Business Finland, the Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY Centres), and other organizations involved in promoting exports and investment. The first stage of the National Plan focused on private-sector participation, while subsequent measures envisioned the expansion of government and international support.

In 2024, Finland continued supplying artillery systems. Ukrainian forces received 122mm D-74 guns [3]. Helsinki did not officially disclose the number of guns transferred. These supplemented the previously supplied Soviet-caliber systems and enabled Ukraine to utilize its accumulated ammunition stocks and trained artillery crews.

By 2024, Finland had transferred several Uisko-class fast landing craft to Ukraine [3]. These vessels expanded the capabilities of Ukrainian forces to conduct operations across rivers, reservoirs, and coastal areas. The boats can be used to transport

personnel, conduct reconnaissance, perform evacuations, patrol, and provide logistical support to units.

On April 3, 2024, Finnish President A. Stubb and V. Zelensky signed a security cooperation agreement in Kiev [1]. Helsinki committed to providing Ukraine with a 10-year long-term support commitment, assisting in the development of its military capabilities and implementing reforms related to integration into the EU and NATO [7]. The agreement covers the development of ammunition production capacity, the training of Ukrainian servicemen, countering cyber threats, intelligence sharing, and strengthening military-industrial cooperation [7]. Finland allocated approximately \$330 million for specific areas of cooperation in 2024–2028 [7].

The signing of the agreement marked a shift from individual aid packages to a long-term model of military-political cooperation. Finnish support is now viewed as part of Ukraine's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic security mechanisms.

Throughout 2024, Finland continued expanding domestic ammunition production. Government contracts were leveraged simultaneously for supporting Ukraine, replenishing Finnish armed forces' stocks, and adapting the defense industry to increased demand following the country's accession to NATO.

Helsinki joined the Czech initiative to procure artillery ammunition for Ukraine, contributing approximately \$34.13 million to it. Finland also supported Polish projects involving the sourcing, refurbishing, and transferring of armored vehicles. Participation in joint mechanisms was paired with increased domestic production of ammunition and military equipment components. The Finnish model combined direct financing of international procurement with orders placed with domestic companies.

In 2024–2025, Finland expanded its participation in NATO and EU initiatives and the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Helsinki joined the artillery, armored vehicles, engineering and demining, and information technology coalitions. This coalition format enabled the coordination of national deliveries with the activities of other Western countries and distributing the financial and production burden among partners [8].

In 2025, Finland announced a military support program for Ukraine valued at approximately \$750.86 million [3]. Unlike the initial packages, it did not involve drawing existing weapons from Finnish army reserves but rather placing orders with domestic defense companies. The weapons, ammunition, and equipment produced would be tailored to the current needs of the AFU.

Procurement was entrusted to the logistics departments of Finland's defense establishment. The orders were distributed among companies capable of producing ammunition, military electronics, vehicles, armored-vehicle components, communications, reconnaissance, and logistics equipment [9].

The decision to place orders domestically demonstrated Finland's shift toward a long-term support model. Deliveries were now viewed as part of national defense-industrial policy. At the same time, the Finnish leadership sought to reduce the risk of critically depleting its own stocks, a risk that had emerged during the first years of large-scale deliveries to Ukraine.

Jukka Kopra, chair of the parliamentary defense committee, stated that Ukraine had the right to use weapons supplied by Finland against military targets on Russian territory [10]. This position reflected Helsinki's decision to lift political restrictions on the use of transferred systems and strengthened the military-political nature of Finnish support for Kiev.

Throughout 2025, Finland continued expanding its domestic production base. Finnish and Ukrainian organizations-initiated cooperation in UAV production. The development of such projects aimed not only at meeting the current needs of the AFU but also at integrating Ukrainian companies into the emerging European defense-production system.

The Finnish side gained the opportunity to study the combat use of unmanned systems, while Ukrainian organizations gained access to technologies, components, and production capacity. This cooperation has been gradually shifting the relationship from one-way aid transfers toward joint production.

In 2025, Finland joined a multinational format for training Ukrainian units of 3,000 to 5,000 personnel as part of cooperation among the Nordic-Baltic Eight [3]. Finland provided equipment, instructors, and tactical training specialists.

The Nordic-Baltic Eight format allows participants to divide the responsibilities for supplying, training, and equipping Ukrainian units. Some countries provide weapons and equipment, while others handle personnel training, communications, transportation, and logistical support. Finland specializes in engineering, marksmanship, and tactical training, as well as equipment transfers.

That same year, Finland joined the maritime coalition led by the UK and Norway [3]. The coalition's activities aim at developing the capabilities of the Ukrainian Navy, including the use of unmanned boats, protecting port infrastructure, personnel training, and securing coastal areas.

In 2025, Finland joined the US-led PURL initiative, under which NATO countries finance the procurement of US-made weapons and military equipment for subsequent transfer to Ukraine. An additional element of military support was the provision of intelligence capabilities to Ukraine by the Finnish company ICEYE. The use of radar satellites enabled the acquisition of imagery irrespective of cloud cover or time of day. In 2025, Ukrainian forces could receive up to 20–24 images of a single area per day [3].

Cooperation with ICEYE demonstrates that Finnish assistance is not limited to the delivery of conventional weapons. Helsinki is helping to develop the intelligence and information capabilities of the AFU, which directly affect operational planning, targeting, and battle damage assessment. Private technology companies are becoming independent participants in the military support system for Ukraine.

On July 7, 2025, the Country Development Cooperation Program between Finland and Ukraine for 2025–2028 was published [11]. The document supplemented the National Reconstruction Plan and outlined the priority areas for allocating Finnish official assistance over the medium term.

The program focuses primarily on attracting investment, rebuilding municipal and energy infrastructure, enhancing cybersecurity, early-warning systems, and public administration mechanisms. According to the document, around 25 Finnish organizations and associations operate in Ukraine [11].

Finland's economic involvement in Ukraine's reconstruction is

seen as a continuation of military-political cooperation. By supporting Finnish companies entering the Ukrainian market, Helsinki seeks to secure a foothold in projects that may be financed by the EU, international development banks, and government funds.

In August 2025, a Taloustutkimus survey revealed that 67% of Finnish citizens supported providing Ukraine with security guarantees [12]. This figure reflected sustained and public support for Helsinki's active involvement in strengthening Ukraine's military capabilities.

In late June 2026, Finland's Economic Policy Committee approved an additional \$45.51 million for the PURL initiative [13]. Total Finnish military financing for Ukraine in 2026–2027 is estimated at \$341.3 million [13].

Participation in the PURL mechanism demonstrates Helsinki's readiness to finance not only products from its own defense industry but also purchases of US weapons systems. This approach enables the acceleration of deliveries of the most urgently needed systems where production in Europe is either nonexistent or limited.

Thus, Finnish policy toward Ukraine in 2022–2026 evolved steadily from confidential deliveries of weapons drawn from national reserves toward a long-term system of military-political and military-industrial cooperation.

The bilateral security cooperation agreement signed in April 2024 established a 10-year framework for support and linked it to Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO. In 2025–2026, Finland expanded its participation in coalition mechanisms, maritime training, the PURL program, and defense-industry projects.

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FRANCE

French assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia's special military operation to defend Donbass has evolved from targeted arms deliveries into a formalized strategic partnership.

By the end of 2024, the French military assistance to Ukraine since the start of the SMO had reached roughly \$6.8 billion. In 2025, this figure grew by another \$2.3 billion, bringing the cumulative military support to approximately \$9.1 billion by early 2026 [4].

On February 16, 2024, French President E. Macron and V. Zelensky signed a 10-year Security Cooperation Agreement in Paris establishing France's commitment to provide military and civilian assistance to Ukraine to safeguard its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. The agreement also reaffirms support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration, including future NATO membership, and outlines cooperation across the defense industry, intelligence, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, strategic communications, and countering foreign interference. In the event of a potential conflict with Russia, the agreement mandates consultations within 24 hours to determine the necessary countermeasures [1]. Subsequently, in November 2025, an additional strategic agreement was signed to pave the way for large-scale military cooperation. This includes the delivery of Rafale fighter jets, SAMP/T air defense systems, radars, missiles, and aerial bombs, alongside a framework agreement for Ukraine to purchase up to 100 Rafale jets by 2035 [11; 12].

Unlike many of its allies, France has opted out of the US PURL initiative, preferring instead to develop its own European defense systems and support Ukraine through national and European mechanisms. Consequently, Paris makes active use of the European Peace Facility. By the end of 2025, France's total contribution to the facility had reached approximately \$2.6 billion [4], although Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orbán had frozen \$1.6 billion of this amount prior to his defeat in the April 2026 parliamentary elections. France is also participating in the European SAFE program. On June 15, 2026, at the G-7 summit in Evian, European

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a \$17 billion military loan to France, with the agreement officially signed the following day. These funds are earmarked to expand Europe's military capabilities and assist Ukraine under the SAFE program [2; 8; 9].

France and the UK also co-initiated the so-called “coalition of the willing,” which has coordinated long-term support for Ukraine and its future security guarantees since 2025. In a joint statement issued on July 10, 2025, coalition participants confirmed their intention to provide Ukraine with at least \$45.5 billion in military support by the end of that year. Later, on January 6, 2026, following the coalition's summit in Paris, French President E. Macron, British Prime Minister K. Starmer, and V. Zelensky signed a declaration of intent regarding the deployment of multinational forces in Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement [4]. Additionally, on February 19, 2026, Paris announced the launch of Ukraine Fund II. This second phase of the fund, which supports critical infrastructure and priority sectors of the Ukrainian economy, operates a total budget of \$80.7 million, directing resources toward healthcare, water supply, sanitation, housing, energy, agriculture, digital infrastructure, and demining [5].

Another key area of French support is defense industry development. In January 2026, France's Defense Innovation Agency (AID) and Ukraine's Bravel defense technology cluster signed a letter of intent to launch the Brave France initiative. The parties formalized their plans for a joint grant program on February 7. On June 16, 2026, at the Eurosatory exhibition, they signed an official agreement to launch Brave France. This joint program operates a \$22.7 million budget—split equally between the two sides—and is aimed at developing missile technologies, unmanned systems, and advanced air defense capabilities. The maximum grant amount is \$1.13 million, with the first calls for companies scheduled for September 2026 [6; 13]. Technologies developed under the program will be tested in real combat conditions. This allows Ukraine to gain access to advanced French technologies, while France can adapt its defense innovations to the realities of modern warfare using Ukrainian combat experience.

Cooperation in heavy weapons is developing in parallel. In June

2024, the French-German defense group KNDS officially established a subsidiary in Ukraine. During a visit to Kiev by French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu, an agreement was signed to service Caesar self-propelled artillery systems and produce spare parts at a Ukrainian facility. This initiative involves manufacturing ammunition and spare parts to maintain the French and German armored vehicles and artillery systems already in service with the AFU, specifically covering spare parts for the Caesar, AMX-10RC, Panzerhaubitze 2000, and Leopard 2 [6; 15]. The priority is to produce the most frequently failing parts locally in Ukraine, which will simplify repair logistics and accelerate the return of equipment to the battlefield. Meanwhile, Ukrainian personnel for the future KNDS plant are currently being trained in France.

France is also actively involved in training Ukrainian servicemen. As of February 2026, more than 22,000 Ukrainian military personnel had completed French-led training [4]. Notably, since September 2024, the French side has been training and equipping over 2,000 soldiers from the “Anna Kyivska” Brigade [7]. Furthermore, transfer of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets was accompanied by specialized training for Ukrainian pilots and mechanics [3]. In June 2026, France resumed its participation in the pan-European EUMAM Ukraine mission, organizing eight training courses in Poland focused on intelligence, combat-group command in difficult conditions, and the maintenance of VAB armored personnel carriers [10].

Energy security occupies a prominent place in France’s support model for Ukraine. As early as 2023, France established a \$227 million civilian assistance grant fund to finance critical infrastructure projects, allocating nearly \$60 million directly to the energy sector. Several initiatives were implemented through this fund, including three joint fuel and energy infrastructure projects valued at over \$37.6 million combined. In 2024, the French Development Agency (AFD) received a mandate to operate in Ukraine, providing \$455 million in loans and an additional \$50 million in grants through 2027. By early 2026, the AFD was supporting 19 joint projects across Ukraine, including in the energy, water supply, transport, and healthcare sectors [7].

Throughout 2025, France consistently expanded its energy support, contributing \$6.5 million to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund, with resources directed toward various areas, including the nuclear sector. Additionally, by the end of 2025, the number of humanitarian shipments carrying energy equipment—such as generators, power transformers, and other critical hardware—had reached 45, with a combined weight exceeding 410 tons. That same year, Ukraine and France deepened their cooperation in distributed generation and nuclear energy, discussing the implementation of innovative solutions for solar generation, energy storage systems, and the modernization of nuclear capacity [7].

Paris has supplied Kiev with a broad range of weapons, consistently expanding its deliveries through a series of assistance packages. In aviation, this includes Mirage 2000-5F fighter jets; the first arrived in February 2025, and two more were delivered by late spring 2026, bringing Ukraine's total to 4–5 aircraft of this type by June 2026 [3; 10]. Additionally, a framework agreement was signed in November 2025 for the prospective purchase of up to 100 Rafale F4 aircraft by 2035. In the realm of air defense, France plans to provide Ukraine with eight SAMP/T NG systems, with the first expected by the end of 2026 [12; 17]. In mid-2025, Ukraine also received about 10 short-range Crotale air defense systems, alongside Mistral, MICA, and Aster surface-to-air missiles to further reinforce its air defenses [4; 18].

France has also supplied Ukraine with Caesar artillery systems. By early 2025, 60 systems had been delivered. KNDS subsequently signed a contract to supply another 12 systems at Ukraine's expense, while an additional 12 were financed using \$341 million from frozen Russian assets, bringing the total to 90 [16]. Production of these self-propelled artillery systems has been significantly accelerated: the production cycle was cut from 30 to 15 months, and the output rate reached six units per month. Furthermore, Ukraine received two LRU MLRS launchers in 2024. Deliveries of 155mm artillery shells are also ongoing; in 2024 alone, French authorities issued nine export licenses for their supply, valued at over \$1.6 billion. In June 2026, the French government announced plans to transfer 80,000 of the 100,000 155mm shells currently being produced to Ukraine [1; 4].

In 2024, Ukraine received 18 AMX-10RC armored reconnaissance vehicles, which are being transferred as they are withdrawn from French armed forces service. Another 162 VAB armored personnel carriers were delivered that same year, with new batches numbering in the hundreds announced in June 2026. Notably, VAB Mk.3 equipped with a Ukrainian Sich combat module has also been observed in Ukraine, alongside the delivery of 10 Bastion armored vehicles in 2024 [19; 20]. Regarding cruise missiles, the first SCALP EG missiles were transferred in May 2023. Ukraine received 11 of these in the first half of 2025, and a new batch of 40 was being prepared for shipment in February 2026. AASM Hammer guided aerial bombs have been supplied since 2024, with France committing to a delivery rate of 600 bombs per year. Over 600 had been delivered by the end of 2024, and in 2025, production was increased to 1,100–1,200 bombs annually, allowing Ukraine to receive about 50 per month. In February 2026, France and Norway jointly financed new AASM deliveries [21; 22].

Beyond these major systems, Ukraine has received UAVs, electronic warfare systems, and air defense radars for air defense systems. Significant quantities of small arms have also been supplied, including pistols, rifles, and 7.62mm and 12.7mm machine guns, along with 282 anti-tank systems and grenade launchers were delivered [20]. However, exact quantities for several of these items remain undisclosed.

Thus, by 2026, French assistance to Ukraine has evolved into a comprehensive framework encompassing military deliveries, financial support via European mechanisms, large-scale training for Ukrainian soldiers, energy assistance, and defense-industrial cooperation. A distinctive feature of the French approach is its emphasis on developing indigenous defense technologies and its deliberate choice not to participate in US procurement initiatives. Ultimately, support for Ukraine is not merely a situational response for France, but a strategic priority aimed at countering Russia.

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CROATIA

Since February 2022, Croatia has maintained a consistent stance in support of Ukraine, combining arms deliveries, transfers of Soviet- and Yugoslav-origin equipment, demining assistance, energy infrastructure restoration, the reception of Ukrainian refugees, and the development of defense-industrial cooperation. Assistance to Kiev has been formalized through government decrees, Croatia's participation in EU and NATO mechanisms, and bilateral agreements with Ukraine.

Croatia's first military assistance package for Ukraine was approved on February 28, 2022 [1]. Valued at \$18.4 million, it included small arms (machine guns, assault rifles, pistols), ammunition, and protective equipment. This move was primarily of operational significance, as Croatia transferred weapons and gear that could be deployed immediately without lengthy personnel training.

The scale of this support subsequently increased. By January 2024, the Croatian Ministry of Defense estimated total military assistance to Ukraine at \$205.7 million [2], a figure that reached \$237.5 million by February 2025 [3]. At the time, Croatian military authorities noted that, relative to GDP, Croatia ranked 12th among donor countries in terms of military deliveries to Ukraine. In October 2025, Ukraine received Croatia's 13th military assistance package, valued at over \$227 million, while preparations for the 14th and 15th packages were also announced [4].

By early 2026, NATO statements placed Croatia's total financial support for Ukraine since 2022 at over \$341 million [5]. It was also noted that Zagreb had contributed \$17 million to the PURL mechanism. Consequently, Croatian assistance gradually expanded beyond direct transfers of stockpiled equipment to include participation in NATO's collective financial mechanisms.

The composition of Croatian deliveries evolved as the conflict progressed. Initially, the focus was primarily on small arms, ammunition, and protective equipment. Later, Zagreb began transferring more substantial types of hardware. One of the most notable decisions was the transfer to Ukraine of all Mi-8 helicopters available to the Croatian armed forces [6].

Alongside this, Croatia transferred artillery systems, ammunition, protective gear, and other military materiel.

Deliveries of Soviet- and Yugoslav-produced equipment were of particular importance. For Ukraine, such systems retained high practical value because they were compatible with its existing logistical infrastructure, familiar to its personnel, and could be utilized without radically restructuring its supply chains.

Among the most significant decisions was the transfer of M-84 tanks and M-80 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). The M-84 is a Yugoslav modification of the Soviet T-72 tank, while the M-80 is a domestically produced Yugoslav IFV. In 2024, Croatia, in coordination with Germany, agreed to transfer 30 M-84 tanks and 30 M-80 IFVs to Ukraine, along with spare parts and ammunition. Berlin subsequently compensated Zagreb \$165 million for the transferred equipment [7].

This arrangement carried dual significance. For Ukraine, it meant receiving equipment that could be rapidly deployed to the front lines. For Croatia, it provided an opportunity to accelerate the modernization of its own armed forces, as transfer of the M-84s and M-80s was directly linked to the procurement of German Leopard 2A8 tanks and the Croatian Army's transition to modern NATO standards.

This approach distinguishes Croatia from countries that limited themselves to financial support or the transfer of isolated stockpiles. Zagreb effectively utilized the Ukrainian track as a catalyst for its own defense transformation. By transferring older-generation equipment, Croatia simultaneously reduced its reliance on its Yugoslav and Soviet legacy and created an opportunity to procure more modern Western systems.

An important component of Croatian support has been the long-term political and legal formalization of relations with Ukraine. On October 9, 2024, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and V. Zelensky signed a 10-year agreement on long-term cooperation and support in Dubrovnik [8]. The document covers political, economic, financial, humanitarian, energy, legal, and technological cooperation, as well as security, reconstruction, and development. Particular importance is attached to leveraging Croatia's experience in humanitarian demining, veteran support, and the investigation of war crimes.

The signing of this agreement demonstrates that Zagreb views support for Ukraine not as a temporary campaign, but as a long-term pillar of its foreign and defense policy. For Kiev, the

agreement is vital because it expands the circle of European partners willing not only to transfer equipment but also to participate in building new production and technological chains. For Croatia, the document allows it to consolidate its expertise in areas such as demining, unmanned systems, equipment repair and maintenance, and territorial reconstruction.

In October 2025, Ukraine and Croatia additionally signed a letter of intent to deepen defense-industrial cooperation. The parties agreed to develop joint production chains, host a defense-industry forum, and explore opportunities for collaboration in FPV drone production.

Croatia's national company, DOK-ING, a manufacturer of robotic systems for demining and hazardous environment operations, plays a pivotal role in this support. According to available data, 69 DOK-ING machines are operating across Ukraine's 10 regions, having cleared more than 25 million square meters of territory and neutralized over 10,000 explosive objects [9]. The company also reported launching assembly and service lines in Ukraine, co-producing spare parts with A3Tech, and training more than 300 Ukrainian specialists. This sector is of practical importance for Kiev given the extensive mine contamination of Ukrainian territory, making it a cornerstone of Croatian-Ukrainian industrial cooperation.

In recent years, Croatia has also actively sought to promote its domestic defense industry. The Croatian government emphasizes that the country not only purchases Western weapons but is also developing national companies capable of supplying technological solutions to EU and NATO partners. In this context, support for Ukraine provides the Croatian defense industry with an opportunity to expand exports, test products under real-world combat conditions, and integrate into pan-European production programs.

Cooperation between DOK-ING and the German company Rheinmetall is of particular importance. In 2024, the two sides agreed to establish a joint venture to develop unmanned ground platforms [10]. Such systems are expected to be utilized for escorting armored vehicles, reconnaissance, air defense, and demining. For Croatia, this represents a move toward a higher tier of defense-industrial cooperation with one of Europe's largest arms manufacturers. For Ukraine, such projects are instrumental in equipping its armed forces with robotic systems and engineering

tasks.

In addition to its military and industrial components, Croatia provides energy assistance to Ukraine. In 2026, Zagreb increased its contribution to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund to \$2.84 million [11]. These funds are intended to purchase equipment and restore Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Furthermore, Croatia has also announced the allocation of additional energy hardware and assistance for restoring the national power grid.

The logistics component also deserves separate mention. After the Black Sea Grain Initiative ended, Ukraine began seeking alternative routes for agricultural exports. In 2023, Kiev and Zagreb agreed to utilize Croatian ports on the Danube and the Adriatic for the export of Ukrainian grain [12]. The Ukrainian side subsequently reported the commencement of grain exports through these Croatian ports. While this did not become a major route for Ukrainian exports, it provided a vital means of diversifying logistics and reducing dependence on Black Sea routes.

Despite sustained support for Ukraine from the authorities, Croatian policy is not entirely unified. The primary domestic friction exists between the government of Prime Minister A. Plenković and President Z. Milanović. The government supports active assistance to Ukraine, participation in EU and NATO allied formats, arms transfers, and the development of long-term cooperation. President Z. Milanović, by contrast, has repeatedly criticized Croatia's involvement in military initiatives related to the Ukrainian conflict, opposing decisions that, in his view, could draw the country into a deeper confrontation with Russia.

The most telling episode was the failure of a parliamentary vote on Croatia's participation in the EU mission to train Ukrainian servicemen, EUMAM Ukraine. In December 2022, the initiative failed to secure the required majority: 97 lawmakers voted in favor, falling short of the 101 votes needed for approval. Croatia had been expected to participate in training up to 100 Ukrainian servicemen over a two-year period, an initiative that President Milanović actively opposed [13].

In 2024, a similar conflict arose over the participation of Croatian servicemen in NATO activities to coordinate assistance to Ukraine within the framework of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) mission. President Z. Milanović refused to approve the deployment of Croatian troops,

citing the risks of expanding the conflict and the need to avoid direct Croatian involvement [14]. This episode confirmed that, despite Croatia's overall pro-Ukrainian policy, the participation of its military personnel in training and coordination missions remains a politically sensitive issue.

Thus, Croatian support for Ukraine is comprehensive, encompassing military, industrial, humanitarian, energy, and logistical components. The most significant areas have been the transfer of Soviet- and Yugoslav-origin weapons and equipment, participation in NATO's collective mechanisms, the development of demining cooperation, and the establishment of a long-term bilateral framework. For Zagreb, assistance to Kiev simultaneously serves as a tool for strengthening its position among EU and NATO allies, promoting its domestic defense industry, and modernizing its national armed forces.

At the same time, Croatia's policy is subject to internal constraints. The main limiting factor is the political confrontation between the government, which supports active assistance to Ukraine, and President Milanović, who remains critical of Croatia's participation in EU and NATO military initiatives. As a result, Zagreb maintains a consistent policy of supporting Kiev while carefully avoiding steps that could be perceived as the direct involvement of Croatian servicemen in the conflict.

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CZECH REPUBLIC

Since 2022, the Czech Republic has developed a model of military support for Ukraine where its own government spending is substantially lower than the value of deliveries organized through Czech defense companies and financed by foreign donors and Ukraine itself. In 2022–2025, total Czech government spending on military assistance amounted to roughly \$819.3 million. Over the same period, weapons, ammunition, and military materiel worth approximately \$12.3 billion were sent to Ukraine through the Czech defense sector, paid for by foreign partners and Kiev. Thus, Prague's role involves not only direct donations but primarily the organization of procurement, the modernization of equipment, the oversight of contracts, and the provision of logistics [1].

Total Czech government expenditure on support for Ukraine and Ukrainian citizens over the same period reached \$4.3 billion. However, this figure includes the reception of refugees, social benefits, humanitarian programs, and expenditures by various government agencies, and thus does not reflect military deliveries per se [2].

Even before the start of large-scale hostilities, Prague transferred more than 4,000 152mm artillery shells to Kiev. Throughout 2022, deliveries became systematic. According to the Czech Ministry of Defense, during the first year of the SMO, Ukraine received, through government and commercial channels, 89 tanks, 226 IFVs and other armored vehicles, 38 howitzers, and 47 other vehicles. An additional 27,518 artillery shells, 12 multiple rocket launchers and 4,900 rockets for these systems, 8,022 anti-tank grenade launchers, 128 mortars, 17,400 mortar rounds, 291 man-portable air defense systems, and small arms and ammunition were also supplied [3].

The value of materiel transferred by the government in 2022 amounted to roughly \$230.7 million. Meanwhile, export licenses issued to Czech companies for military products were estimated at approximately \$3.2 billion, while actual exports reached \$1.41 billion [3].

The term “Czech arms manufacturers” primarily refers to private commercial companies. Major suppliers include Czechoslovak Group, its subsidiary Excalibur Army, STV Group, Colt CZ Group, Omnipol, DSS, PBS Group, VRGINEERS, and URC Systems. However, the country’s authorities did not grant these companies the authority to independently determine the structure and volume of assistance. The Czech model of participation in the conflict is structured as follows: the Ukrainian side identifies its requirements for specific weapons, the Czech Ministry of Defense and its Agency for Intergovernmental Defense Cooperation (AMOS) coordinate the projects, foreign donors select and finance the proposals, and companies then manufacture, repair, or modernize the equipment [1].

Prague used the transfer of Czech Army stockpiles to accelerate the modernization of its own armed forces. In return, Germany initially provided the Czech Republic with 15 Leopard 2A4 tanks, while the US transferred eight H-1 family helicopters and allocated \$306 million for procurement and modernization [3]. By 2025, this compensation had increased to 28 Leopard 2A4s, two Buffalo armored recovery vehicles, eight H-1 helicopters, and US assistance worth roughly \$1.12 billion [1].

The Czech model enabled the Czech Army to phase out Soviet-produced equipment and replace it with Western systems. As of the end of 2025, Prague had transferred 390 units of equipment and other materiel to the AFU, with an estimated market value of over \$715.8 million [1].

In 2022, the Czech Republic began training Ukrainian servicemen. By the end of the year, approximately 800 personnel had completed training in the Czech Republic. In 2023, this figure exceeded 4,300, while by the end of 2025, the cumulative number of AFU personnel trained had reached 9,800. Approximately \$15.7 million was allocated for this training [1; 3]. The curriculum included combined-arms disciplines, the operation of transferred weapons, crew training, and specialized courses under the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine.

In 2023, Prague shifted from predominantly drawing on army stockpiles toward a model of intergovernmental procurement. The largest project was the modernization of 90 T-72 tanks for

the AFU. The US and the Netherlands provided the financing, AMOS coordinated the contract, and Excalibur Army carried out the repair and conversion of these vehicles to the T-72EA configuration. The first 20 tanks were delivered by early 2023. The modernization included the installation of explosive reactive armor, upgraded communications and observation systems, improved fire-control systems, and powerplant repairs [5].

The T-72EA project demonstrates the functional distribution of roles within the Czech system. The Czech Republic provided the production facility, specialists, existing repair documentation, and access to stockpiles of Soviet-origin equipment, while the US and the Netherlands paid for the work.

The Netherlands also financed the production of 100 MR-2 Viktor mobile anti-aircraft systems. Each system consists of a twin-mounted 14.5mm KPVT machine gun installed on a vehicle chassis and supplemented by electro-optical targeting systems. Its primary purpose is to engage low-flying UAVs and other low-speed aerial targets. Production and conversion were handled by Czech companies, while Prague provided intergovernmental coordination and logistics [3; 5].

In September 2023, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and the Netherlands signed an agreement for the further procurement of Czech defense industry products. The first package included 15 modernized T-72EA tanks. Subsequent contracts covered howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles, air defense systems, small arms, passive surveillance systems, and electronic warfare equipment [6]. This arrangement established Prague as an operator of foreign funds allocated to support its domestic defense industry.

A separate Danish-Czech project involved the delivery of approximately 50 tanks and IFVs, 2,500 pistols, 7,000 assault rifles, 500 light machine guns, and 500 sniper rifles. The package also included 500 heavy machine guns, 280 recoilless rifles, 7,000 anti-tank weapons, 10,000 hand grenades, 60 mortars, electronic warfare, reconnaissance and surveillance equipment, as well as heavy-caliber ammunition [7].

The signing of a memorandum on defense-industrial cooperation between Prague and Kiev in July 2023 laid the

groundwork for weapons repair, ammunition production, and armored vehicle modernization. The memorandum's strategic significance lies in the shift from the delivery of finished systems to technological cooperation [8].

In 2024, the primary focus was the Czech ammunition initiative. Its launch was prompted by the inability of European manufacturers to quickly compensate for the shortage of artillery shells, primarily 155mm rounds. Czech organizations identified available batches on the global market, vetted suppliers, assessed the technical condition of the ammunition, prepared proposals for foreign donors, and organized their delivery. Supplier names were not disclosed in order to prevent competitors from intercepting contracts and exerting pressure on sellers [1].

By June 2024, financing had been secured for roughly 500,000 artillery shells, while the first batch of 45,000 rounds arrived in Ukraine. Overall, in 2024, Prague organized the delivery of approximately 1.5 million artillery rounds of various calibers, including roughly 500,000 155mm shells [9]. The Czech Republic's initial contribution amounted to roughly \$40.8 million, while the bulk of the financing was provided by the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Canada, and other participants.

In 2024–2025, foreign donors allocated approximately \$4.39 billion to the Czech ammunition initiative, while Prague's own contribution amounted to only roughly \$80.1 million [1]. Thus, more than 98% of the financial burden was borne by entities other than the Czech government.

In parallel, outside this initiative, foreign states and Ukraine purchased tanks, armored vehicles, howitzers, MLRS, trainer aircraft, air defense systems, UAVs, electronic warfare equipment, passive surveillance systems, and ammunition from Czech companies totaling roughly \$7.93 billion. The Czech Republic itself allocated another \$306.1 million for such procurements [1]. The main economic effect came not from direct exports from government stockpiles but from sustaining the private defense sector with foreign orders.

On July 18, 2024, the Czech Republic and Ukraine signed a 10-year security cooperation agreement. The document outlined provisions for arms deliveries, military training, cooperation

between defense companies, countering cyber threats, and the support of Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO [10]. The agreement did not include a guaranteed annual volume of assistance. Its practical significance lies in establishing a political framework for continued commercial and intergovernmental contracts.

At the same time, Czechoslovak Group and Ukrainian Armor agreed to the licensed production of artillery ammunition in Ukraine. The project's initial capacity was set at 100,000 155mm and 50,000 105mm shells per year. The Czech side supplies propellant charges, fuzes, primers, and technical documentation, while Ukraine manufactures the shell bodies and performs final assembly [11]. This structure maintains the Ukrainian production line's dependence on critical components from Czechoslovak Group, while simultaneously reducing transportation costs and enabling the scaling up of production directly in Ukraine.

By September 30, 2025, the Czech Republic had organized the delivery of over 3.7 million heavy-caliber rounds, roughly 1.28 million of which were delivered during 2025. By the end of October, the cumulative figure for the year had surpassed 1.4 million rounds [1; 12].

By the end of 2025, the structure of the Czech Republic's own military spending was as follows: approximately \$271.7 million was allocated for materiel from army stockpiles, \$161.5 million for military training and contributions to international funds, and \$386.1 million for the procurement of ammunition, weapons, and materiel. This brought the total to \$819.3 million [1]. In return, the Czech Republic received financial compensation and military equipment worth approximately \$1.18 billion.

Public fundraising campaigns emerged as another channel of assistance to Ukraine, raising roughly \$127.1 million by autumn 2025. Among the most notable purchases were a T-72 tank valued at roughly \$1.41 million, an RM-70 MLRS with ammunition valued at up to \$2.35 million, 15 Viktor mobile anti-aircraft systems, a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter valued at roughly \$3.42 million, and six D-30 howitzers with a combined value of roughly \$2.83 million [1; 13]. The volume of public fundraising was significantly lower than that of government and

intergovernmental channels, but it enabled the financing of individual weapons packages.

After A. Babiš's government took power at the end of 2025, this mechanism was not abolished. Prague retained administrative coordination and logistics but abandoned any direct budget financing. By February 2026, the total volume of heavy-caliber ammunition delivered under the Czech initiative had reached approximately 4.4 million rounds. In May, President P. Pavel reported that the number of countries directly financing procurements had fallen from 18 to nine. According to his assessment, the mechanism accounted for up to 50% of the heavy-caliber ammunition supplied to the Ukrainian army [14].

The decline in the number of donors is the primary constraint on the Czech model of participation in the war against Russia. Prague does not have sufficient budgetary resources to independently sustain million-round procurement volumes. The sustainability of deliveries depends on foreign financing, the availability of stockpiles on the global market, the technical condition of the ammunition, and the ability of Czech companies to inspect and refurbish it. If these conditions are met, the Czech Republic will continue to serve as a procurement and industrial hub. If funding declines, delivery volumes will decrease regardless of the stance of Czech companies.

Thus, the Czech Republic is not the largest Western donor in terms of its own budgetary spending. Its importance is defined by a different specialization: Prague has combined remaining stockpiles of Soviet-produced weapons, repair capabilities, ammunition manufacturers, and the state-run AMOS mechanism. This enabled it to turn roughly \$819.3 million in its own military spending into a supply system worth over \$12.3 billion, most of which was paid for by foreign states and Ukraine.

The political caution of A. Babiš's government does not mean that deliveries have ceased. The change in leadership merely resulted in a transition from a model in which the Czech Republic simultaneously financed and coordinated assistance to one based primarily on foreign financing while retaining Czech industrial and logistical capabilities. The main result is that support for Ukraine has become a source of accelerated modernization for the

Czech Army, the growth of the private defense sector, and a stronger position for Prague in the European arms procurement system.

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SWEDEN

Swedish support for Ukraine has evolved from the transfer of equipment from armed forces' stockpiles in 2022 to the large-scale procurement of new equipment, investment in Ukraine's defense industry, and long-term aviation cooperation. As of July 2, 2026, total assistance reached approximately \$15.95 billion, including \$13.17 billion in military and \$2.78 billion in civilian support. Annual military funding amounted to approximately \$627.6 million in 2022, \$1.75 billion in 2023, \$2.57 billion in 2024, and \$4.12 billion in 2025. An additional \$4.12 billion has been allocated for both 2026 and 2027 [1]. The Swedish model is characterized by a shift from drawing on army reserves to producing new systems at Saab, BAE Systems Hägglunds, BAE Systems Bofors, and other companies.

The initial packages in 2022 included body armor, protective helmets, field rations, small arms, ammunition, and anti-tank weapons. Sweden subsequently supplied NLAW anti-tank systems, AT4 disposable grenade launchers, Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles, automatic rifles, RBS 17 anti-ship missiles, demining equipment, surveillance equipment, winter gear, and vehicles [2]. The priority during this initial phase was to rapidly equip infantry units with systems that could be operated without lengthy training or complex maintenance infrastructure.

In January 2023, Stockholm began delivering heavy equipment. A package worth approximately \$442.4 million included 50 CV90 infantry fighting vehicles alongside ammunition, anti-tank weapons, automatic rifles, and demining equipment, while also preparing for the transfer of Archer self-propelled howitzers [3]. In February 2023, Sweden announced the transfer of up to 10 Leopard 2 tanks, as well as HAWK and IRIS-T components [4]. The tanks became part of a joint European program to form Ukrainian Leopard 2 units, while the HAWK and IRIS-T components strengthened layered air defenses. By then, Swedish assistance had expanded beyond infantry weapons to include armored, artillery, and air defense capabilities.

Subsequent packages in 2023 included artillery shells, spare

parts for CV90s, communications equipment, engineering equipment, and funding for the maintenance of previously transferred systems.

On May 31, 2024, Sweden and Ukraine signed a 10-year security cooperation agreement. For 2024–2026, the document outlined approximately \$7.72 billion in military support and identified aviation, air defense, armored vehicles, artillery, maritime security, demining, and unmanned systems as priorities [5]. The agreement envisions the localization, maintenance, and possible production of Swedish equipment in Ukraine, including the CV90 platform.

The most significant decision in 2024 was the 16th package, worth approximately \$1.37 billion. Sweden announced the transfer of two ASC 890 airborne early warning and control aircraft, the entirety of its PBV 302 tracked armored personnel carriers, AMRAAM missiles, and 155mm artillery ammunition [6]. The number of PBV 302s exceeded 200. The ASC 890 aircraft enable the detection of air and maritime targets at considerable distances and facilitate data distribution between fighter aircraft and ground-based air defense assets. The transfer of these aircraft diminished Sweden's own capabilities, prompting the government to accelerate the procurement of more advanced GlobalEye aircraft.

The maritime component included Combat Boat 90 vessels, small landing craft, RBS 17 anti-ship missiles, and underwater equipment. By February 2026, the total number of Combat Boat 90s delivered or ordered had reached 32 [1]. Their delivery complemented Sweden's participation in the maritime coalition and expanded Ukraine's capabilities on rivers and in the northwestern Black Sea.

In January 2025, Sweden approved its 18th package, worth approximately \$1.39 billion. This included the procurement of new equipment worth \$607.1 million, contributions to international funds supporting Ukraine worth \$288.1 million, and the transfer of equipment from armed forces stockpiles to be subsequently replaced, worth \$339.5 million [7]. Ukraine was slated to receive 146 trucks, another 16 Combat Boat 90s, 23 naval combat modules, 1 million 12.7mm rounds, 1,500 TOW anti-tank guided missile systems, and 200 other anti-tank weapons. An additional \$102.9

million was earmarked for Ukraine's production of long-range missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

In March 2025, a 19th package worth approximately \$1.65 billion was announced, bringing Sweden's total military financing for Ukraine that year to approximately \$3.04 billion. Approximately \$946.6 million was allocated for the procurement of ammunition, air defense systems, maritime equipment, satellite communications, armored vehicles, and infantry equipment. More than \$514 million was directed to international funds and the procurement of Ukrainian defense industry products under the Danish model [8]. This format enabled finance production directly in Ukraine and shortened the time between placing an order and the delivery of weapons to units.

In September 2025, Sweden presented its 20th package, worth approximately \$946.6 million. The core of this package included 18 new Archer self-propelled howitzers with ammunition and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles worth approximately \$370.4 million. An additional \$216.1 million was allocated for maritime equipment, including coastal radars, support vessels equipped with grenade launchers, diving systems, and truck cranes. Approximately \$360.1 million was earmarked for air defense systems, radar sensors, ammunition, and air base equipment [9]. By February 2026, the total number of Archer systems delivered or ordered had reached 44, while the number of CV90s had reached 90, including 40 new vehicles procured jointly with Denmark.

Concurrently, Sweden financed Tridon Mk2 mobile anti-aircraft artillery systems manufactured by BAE Systems Bofors. Approximately \$216.1 million was allocated for these systems under the 18th, 19th, and 20th packages. By February 2026, Swedish commitments encompassed 25 systems designed to counter UAVs, cruise missiles, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft [10].

On October 22, 2025, Sweden and Ukraine signed a letter of intent on cooperation in the aviation sector. The document served as the first step in preparing a possible Gripen deal and envisions the exchange of experience in the use of fighter aircraft and air defense systems [11]. In November, the sides signed a separate letter of intent on defense innovation. It envisages combining

Sweden's industrial and technological base with Ukraine's combat experience, creating joint projects, and accelerating the deployment of new technologies.

Also in 2025, Sweden began participating in the US PURL mechanism. In August, together with Denmark and Norway, it financed a package of US weapons comprising Patriot ammunition, anti-tank systems, and spare parts. Sweden's contribution amounted to \$275 million [12]. PURL enabled Stockholm to procure systems that are not manufactured by the Swedish industry or those Ukraine requires more quickly than European companies can supply them.

On February 19, 2026, a 21st package worth approximately \$1.33 billion was announced, bringing cumulative military support to approximately \$10.60 billion. Roughly \$442.4 million was allocated for new air defense capabilities, including artillery and missile systems, interceptors, electronic warfare, active and passive sensors, and command-and-control systems. Approximately \$308.7 million was earmarked for long-range artillery ammunition, 40mm air defense ammunition, mortar rounds, training, and the maintenance of previously transferred equipment. An additional \$576.2 million was allocated for long-range UAVs, unmanned boats, innovation projects, and international funds [13].

On May 28, 2026, Sweden presented its 22nd package worth approximately \$2.59 billion, the largest since the beginning of hostilities. The bulk of this amount, roughly \$2.28 billion, was linked to the possible transfer of up to 16 JAS 39 Gripen C/D fighter aircraft, IRIS-T, AMRAAM, and METEOR air-to-air missiles, as well as the procurement of Gripen E/F aircraft to replace the transferred aircraft in the Swedish Air Force [14]. The remaining funds were earmarked for ammunition, electronic warfare systems, long-range capabilities, defense innovation, and international procurement mechanisms.

The transfer of Gripen C/D aircraft remains conditional. Ukraine must conclude an agreement to purchase up to 20 new Gripen E/F aircraft, enabling Sweden to transfer up to 16 C/D aircraft. Kiev plans to allocate approximately \$2.84 billion from an EU credit mechanism for the initial purchase. The first Gripen C/D aircraft could be delivered in 2027, while deliveries of the new E/F aircraft

are not expected before 2030 [14].

In May 2026, the sides signed a Joint Declaration on Enhanced Cooperation in Security and Defense. It outlined the development of aviation projects, unmanned systems, joint production, and the Drone Deal initiative [15]. Swedish-Ukrainian cooperation aims not only to supply finished products but also to combine production capabilities, test new systems, and subsequently integrate Ukrainian developments into European supply chains.

In February 2026, Saab and Ukraine's state defense conglomerate signed a memorandum of cooperation in aviation and radar technology. The document does not constitute a contract for the delivery of specific systems, but rather establishes a basis for joint development, production localization, and technical maintenance [16]. In June, Ukrainian AIDronesUA and Swedish Njord Technology agreed to jointly produce the Maul heavy ground-based unmanned platform in Sweden, designed to evacuate wounded personnel, transport ammunition, and perform logistical tasks.

On June 18, 2026, Sweden allocated an additional \$108 million to PURL. This was the country's fourth contribution, bringing its cumulative financing of the mechanism to \$543 million [17]. The funds are directed toward US air defense systems, ammunition, and other equipment that the US provides according to Ukraine's priority needs lists.

Since June 1, 2026, Sweden has classified its spending on military support for Ukraine as national defense expenditure in its reporting to NATO [18]. This decision increases the calculated share of defense spending in GDP while allowing Sweden to meet allied targets and finance Ukraine simultaneously. However, this does not change the recipient of the funds and does not mean that assistance to Ukraine is being used to directly strengthen the Swedish armed forces.

Energy support is a primary area of civilian assistance. Since 2022, Sweden has allocated approximately \$689.4 million to Ukraine's energy sector [19]. These funds were used to purchase generators, transformers, spare parts, heating equipment, and gas turbines, as well as to restore grid infrastructure. Through the Ukraine Energy Support Fund, projects involving distributed

generation and equipment for operators in the hardest-hit regions were financed.

In June 2026, the government approved an energy package worth approximately \$154.3 million. Of this, \$141 million was allocated to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund, \$10.3 million to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and \$2.1 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency [19]. Following the transfer of these funds, Sweden's cumulative contribution to the energy fund exceeded \$439 million, solidifying its position as one of the fund's largest donors.

By July 2026, Sweden's civilian assistance reached approximately \$2.78 billion. In 2025, it amounted to approximately \$946.6 million, or slightly more than 16% of the international development assistance budget. A minimum of roughly \$1.03 billion annually has been set for 2026 and 2027 [20]. The funding encompasses humanitarian assistance, infrastructure reconstruction, Ukraine's state budget, reforms, demining, and preparations for EU accession.

An additional economic instrument involves guarantees and contributions through the World Bank. In 2026, Sweden allocated approximately \$144.1 million to a new crisis mechanism, facilitating roughly \$432.1 million in lending to Ukraine. The funds are intended for reconstruction, support for public services, and budget resilience [21]. Thus, civilian assistance is increasingly reliant not only on non-repayable transfers but also on financial instruments that mobilize larger volumes of credit resources.

In summary, from 2022–2023, Sweden primarily transferred anti-tank weapons, armored vehicles, tanks, artillery, and air defense systems from national stockpiles. In 2024, the key elements included two ASC 890 aircraft, over 200 PBV 302s, maritime equipment, and a 10-year security agreement. In 2025, Stockholm shifted to procuring new Archer, CV90, and Tridon Mk2 systems, boats, ammunition, and unmanned systems, while also beginning to finance Ukrainian production. In 2026, the focus shifted to air defense, long-range capabilities, PURL, and the development of an aviation partnership centered on Gripen.

The Swedish model integrates support for Ukraine with the modernization of its own armed forces and the expansion of the

national defense industry. Transferred systems are offset by new orders for the Swedish Army, while a significant portion of the assistance flows back into the Swedish economy through contracts with Saab, BAE Systems Hägglunds, BAE Systems Bofors, and other companies. Consequently, assistance to Ukraine simultaneously serves as an instrument of foreign policy, compliance with NATO targets, support for the defense industry, and adaptation of the Swedish armed forces to the experience of modern conflict.

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ESTONIA

Estonia's model of support for Ukraine is characterized by substantial spending relative to the size of its national economy, a focus on military needs, and a gradual shift of assistance toward orders placed with its domestic defense industry. In absolute terms, Tallinn's capabilities are significantly smaller than those of the US, Germany, and the UK, but in terms of aid as a share of GDP, Estonia has become one of Europe's most active donors.

Estonia began supplying weapons to Ukraine prior to February 24, 2022. One of the main elements of its early assistance was the US-made Javelin anti-tank missile system. After the start of large-scale hostilities, the range of equipment expanded to include Milan anti-tank systems, anti-tank mines, Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles with ammunition, Instalaza C90 disposable grenade launchers, vehicles, watercraft, communications equipment, and medical supplies. Ukraine subsequently received four ROLE 2 field hospitals [1; 2].

Throughout 2022, Tallinn also transferred artillery systems and ammunition. These aid packages included 122mm and 155mm towed howitzers and large quantities of artillery shells. This composition matched the AFU's immediate needs, as artillery and ammunition were among the most rapidly depleted items of military assistance.

On April 21, 2022, the Estonian parliament adopted a statement classifying Russia's actions in Ukraine as a genocide against the Ukrainian people [1]. The decision cemented Tallinn's hardline foreign policy and became the basis for the further advancement of sanctions, confiscation mechanisms, and international legal instruments to pressure Russia.

In 2022, Estonia began training Ukrainian military personnel. Key areas included basic combined-arms, artillery, and sniper training, military medicine, cybersecurity, and strategic communications. Estonian instructors participated in the British Operation Interflex mission. The small size of Estonia's own armed forces limited the scale of the training, but enabled the country to focus on specialties in which Estonia had practical

expertise.

The largest assistance package in this initial phase was announced in January 2023 as part of the Tallinn Pledge. Valued at \$128.6 million [3], the package included dozens of 155mm FH70 howitzers and 122mm D-30 howitzers, thousands of artillery shells, support vehicles for artillery units, and hundreds of Carl Gustaf M2 anti-tank weapons with ammunition.

Following the delivery of this package, the total value of Estonian military assistance surpassed \$420.9 million, exceeding 1% of the country's GDP [3]. The transfer of towed howitzers also accelerated the modernization of Estonia's own artillery. FH70 and D-30 howitzers were withdrawn from Estonian service upon the delivery of South Korean K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers. Thus, assistance to Ukraine was accompanied by the replacement of aging systems with more modern weapons.

In 2023, Estonia and Luxembourg co-founded the IT Coalition within the framework of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. The coalition focuses on supplying the AFU with data centers, network equipment, satellite and tactical communications systems, software, and user devices. This IT component allowed Estonia to draw on its own specialization in digital government and cybersecurity.

In December 2023, the Tallinn Mechanism was established to coordinate civilian cyber assistance to Ukraine. Its mandate includes protecting government information systems, ensuring the resilience of digital services, responding to cyberattacks, and restoring critical digital infrastructure. Subsequently, the mechanism's participants announced commitments worth more than \$341.3 million, of which Estonia contributed approximately \$3 million [1].

In May 2024, parliament adopted a law permitting the use of assets belonging to Russian individuals and legal entities frozen under international sanctions to compensate Ukraine for damages. Sixty-five MPs voted in favor of the law, while three voted against it [4]. Estonia became one of the first EU states to establish a national legal framework for using frozen assets for Ukraine's benefit. However, the practical application of the mechanism depends on establishing a link between the asset's

owner and the damage caused to the Ukrainian side.

On June 27, 2024, Estonia and Ukraine signed a 10-year security cooperation agreement [2]. The document covers arms deliveries, military training, defense-industrial cooperation, cybersecurity, Ukraine's reconstruction, and support for its integration into the EU and NATO.

By the signing of the agreement, Estonia had provided Ukraine with approximately \$568.8 million in military assistance, equivalent to more than 1.3% of its national GDP. Assistance in 2024 amounted to more than \$113.8 million [2]. The agreement established a formula under which at least 0.25% of GDP would be allocated annually to military assistance to Ukraine. Tallinn seeks to transform this figure from a national policy decision into a benchmark for other allies.

The agreement also outlined the range of weapons previously supplied: 122mm and 155mm howitzers, artillery ammunition, Milan and Javelin anti-tank systems, anti-tank mines, Carl Gustaf and Instalaza C90 grenade launchers, vehicles, boats, communications equipment, medical supplies, and field hospitals [2]. By June 2024, Estonia had trained more than 1,500 Ukrainian military personnel.

In 2024, Estonia continued participating in international procurement and training mechanisms. Artillery ammunition, anti-tank capabilities, communications, and personnel training remained priorities. However, the depletion of its national stockpiles limited its ability to continue large-scale weapons transfers under the 2022–2023 model. Tallinn therefore began redirecting assistance toward purchases from domestic companies and joint international projects. By 2025, the total volume of Estonia's direct military assistance to Ukraine had reached approximately \$921.5 million. Including logistics and delivery costs, the figure is estimated at \$932.9 million. Approximately \$455.1 million of this amount was spent on ammunition [1]. This allocation demonstrates that Tallinn's main priority is sustaining the current intensity of hostilities rather than transferring individual high-value weapon systems.

In 2025, Ukraine provided Estonia with a list of weapons and military equipment that domestic companies could produce. The

list included UAVs, ground robotic platforms, watercraft, medical equipment, and logistics systems [5]. The catalog of the Estonian Centre for Defence Investment listed up to 500 products and services from approximately 100 companies.

This scheme represents a shift from drawing down stockpiles to an industrial model. The Ukrainian side identifies priority needs, the Estonian government finances procurement, and companies receive guaranteed orders and an opportunity to test their products under combat conditions. Military assistance thus became an instrument for developing the national industrial base simultaneously.

In 2025, Estonia allocated approximately \$4 million to procure Starlink terminals and services for Ukraine through the IT Coalition [6]. The decision was driven by the growing number of unmanned units and the need to maintain resilient data transmission. By then, 18 states were participating in the IT Coalition, while the total amount of pledged financial and material support had exceeded \$1.48 billion [1]. Tallinn's role primarily consists of coordinating projects and determining technical priorities in coordination with the Ukrainian side.

Estonia also joined the PURL mechanism, allocating approximately \$23.9 million to procure US weapons and ammunition. Public reports separately identify approximately \$12.5 million in funding for critical US military equipment [1].

By 2025, the number of Ukrainian military personnel trained by Estonian specialists had neared 2,000 [7]. After participating in Operation Interflex, Tallinn redirected some of its efforts to Operation Legio, a mission conducted in Poland. Initially, up to ten military personnel, reservists, and representatives of the Kaitseliit volunteer territorial defense organization were sent there. Each training cycle lasted approximately two months.

From 2022 to 2025, Estonia's total civilian assistance to Ukraine amounted to approximately \$370.9 million [1]. This included financial support, reconstruction projects, assistance to government institutions, cybersecurity, and support for businesses. Separately, Estonia provided a guarantee of approximately \$11.4 million to the European Investment Bank's EU for Ukraine fund.

An additional \$28.7 million was earmarked to support Estonian industrial companies participating in Ukrainian projects [1]. This scheme allows Tallinn to combine assistance to Ukraine with the promotion of national technologies for the future reconstruction market, primarily in digitalization, cybersecurity, energy, unmanned systems, and engineering infrastructure.

Humanitarian assistance in 2022–2025 amounted to approximately \$7.6 million [1]. Resources were directed toward rescue equipment, demining, the reconstruction of schools, support for centers for internally displaced persons, and cash assistance to the population. Support for Ukraine’s energy sector reached approximately \$3.4 million.

In October 2025, Estonia contributed an additional \$170,600 to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund. This brought the country’s cumulative contribution to the mechanism to approximately \$705,300 [8]. The funding was intended to procure equipment needed to restore damaged generation and grid facilities.

By June 2026, approximately \$42.1 million in Russian assets had been frozen in Estonia [1]. Tallinn has consistently advocated for the expansion of sanctions, establishing a special tribunal for the crime of aggression, and creating an international compensation mechanism. The political and legal track complements military assistance and allows Estonia to serve as one of the EU’s most hardline advocates of sanctions pressure.

In 2026, Estonia maintained its commitment to allocate at least 0.25% of GDP to military support for Ukraine. This annual allocation was set at \$125.9 million [1]. The funds are distributed according to a 90–5–5 formula. Approximately \$113.3 million, or 90%, is allocated to the procurement of defense industry products. An additional \$6.3 million each is allocated through the IT Coalition and for training Ukrainian military personnel.

The 90–5–5 formula reflects the full consolidation of the industrial model of support. Most of the funding flows back into the national economy through orders placed with Estonian companies, while Ukraine receives unmanned systems, robotic platforms, communications equipment, medical equipment, and other products tailored to operational needs.

In April 2026, Estonia and Ukraine signed a letter of intent to

expand defense-industrial cooperation [9]. The document outlines the creation of legal and organizational conditions for the joint development and production of weapons. Priority areas include strike UAVs, interceptor drones, and electronic warfare systems.

That same month, Estonia's Ministry of Defense announced an increase in the number of instructors participating in Operation Legio to 27 personnel [10]. The nearly threefold expansion of this presence demonstrates that Tallinn seeks to maintain a permanent role in training the AFU despite the limited size of its own armed forces.

In 2026, PURL funding is expected to continue, with air defense systems and ammunition as procurement priorities [1]. Simultaneously, Estonia will remain involved in the IT Coalition, Tallinn Mechanism, and training programs. Tallinn is therefore concentrating resources on areas where its limited financial capabilities can have the greatest impact: ammunition, unmanned systems, communications, cybersecurity, and specialized training.

In 2027, Tallinn plans to maintain military assistance at no less than 0.25% of GDP. Up to 15% of the annual amount, or approximately \$17.1 million, is expected to be allocated to joint production projects under the Build with Ukraine initiative [9]. Key focus areas will include strike unmanned systems, interceptors, and electronic warfare systems.

Factoring in implemented and planned measures, Estonia's total support for Ukraine through the end of 2027 is estimated at approximately \$1.6 billion [1]. Civilian assistance is expected to reach approximately \$478.9 million, while humanitarian assistance is projected to total approximately \$9.9 million. These figures include future commitments and therefore should be distinguished from actual expenditures.

In summary, in 2022–2023, Estonia primarily transferred weapons and ammunition from national stockpiles, including howitzers, anti-tank weapons, and field hospitals. In 2024, the 10-year agreement established annual military assistance at no less than 0.25% of GDP. Since 2025, the bulk of funding has been directed toward products manufactured by Estonian defense

companies, while in 2026–2027 Tallinn has shifted toward the joint production of unmanned systems and electronic warfare equipment. Estonia's model combines meeting the AFU's immediate needs with modernizing its own military, developing the national defense industry, and consolidating the country's role as a coordinator of digital and cyber support for Ukraine.

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SOUTH KOREA

The Republic of Korea's (ROK) assistance to Ukraine since February 2022 has primarily taken the form of humanitarian support, reconstruction financing, and the supply of equipment for civil protection, demining, healthcare, and energy. Because Seoul has maintained a policy of not directly supplying lethal weapons to the AFU, the Korean model of support is built around three pillars: official non-lethal assistance to Ukraine, long-term financial mechanisms, and indirect military-industrial support through the supply of ammunition to the US and the rearmament of Eastern European states with Korean-made systems.

In 2022, the ROK operated in an emergency humanitarian assistance mode. By June 21, 2022, Seoul had already provided Ukraine with \$50 million in assistance and subsequently decided to allocate another \$50 million. These funds were distributed through international organizations, Ukrainian government agencies, and bilateral channels. The bulk was directed toward food, medical equipment, medicines, essential supplies, temporary accommodation for civilians, refugee assistance, and the restoration of basic public utilities [1].

In December 2022, the ROK sent two charter flights to Ukraine carrying more than 100 tons of humanitarian cargo. These shipments included pediatric vaccines, medical equipment, emergency medical kits, and generators. The supplies were intended to support healthcare facilities and maintain civilian infrastructure during power outages. During this period, the South Korean side also provided body armor, protective helmets, military uniforms, and other non-lethal equipment [2].

In 2023, this assistance became more structured. In May 2023, Seoul and Kiev signed an agreement on a \$130 million financial package that included grants and concessional financing. In July, ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol announced an additional \$150 million in assistance for the year. Separately, \$1 million was provided through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the International Committee of the Red Cross to address the consequences of the destruction of the

Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant [3]. A significant portion of the 2023 Korean package was dedicated to humanitarian demining, with the ROK beginning to transfer equipment to Ukraine's State Emergency Service. By December 2023, Ukraine had received 200 SsangYong pickup trucks, 10 DOK-ING MV-4 and MV-10 mechanical demining machines, two specialized emergency rescue vehicles with manipulators, one ambulance, metal detectors, pyrotechnic equipment, metal and inflatable boats, generators, and other essential equipment.

During Yoon Suk Yeol's visit to Kiev in July 2023, the Ukraine Peace and Solidarity Initiative was unveiled. This initiative brought together humanitarian assistance, infrastructure reconstruction, demining, digital transformation, medical cooperation, countering disinformation, and the transfer of non-lethal equipment. While the South Korean leadership's statement also referred to preparations for larger-scale deliveries of military equipment, the specific types were not disclosed. Seoul's official policy remained based on restrictions regarding the direct supply of lethal weapons to the conflict zone.

In August 2023, the ROK government included approximately \$394 million for assistance to Ukraine in its draft 2024 budget. Of this amount, approximately \$98 million was earmarked for reconstruction, roughly \$197 million for humanitarian assistance, and the remaining \$98 million was to be provided through international organizations [4]. This planned amount was approximately eight times higher than the previous year's figure.

Concurrently, Seoul presented a long-term financial framework. In 2023, it announced an additional assistance program worth \$2.3 billion. Of this, \$200 million was intended for immediate humanitarian support, while \$2.1 billion was earmarked for subsequent concessional lending through the ROK's Economic Development and Cooperation Fund (EDCF) [5]. Because these amounts belong to different financial categories and partially overlap with annual budget decisions, they cannot be mechanically added together as independent tranches.

On April 19, 2024, the governments of Ukraine and the ROK signed a framework agreement providing for up to \$2.1 billion in EDCF loans for 2024–2029. Under this mechanism, each project

is to be approved separately, with the amount, term, interest rate, and financing conditions determined individually. Initially, the financing was to be used primarily to purchase equipment.

Starting in 2025, the loans could also be used for infrastructure projects, the restoration of production capacity, programs implemented by state-owned enterprises, and support for Ukraine's budget. The first loan under this framework was arranged on October 2, 2024, between Ukraine's Ministry of Finance and the Export-Import Bank of Korea. Valued at \$100 million, the loan featured a 20-year term, an annual interest rate of 1%, and a five-year grace period. Ukraine received the funds on November 29, 2024 [6]. This tranche was directed toward supporting the social sector and maintaining budget stability amid the war.

In 2024–2025, the ROK significantly expanded the medical component of its assistance. In April 2024, Ukraine received 70 KIA Bongo ambulances, bringing the number of vehicles delivered to 100. In April 2025, a final batch of 20 vehicles was delivered, bringing the total volume of Korean humanitarian deliveries to 200 KIA Bongo ambulances. Valued at over \$12 million [7], this program also included 100 modern ultrasound diagnostic systems and 30 mobile C-arm X-ray systems. This equipment was distributed among emergency medical facilities, hospitals in affected regions, and medical units treating the wounded.

In 2025, the Korean side continued its financial support for reconstruction. In April, a new \$100 million package was announced, focusing on humanitarian programs, infrastructure repairs, and reconstruction projects. In November 2025, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the United Nations Development Programme launched a \$14.05 million initiative for Ukraine's energy resilience [8]. Designed for 2025–2028, the project envisages the deployment of decentralized and renewable energy solutions for approximately 100,000 residents, the training of 1,800 local specialists, and feasibility studies in 20 pilot communities across the Sumy, Kharkov, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kherson regions.

The energy component is of particular importance to the Korean strategy. KOICA and Ukrainian government agencies have

focused on decentralized generation, local backup power systems, energy efficiency at municipal facilities, and winter preparedness. The ROK draws here on its experience in developing digital energy systems, manufacturing equipment, modernizing public utilities, and technological planning. This approach enables the linking of emergency assistance with the subsequent involvement of Korean companies in postwar reconstruction projects.

Another area involves support for Ukraine's transportation and infrastructure. The EDCF framework provides equipment deliveries and financing for projects implemented by state-owned companies. Potential areas include rail transport, urban infrastructure, public utilities, energy, digital services, the restoration of production capacity, and the modernization of logistics facilities. For the ROK, this model creates opportunities for government institutions, banks, insurance companies, and private businesses to participate in long-term projects in Ukraine.

The ROK's military significance for Ukraine is considerably broader than the volume of its official deliveries. In November 2022, the US negotiated the purchase of 100,000 155mm artillery shells from Seoul for subsequent use in support of Ukraine. The South Korean side emphasized at the time that the formal end user would be the US. In April 2023, reports emerged of an agreement under which the US would borrow 500,000 155mm artillery shells [9]. According to press reports, this arrangement allowed Washington to replenish its own stocks while freeing up US ammunition for the Ukrainian theater.

In May 2023, additional reports emerged of hundreds of thousands of South Korean 155mm shells moving toward Ukraine via the US. Although Seoul's public position on the direct transfer of lethal weapons did not change, the detailed types, delivery schedule, and final distribution of the ammunition were not officially disclosed. This channel should therefore be viewed as an indirect mechanism for supplying Ukrainian artillery. Its practical significance lay in reducing pressure on US stocks and expanding Washington's ability to subsequently supply Ukraine with 155mm rounds [10].

In 2026, the ROK considered joining the PURL mechanism. In February 2026, ROK Foreign Ministry representatives confirmed

that consultations with NATO on various forms of support for Ukraine were ongoing. As of June 2026, there was no public information indicating that Seoul had allocated a specific amount or signed a PURL package [11]. The Korean position in the discussions continued to emphasize humanitarian assistance and non-lethal military equipment.

The ROK's indirect significance has also emerged through major defense contracts with Poland. In August 2022, Hanwha Aerospace signed a contract worth approximately \$2.4 billion with Poland for the supply of 212 K9 self-propelled howitzers, 155mm ammunition, logistics support, and personnel training. In December 2023, a second contract worth approximately \$2.6 billion was concluded for 152 K9 howitzers, ammunition, and production localization [12]. Thus, the value of just the two main K9 agreements reached approximately \$5 billion, while the total number of howitzers ordered by Poland reached 364.

In April 2024, Hanwha Aerospace received an additional Polish contract for 72 K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers worth approximately \$1.64 billion, supplementing a previous order for 218 systems. By autumn 2024, the total value of Hanwha's agreements with Poland was estimated at \$9.2 billion, covering 364 K9 howitzers and 290 Chunmoo systems. At the end of 2025, the Polish-Korean framework was expanded by another agreement worth approximately \$4 billion related to the production and supply of CGR-080 missiles for the K239 Chunmoo, with production processes established in Poland [13].

Contracts with Romania are smaller in scale but remain important for NATO's eastern flank. In July 2024, Hanwha Aerospace concluded an agreement worth approximately \$1 billion to supply Romania with 54 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, 36 K10 armored ammunition resupply vehicles, and ammunition [13]. Scheduled for completion by 2029, the contract involves the K9, a 155mm self-propelled howitzer with a 52-caliber barrel, and the K10, which is designed for mechanized ammunition resupply and artillery unit support.

While the Polish and Romanian contracts cannot be classified as direct assistance to Ukraine, their significance lies in expanding the production capabilities of European armed forces, accelerating

the replacement of Soviet-origin weapons, and creating additional reserves of equipment and ammunition in NATO's eastern-flank states. Poland has gained the ability to modernize its artillery and rocket systems more rapidly while retaining resources for the continued support of Ukraine. In this arrangement, the ROK serves as a supplier of industrial capacity, technology, weapons, and ammunition to states directly involved in supporting Ukraine.

Thus, the ROK's assistance to Ukraine encompasses four primary areas. The first involves humanitarian and civilian support, including \$100 million in assistance in 2022, the 2023–2025 packages, ambulances, medical equipment, generators, civil protection equipment, and supplies for rescue services. The second covers demining and addressing the consequences of hostilities, such as 200 SsangYong pickup trucks, 10 DOK-ING MV-4 and MV-10 machines, specialized equipment, metal detectors, pyrotechnic equipment, and resources for the State Emergency Service. The third centers on financial and infrastructure reconstruction through the EDCF: a framework of concessional loans totaling up to \$2.1 billion for 2024–2029, a first tranche of \$100 million, KOICA and UNDP programs, and energy resilience projects. The fourth features an indirect defense component that includes reports of the transfer of 155mm ammunition to the US, possible participation in PURL, and multibillion-dollar deliveries of K9, K10, and K239 Chunmoo systems to Poland and Romania, which strengthens the resource base of NATO's eastern flank and creates additional capacity for the continued support of Ukraine.

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JAPAN

Japanese assistance to Ukraine since February 2022 has evolved from emergency humanitarian deliveries and financial support into a long-term model of cooperation in reconstruction, energy resilience, demining, macro-financial stabilization, and the technical upgrading of civilian infrastructure. In terms of pledged commitments, Tokyo has become one of Ukraine's largest Asian donors. At the same time, the Japanese model has its own specifics: no direct deliveries of lethal weapons to Ukraine have been announced; officially disclosed military assistance has been non-lethal, focusing on protective equipment, vehicles, unmanned systems, medical assistance, demining, and information security.

In 2022, Japan's assistance focused on emergency response. Tokyo provided funding through UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Food Programme, the International Organization for Migration, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Japanese non-governmental organizations. This assistance covered food, medicines, temporary housing, civilian protection, water supply, sanitation, and support for Ukrainian refugees in neighboring countries. By March 2023, the total volume of financial, humanitarian, and reconstruction assistance had reached approximately \$1.6 billion [1; 2; 3].

This practical assistance included deliveries through international humanitarian organizations and the use of the logistical capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. For the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Japan provided 5,000 blankets, 4,500 plastic tarpaulins, and 8,500 sleeping mats. Self-Defense Forces aircraft delivered approximately 103 tons of humanitarian supplies to Poland and Romania for subsequent transfer to Ukraine and refugees located in neighboring countries. Separately, 15 tons of food, including rice, canned fish, powdered milk, and canned bread, were delivered. For Ukraine's emergency and rescue services, Japan assembled a shipment of 25 types of equipment and communications gear with a total weight of approximately 30 tons [4]. These deliveries combined international

humanitarian channels with direct material and logistical assistance to Ukrainian civil protection services.

During the same period, Japan began supplying non-lethal equipment. Through the Self-Defense Forces, it provided body armor, protective helmets, and other equipment to Ukrainian agencies. Support for the State Emergency Service of Ukraine became a separate channel. In May 2022, Tokyo allocated approximately \$1.7 million through the UN Office for Project Services for the transfer of firefighting and rescue equipment, communications equipment, and technical equipment. In June, an emergency \$500 million loan was provided for economic recovery [5]. By the winter of 2022–2023, Japan had allocated approximately \$2.6 million for generators and solar-powered lamps for schools, hospitals, and social infrastructure [6].

In 2023, Japanese support took on a pronounced macro-financial dimension. In February, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced an additional \$5.5 billion in assistance. By spring 2023, Tokyo's total commitments had exceeded \$7 billion [7]. The funds were directed toward supporting Ukraine's state budget, repairing energy infrastructure, humanitarian programs, agricultural recovery, demining, and strengthening public administration systems. To finance part of the program, Japan used the World Bank's loan guarantee mechanism, enabling the expansion of budgetary support for Kiev without placing a direct burden on Ukraine's financial resources.

Alongside budgetary and humanitarian support, Japan expanded deliveries to address the consequences of the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant. Approximately 160 water purification units, 30 drainage pumps, 4,000 plastic water containers, 21 water tanks, approximately 8 km of rescue ropes, and 3,000 units of absorbent materials were sent to Ukrainian regions [8]. The supplies were intended to provide the population with drinking water, drain contaminated water, equip temporary shelters, and conduct emergency rescue operations. In September 2023, through the UN Development Programme, Japan provided Ukraine with two autotransformers to restore power grid resilience.

Through the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Japanese assistance also included deliveries of sunflower and corn seeds to small Ukrainian farms affected by hostilities and supply chain disruptions [9].

Another area of assistance focused on supporting the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and developing humanitarian demining capabilities. Japan provided the Ukrainian side with 24 crane trucks for unexploded ordnance disposal, 50 Japanese-made ALIS mine-detection systems, and 40 vehicles [10]. In addition, equipment was supplied to Ukraine's public broadcaster to help maintain the stable operation of information infrastructure during wartime. These measures complemented Japan's financial participation in NATO programs and laid a practical foundation for further expanding Japanese involvement in demining, civil protection, and the restoration of critical infrastructure.

Security assistance represented a distinct area in 2023. Japan announced the transfer of approximately 100 vehicles, primarily trucks, as well as about 30,000 ready-to-eat meals. The vehicles were intended to transport personnel, equipment, food, ammunition, and medical supplies. Japan also announced plans to provide treatment and rehabilitation for Ukrainian military personnel at the Central Hospital of the Self-Defense Forces [11]. At the same time, Tokyo allocated \$30 million to NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine to purchase non-lethal equipment, strengthen communications, logistics, and medical support, and improve the interoperability of Ukrainian forces with Western standards.

In early 2024, Japan continued to expand non-lethal support for Ukraine's security sector. In January, Tokyo announced an additional contribution of approximately \$37 million to NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine [12]. The funds were intended to purchase non-lethal equipment and strengthen the capabilities of Ukrainian agencies in communications, logistics, medicine, and protection against modern threats. Concurrently, Japan announced the transfer of a UAV detection system, marking a concrete example of Japanese assistance in countering aerial

threats without supplying lethal equipment.

A key milestone was the signing of the Japan-Ukraine Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Security and Long-Term Support on June 13, 2024 [13]. Valid for 10 years, the document became the political and legal basis for further expanding Japanese involvement. At the time of its signing, Japan had provided or pledged to provide Ukraine with more than \$12 billion in assistance, including \$4.5 billion for 2024. The agreement established areas of bilateral cooperation in non-lethal assistance, cybersecurity, intelligence, critical infrastructure protection, demining, countering disinformation, economic recovery, and support for Ukraine's defense industry within the framework of Japanese legislation.

The reconstruction component of Japanese assistance was formalized in greater detail in February 2024 at the Japan-Ukraine Conference for Promotion of Economic Reconstruction. Following the event, government agencies, banks, insurance organizations, industrial companies, and research institutions from the two countries signed 56 cooperation documents [14]. The initiative involved the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and the Nippon Export and Investment Insurance Agency (NEXI). These institutions provide grant financing, technical support, private capital mobilization, risk insurance, and assistance in integrating Japanese companies into Ukrainian projects.

The main areas of industrial cooperation included energy, transport, urban infrastructure, digital technologies, agriculture, machinery, food processing, robotics, electronics, new materials, and the production of demining equipment. The 2024 agreement also addressed prospects for establishing joint ventures, conducting applied research, and introducing Japanese technologies into the Ukrainian economy. A separate area concerned nuclear and radiation safety, including support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, assistance to nuclear power facilities, and the management of risks around the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power

Plant.

Energy became one of the most tangible areas of Japanese assistance. In 2024, through the UN Development Programme and JICA, Ukraine received seven large transformers, five gas-turbine generators, water-supply equipment, and dozens of small generators. The deliveries were intended to restore power grids and maintain the operation of municipal facilities, hospitals, schools, heating centers, and drainage systems. In November 2024, Japan provided an additional gas turbine, 15 frequency converters for water pumps, two gas-piston generators, and 32 small generators. This package helped offset the consequences of damage to energy infrastructure and maintain the operation of municipal services during the winter.

In 2025, Japan expanded financial support through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) mechanism. This program provides Ukraine with loans whose repayment is secured by revenues from frozen Russian sovereign assets. In June 2025, Tokyo arranged a loan of approximately \$3.3 billion [15]. The funds were provided for a 30-year term and were intended to support the state budget, maintain basic social services, finance reconstruction, and ensure Ukraine's economic resilience.

In 2025, Japanese assistance was further expanded in the areas of reconstruction and humanitarian demining. In April, JICA launched the fourth phase of its Ukraine Emergency Recovery Program, which included support for energy, water supply, public safety, road infrastructure, education, border infrastructure, and explosive ordnance clearance. One of the most notable material results of Japanese involvement was the provision of equipment to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. By November 2025, Ukraine had received 54 ALIS mine-detection systems and 22 Japanese demining machines. These deliveries expanded the State Emergency Service's ability to survey contaminated areas, detect mines and unexploded ordnance, and conduct operations in areas affected by hostilities. In October 2025, Tokyo hosted the Ukraine Mine Action Conference UMAC-2025, which brought together approximately 600 representatives of around 75 countries and

international organizations [16]. The forum was used to coordinate international assistance to Ukraine, discuss demining technologies, and showcase Japanese technical solutions used in humanitarian my action.

In 2026, Tokyo maintained its policy of targeted reconstruction financing and increased participation in international mechanisms supporting Kiev. In February, JICA announced the fifth phase of its Emergency Recovery Program, worth approximately \$41 million. The funds were directed toward healthcare, agriculture, debris removal, restoration of information and communications systems, job creation, and support for local authorities. In May, Japan joined the PURL mechanism, with a contribution amounting to \$14.658 million. Tokyo explicitly stated that the funds would be used exclusively to purchase non-lethal equipment [17].

By February 2026, the total volume of Japan's commitments and assistance implemented for Ukraine had reached approximately \$20 billion. Japan retained its role as a major financial donor, supplier of energy and engineering equipment, organizer of international reconstruction and demining conferences, and partner to Ukraine in technological and industrial cooperation. The restriction on direct deliveries of lethal weapons has led Japan to concentrate its policy on areas where Tokyo has significant financial, technological, and organizational capabilities.

Thus, Japanese assistance to Ukraine encompasses four interconnected areas. The first involves macro-financial support, budget loans, grants, and participation in the ERA mechanism through the World Bank and other international financial institutions. The second covers humanitarian assistance, energy infrastructure repairs, medical support, supplies for municipal facilities, and preparations for the winter period. The third includes non-lethal support for security agencies: protective equipment, vehicles, unmanned systems, treatment of military personnel, contributions to NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package, and PURL financing. The fourth centers on reconstruction, demining, Japanese technologies, private capital mobilization, investment insurance, and the development of joint Japanese-Ukrainian

projects in energy, infrastructure, the digital sector, and industry.

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AIR FORCE COALITION

The activities of the Air Force Capabilities Coalition for Ukraine exemplify long-term multilateral cooperation aimed at reequipping the Ukrainian Air Force. The coalition was established in 2023 within the framework of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, known as the Ramstein format. The US, Denmark, and the Netherlands lead the coalition's activities. Its main strategic objective is to gradually transition the Ukrainian Air Force from its aging fleet of Soviet-made combat aircraft, primarily Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters, to Western fourth-generation multirole platforms. The ultimate goal of the initiative is to create a sustainable and technologically independent air defense and aviation system [1; 2].

Within this framework, responsibilities among the co-chairing countries are clearly divided. The US acts as the primary rights holder, coordinating and approving the re-export of US military technologies, while also providing precision-guided weapons and access to major training facilities. Denmark and the Netherlands, in turn, serve as the main donors of aircraft, transferring combat aircraft from their own air forces and acting as operational coordinators for the European track of professional personnel training.

The material and technical contribution of the Air Force Coalition centers on the transfer of General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole fighters in the AM and BM variants, which have undergone the Mid-Life Update modernization program. These aircraft are being delivered in carefully coordinated stages as flight and technical personnel become ready. By mid-2026, the total confirmed number of aircraft transferred by European partners stood at 61. The Dutch Ministry of Defense successfully fulfilled its commitment to transfer the first planned group of 24 combat aircraft, while the remaining 18 aircraft are being used to support the training process. Denmark also completed the transfer of all 19 aircraft it had pledged. As part of the coalition's expanded initiatives, in June 2026, the

Czech Republic transferred five ALTO NG light trainer aircraft to the Ukrainian side to reduce flight-hour costs during initial pilot training, while another five aircraft were purchased by a Czech foundation affiliated with the initiative [3].

Financial participation by coalition members is strictly allocated between designated program support funds and ammunition procurement. As of June 2026, the Netherlands' total commitments under the US-led PURL initiative amounted to \$1.13 billion. Of this amount, \$341 million was allocated directly to the procurement of precision-guided air-to-surface missiles and bombs. Two additional tranches of \$284 million each were allocated in December 2025 to purchase air defense ammunition and air-to-air missiles, and in June 2026 to procure surface-to-air missiles for countering ballistic threats to the airfield network. The Netherlands also allocated \$1.08 million to cover operational costs associated with the training process.

Denmark provided a specialized \$639 million military assistance package focused on the technical maintenance and servicing of the aircraft fleet, while all \$95 million in proceeds from Denmark's sale of surplus fighter aircraft to third countries were officially redirected to the Danish Ukraine Fund.

Canada also joined in financing the coalition track, allocating \$275.8 million through a trust fund to administer training programs and procure ground equipment.

US financial and technical involvement focuses on maintaining stable logistics chains and supplying aviation weapons through the Foreign Military Sales mechanism and direct commercial contracts. The US State Department authorized a \$310 million support package covering upgrades to onboard software and the supply of spare parts. In addition, in January 2026, the US Program Executive Office signed a direct \$235 million contract with the Belgian engineering company Sabena Aerospace Engineering to provide major overhauls of airframe components and onboard radar systems [4; 5].

Training center capacity remains a key factor determining the pace at which the aircraft fleet can be deployed. Due to

operational security requirements, precise aggregate figures on the number of trained pilots and trainees are classified and are not fully disclosed publicly. Nevertheless, official statements by the defense ministries of partner countries indicate a clear division of the training process among autonomous tracks. Personnel training under the US continental track is conducted at facilities operated by the US Air National Guard at Morris Air National Guard Base in Arizona. This specialized course focuses on upgrading the skills and retraining experienced flight and technical personnel, while the center's operational capacity is limited by a regulatory quota of up to 12 trainees per training cycle [6; 7].

The European F-16 fighter pilot training center in Romania was established with active support from the Netherlands and the US corporation Lockheed Martin, maintaining a standard quota of approximately eight to 10 Ukrainian pilots per training cycle. Another center, which operated at Skrydstrup Air Base in Denmark, provided initial training for flight and technical crews. At the same time, the Czech state-owned company LOM Praha provides simulator and L-39 trainer aircraft flight training for a group of eight Ukrainian pilots [8; 9].

Current verified training figures show that more than 200 Ukrainian pilots have successfully completed the initial stage of training under the auspices of the British Air Force. An estimated 20 to 35 pilots have the specialized qualifications required to perform combat missions directly on F-16 fighters. Engineering and technical personnel are trained in larger groups; in particular, more than 65 specialists in life-support and avionics systems maintenance have been trained in Denmark alone. The transfer of specialized aviation simulators from the Netherlands to the Ukrainian side was an important step in intensifying the training process, allowing some training programs to be moved directly to Ukrainian territory and accelerating personnel training without removing staff from operational bases.

The integration of the transferred fighters into Ukraine's unified air defense system is being carried out under two key

operational scenarios. Under the air-to-air scenario, the aircraft are used to intercept cruise missiles and long-range attack UAVs. These missions employ AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles and AIM-9 Sidewinders. Under the air-to-surface scenario, the platforms have been documented operating with US-made precision-guided munitions, including GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs, significantly expanding their ability to suppress Russian Armed Forces frontline air defenses. AN/APG-66 and AN/APG-68 onboard radars are maintained in a constant state of readiness through contracts with Northrop Grumman. At the operational level, mixed international squadrons are reportedly being formed, with technical support provided in part by foreign contractors and coalition instructors to minimize aircraft downtime [10; 11].

Despite successfully fulfilling its basic commitments to transfer more than 40 aircraft, the Air Force Coalition faces several systemic challenges. These include a shortage of qualified personnel caused by pilot training lagging behind the pace of aircraft transfers, as well as the high vulnerability of ground infrastructure. Expanding training quotas and accelerating the training of flight and technical personnel remain key demands raised by the Ukrainian side at meetings of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Basing the aircraft requires continuous protection of airfields against ballistic missile strikes, forcing coalition members to simultaneously invest in deliveries of Patriot air defense systems and Norwegian NASAMS advanced surface-to-air missile systems. In addition, the political factor remains relevant, as Washington must continually approve the types and geographic areas of use of the transferred missiles and bombs. Overall, the coalition's transition toward supplying modern flight simulators and concluding long-term service contracts indicates that international assistance is evolving from an emergency response into a systematic effort designed to support the long-term operation of Western aviation platforms.

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ARTILLERY COALITION

The Artillery Coalition was established in response to Ukraine's main material shortages in the war of attrition: artillery systems, 155mm ammunition, long-range shells, counter-battery radars, repair capacity, and a sustainable production cycle. The coalition was formally launched on January 18, 2024, in Paris within the framework of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. France and the US emerged its leaders. Initially, France announced the participation of 23 countries [1; 2].

The coalition lacks a single public budget. Instead, funding is distributed through national assistance packages, the French CAESAR program, the Czech ammunition procurement initiative, Swedish procurement of Archer and Arthur systems, the Danish model of financing Ukraine's defense industry, German and Rheinmetall industrial contracts, as well as individual decisions by participants in the Ramstein format.

By 2025, the Artillery Coalition was led by France and the US as, alongside Belgium, the UK, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and Sweden [3]. Key areas of assistance include 155mm ammunition, counter-battery warfare equipment, the repair and maintenance of artillery systems, specialized repair hubs in Ukraine, long-range strike capabilities, and counter-battery radars [3].

The centerpiece of the French component of the coalition is the CAESAR self-propelled howitzer. As of January 2024, Ukraine had already received 49 CAESAR systems previously supplied by France and Denmark [4]. That same month, Ukraine additionally purchased six CAESAR systems from France for approximately \$27 million [5]. Concurrently, France announced a plan to bring deliveries to Ukraine to 78 CAESAR systems. This included 12 systems to be financed by France at a cost of \$56.8 million, six to be paid for by Ukraine, and the remaining 60 systems requiring an estimated \$318 million in partner contributions [1; 2]. The overall financial framework of the

CAESAR program within the coalition amounted to at least \$402 million, excluding some systems delivered previously.

French artillery assistance has not been limited to CAESAR. Prior to the coalition's launch, France had supplied Ukraine with 155mm CAESAR howitzers, TRF1 towed artillery systems, and 120mm mortars [1]. However, CAESAR became the core platform of the French contribution because it combines mobility, the NATO-standard 155mm caliber, and the ability to rapidly change position after firing. This capability is practically vital for Ukraine due to the proliferation of the front with UAVs and counter-battery warfare capabilities.

Ammunition has proven to be the most vulnerable element of the Artillery Coalition. France planned to supply Ukraine with 80,000 155mm shells in 2024. Prior to that, since the start of Russia's SMO, Paris had supplied approximately 30,000 such shells [6]. French industry increased monthly 155mm shell production from the pre-conflict level of approximately 1,000 rounds to 3,000 rounds per month [2]. Even this surge falls short of meeting the needs of the AFU, consequently, the bulk of ammunition supplies has increasingly come not from French stocks but from the Czech initiative and external procurement.

The Czech initiative has effectively emerged as the main ammunition component of artillery support for Ukraine. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, the initiative supplied more than 1.5 million large-caliber rounds through various mechanisms in 2024, including approximately 500,000 155mm shells [4]. By February 2026, according to Czech President P. Pavel, Ukraine had received 4.4 million large-caliber rounds via this mechanism since its inception, with approximately 2 million delivered in 2025 alone [7].

In 2026, the Czech initiative encountered a funding shortfall. While requirements were estimated at approximately \$5.6 billion, only \$1.6 billion had been raised by February 2026 [8]. By May 2026, approximately 1 million artillery shells had been contracted, of which around 500,000 had already been delivered to Ukraine. Secured funding at that point amounted to less than

\$1.13 billion [9]. For comparison, deliveries through the mechanism in 2025 were estimated at approximately 1.8 million shells [9]. Thus, volumes in 2026 could decline not from a lack of demand but from insufficient funding for paid contracts.

Sweden bolstered the artillery component by procuring 18 Archer self-propelled howitzers and five Arthur counter-battery radars for Ukraine in a package worth approximately \$309 million. Sweden had previously transferred eight Archer systems to the AFU. Deliveries of the Arthur systems were scheduled to begin in 2025, with the new Archer systems to follow in 2026 [10]. This package is crucial as it simultaneously addresses firepower and counter-battery detection within the artillery cycle

Denmark remains one of the most significant contributors to the artillery component. Copenhagen's official assistance roster to Ukraine includes 19 CAESAR 8x8 systems, 16 Zuzana 2 systems, CAESAR 6x6 systems, M109s for spare parts, Bohdana systems, 2S1s, heavy and medium mortars, 122mm rockets, 122mm, 152mm, and 155mm artillery shells, propellant charges, primers, and fuzes [11]. Furthermore, Denmark serves not only in the Artillery Coalition as a donor of platforms and ammunition, but also a provider of command-and-control solutions and training.

In June 2026, Denmark announced its 30th military assistance package for Ukraine, worth \$669.7 million. Approximately \$198 million of this amount was allocated through the Danish model of financing Ukraine's defense industry [12]. The package also included funding for long-range artillery ammunition [12]. The practical significance of this approach lies in the fact that a portion of Ukraine's artillery requirements is now being met not through deliveries from Western stockpiles but through orders placed with Ukrainian manufacturers. Ukraine's Ministry of Defense explicitly linked the Danish model to the acquisition of new Bohdana self-propelled artillery systems [4]. This represents one of the most critical shifts in 2025–2026: artillery support is gradually moving from transferring off-the-shelf systems to financing production in Ukraine. For Ukraine, this reduces

dependence on NATO's limited stockpiles.

Germany and Rheinmetall constitute the industrial backbone of artillery support. On June 30, 2026, Rheinmetall announced that it had received a Ukrainian order for 155mm long-range artillery shells and propellant charges. The specific contract value was not disclosed, but according to senior representatives of the German defense company, it totals "many tens of millions of euros." Deliveries are scheduled to be completed in the first quarter of 2027, with production taking place at Rheinmetall Expal Munitions in Spain [13].

This contract is significant not merely for its absolute volume, but for the specific nature of the munitions. Ukraine is emphasizing long-range 155mm shells because shorter firing ranges increase the vulnerability of artillery crews. Given the intensive use of UAVs, artillery positions must be located farther from the line of contact, while guns must be able to change positions more rapidly after firing. Consequently, extended range, counter-battery reconnaissance, and rapid relocation have become just as critical as sheer number of shells.

The US contribution constitutes the largest single component of overall artillery support for Ukraine, though not all of these deliveries are channeled specifically through the Artillery Coalition. According to US data as of January 2025, Ukraine had received more than 200 155mm howitzers, more than 3 million 155mm artillery shells, more than 7,000 precision-guided 155mm shells, more than 40 HIMARS multiple rocket launchers, 36 105mm howitzers, and 180,000 105mm shells [14]. These deliveries laid the foundation of Ukraine's NATO-caliber artillery and long-range rocket artillery capabilities.

Ukraine's overall inventory of artillery systems is now highly diverse. Official Ukrainian inventories list M777 and M102 systems from the US, M109s from Italy, CAESAR systems from France and Denmark, Krab systems from Poland, Zuzana systems from Slovakia, Archer systems from Sweden, Dita systems from the Czech Republic, PzH 2000s from Germany, Ukrainian-made Bohdana systems, HIMARS, and various mortar systems [4].

While this diversity expands the number of available platforms, it significantly complicates logistics, including crew training, repairs, resupply, and the provision of spare parts, gun barrels, and compatible ammunition.

The Artillery Coalition's plans for 2026–2027 are guided by the Capability Coalitions Road maps. In January 2025, the leaders of eight capability coalitions approved road maps for the development of the AFU through 2027 [15]. Kiev defined the objective of the artillery component as creating sustainable, integrated, NATO-compatible artillery capabilities by the end of 2027 [16]. For the artillery component, this entails not only supplying guns but also establishing a comprehensive ecosystem for ammunition resupply, repairs, training, reconnaissance, fire control, and domestic production.

Key quantitative targets for 2026 include the following. Through the Czech initiative, approximately 1 million shells have been contracted, of which around 500,000 had been delivered by May 2026 [9]. Under the Swedish package, deliveries of 18 Archer systems are scheduled to begin, in addition to the eight systems already transferred [10]. Denmark has allocated approximately \$669.7 million, including around \$198 million through the Danish model [12]. Additionally, Germany announced \$13 billion in defense support for Ukraine, with air defense, UAVs, and artillery shells listed among the priorities [17].

While publicly confirmed targets for 2027 are less detailed, the overarching planning structure is clear. First, the continuation of 155mm shell deliveries through the Czech initiative, European contracts, and national assistance packages. Second, the fulfillment of some industrial contracts, including Rheinmetall's deliveries scheduled through the first quarter of 2027 [13]. Third, the development of repair facilities in Ukraine [3]. Fourth, the expansion of Ukrainian production, including Bohdana systems and various types of ammunition through the Danish model [4; 12]. Finally, the enhancement of NATO interoperability in caliber, fire control, training, and maintenance [15; 16].

The financial structure of artillery support reveals that the largest and most measurable components are distributed not through a single fund, but across several parallel channels. The French CAESAR component amounts to at least \$395–403 million. The Swedish Archer and Arthur artillery package is estimated at approximately \$309 million. The Danish package announced in June 2026 amounts to approximately \$669.7 million, of which around \$198 million is allocated to Ukrainian production. The Czech initiative for 2026 requires approximately \$5.6 billion, but as of February only \$1.6 billion had been raised. These figures demonstrate that while the Artillery Coalition operates on a scale of billions of dollars, its funding remains fragmented.

By July 2026, the coalition's primary practical achievement was the transition from emergency deliveries to a systemic artillery architecture. Deliveries of CAESAR, Archer, Zuzana, Bohdana, M777, PzH 2000, Krab, Dita, HIMARS, and ammunition of various calibers have laid the material foundation. The Czech initiative addresses the large-scale demand for shells. Sweden has strengthened the counter-battery component through Arthur. Denmark is actively financing Ukrainian production. Rheinmetall and European industry are scaling up 155mm ammunition output. The US continues to play a pivotal role in supplying howitzers, HIMARS, and millions of shells.

Thus, the Artillery Coalition has emerged as one of the central mechanisms of Western military support for Ukraine. Its significance lies not in any single delivery of CAESAR or Archer systems, but in integrating several critical elements of a war of attrition: artillery systems, ammunition, range, counter-battery reconnaissance, repairs, training, production, and financing. By July 2026, the coalition had established a functioning architecture, though a critical vulnerability remains: publicly confirmed funding and production volumes still fall short of guaranteeing Ukraine sustainable artillery parity with Russia over the 2026–2027 horizon.

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ARMOR AND MANEUVERABILITY COALITION

The Armor and Maneuverability Coalition is one of the key pillars of military support for Ukraine within the framework of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Its formation is linked to the shift in Western assistance from disparate deliveries of individual tanks and armored vehicles toward the creation of a sustainable mechanized component within the AFU. Unlike the 2023 Tank Coalition, this format covers not only main battle tanks, but also infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, engineering equipment, repair and recovery vehicles, protected medical platforms, bridge-laying systems, spare parts, repair centers, and comprehensive training of crews and technical personnel.

The coalition was formally launched in March 2024, with Poland initiating the effort, while Germany and Italy also assumed leadership roles. The US, the UK, Canada, the Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden, France, Spain, and Finland subsequently joined the coalition [1]. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the coalition operates in four key areas: the supply of armored vehicles and ammunition, maintenance and repair, the training of crews and technical personnel, and the development of tactics, doctrine, and the exchange of combat experience [1]. This structure reflects Ukraine's practical challenge: Western armored vehicles require not only their transfer but also continuous technical support.

The coalition lacks a single publicly disclosed budget. Instead, funding is provided through national packages from the US, Germany, Canada, Poland, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and other participants, as well as through industrial contracts, repair centers, training programs, and joint production projects. Therefore, the coalition's actual scale must be assessed based on confirmed equipment inventories, national programs, and industrial contracts.

The main types of armored vehicles supplied to Ukraine by

coalition participants and related mechanisms include T-72, PT-91, Leopard 1, Leopard 2, Abrams, and Challenger 2 tanks; AMX-10RC wheeled combat vehicles; Bradley, Marder, CV90, YPR 765, and Pbv 302 infantry fighting vehicles; M113, Stryker, LAV, M1117, CVR(T), Senator, and MRAP armored personnel carriers; as well as engineering vehicles, bridge-laying systems, repair and recovery vehicles, and armored medical platforms [1]. This structure shows that the priority is not only the heavy tank component, but also protected infantry mobility, evacuation, repair, and engineering support.

The US has made the largest quantitative contribution to Ukraine's mechanized mobility. According to the US Department of Defense, as of January 2025, Ukraine had received 31 Abrams tanks, 45 T-72B tanks, more than 300 Bradley IFVs, more than 400 Stryker APCs, more than 900 M113 APCs, more than 400 M1117 ASVs, more than 1,000 MRAPs, more than 5,000 HMMWVs, 300 armored medical vehicles, 153 repair and recovery vehicles, 29 armored bridge-laying systems, 80 trucks, and more than 200 heavy-equipment transport trailers, along with 1,000 tactical vehicles for towing and transport, 30 ammunition support vehicles, and 10 command-and-staff vehicles [3]. The US has also supplied more than 1.8 million 25mm rounds for Bradley vehicles, as well as 125mm, 120mm, and 105mm tank ammunition [3].

The US contribution has formed the backbone of Ukrainian mechanized units. Abrams tanks have reinforced the heavy tank component, Bradley vehicles have become one of the most sought-after IFVs on the front, Strykers and M113s provide protected personnel transport, while MRAPs and HMMWVs meet the large-scale mobility needs of small units. Additionally, the 153 repair and recovery vehicles and 29 bridge-laying systems are particularly important.

Germany is one of the key European donors of heavy armored vehicles. According to the official German aid list, Ukraine has received 103 Leopard 1A5 tanks with spare parts, 18 Leopard 2A6 tanks with ammunition and spare parts, 140 Marder IFVs, 269 MRAPs, 78 Bandvagn 206 vehicles, 50 Dingo vehicles, 66

armored personnel carriers, 54 M113s whose conversion was funded by Germany, 11 Warthog command vehicles, and five Warthog repair and recovery vehicles [4]. Equipment prepared for transfer includes another 22 Leopard 1A5 tanks, 25 Marder IFVs, and 131 MRAPs, as well as ammunition for the Leopard 1, Leopard 2, and Marder [4].

Germany's engineering component is particularly significant. Berlin has transferred 28 Bergepanzer 2 vehicles, two Bergepanzer 3 vehicles, 65 Wisent 1 mine-clearing vehicles, 81 mine plows, 27 Biber bridge-laying vehicles, five bridges for Biber systems, and 12 Dachs armored engineering vehicles [4].

Poland played a key role during the early stage of armored assistance. According to open sources, Warsaw provided Ukraine with more than 300 T-72 and PT-91 tanks, as well as 14 Leopard 2 tanks [5]. The significance of Poland's contribution lay in its speed. In 2022–2023, T-72s and PT-91s addressed the most urgent needs of Ukrainian tank units while Western deliveries of Leopard, Challenger, and Abrams tanks were still undergoing political approval, crew training, and logistical deployment. Poland also became one of the primary training sites for Ukrainian Leopard 2 crews, with instructors from other countries taking part [5].

Canada has focused on protected mobility. In February 2026, Ottawa announced \$1.4 billion in military assistance to Ukraine for fiscal years 2026–2027 [6]. Under this initiative, Canada is to supply more than 400 armored vehicles: 66 LAV 6 vehicles manufactured by General Dynamics Land Systems and 383 Senator vehicles manufactured by Roshel. This brings the total to 449 armored vehicles [6].

A separate Canadian program involves 50 Armoured Combat Support Vehicles (ACSVs). The first four vehicles were sent to Ukraine in June 2024. Initially, the first 10 ACSVs were to be delivered in a medical evacuation configuration. The total investment in the program amounts to \$455 million over three years [7]. Canada also allocated \$35.2 million for a Leopard 2 maintenance center in Poland and approximately \$664.4 million for critical equipment, including armored vehicles, spare parts, and

associated components [8].

The Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden are developing an industrial framework around the CV90. In June 2024, the Netherlands announced a \$455 million investment in the production of combat vehicles for Ukraine [9]. These funds are being directed through a joint mechanism with Denmark and Sweden focused on CV90 production. In December 2024, BAE Systems signed contracts worth approximately \$2.5 billion for the delivery of new CV90s to Sweden and Denmark. The contracts include 115 vehicles for Denmark, 50 for Sweden, and additional vehicles for Ukraine financed by Denmark and Sweden [10].

The CV90 has become one of the most important European projects for the Armor Coalition. This effort involves not only transferring existing vehicles but also launching serial production to meet Ukrainian and European requirements.

The Netherlands has also transferred YPR armored personnel carriers to Ukraine. By February 2025, Amsterdam had already delivered more than 200 YPRs of various types and announced the transfer of another 25 YPRs in a medical evacuation configuration [11]. In 2025, the Netherlands also allocated a new military aid package of up to \$200 million, including 20 medical evacuation vehicles [12].

The UK became the first country to announce the transfer of Western main battle tanks to Ukraine. The package included 14 Challenger 2 tanks. Although this number was limited, the decision politically paved the way for subsequent deliveries of Leopard 2 and Abrams tanks. In 2026, the British contribution acquired new significance through repair infrastructure. The UK disclosed the existence of four maintenance and repair facilities in Ukraine, with a fifth under development. These facilities service CVR(T), Husky, L119, AS90, and several other types of equipment transferred to Ukraine [13]. Repairs are carried out by British and Ukrainian specialists under contracts with the UK Ministry of Defense [13].

In June 2024, Rheinmetall opened a service center in western Ukraine. The center services Marder vehicles supplied to Ukraine and is subsequently expected to service Leopard 1 and Leopard 2

tanks. Ukrainian specialists undergo training at Rheinmetall facilities in Germany before taking part in equipment repairs in Ukraine [14]. This reduces the time needed to return damaged equipment to the front and eases the burden on repair facilities outside Ukraine.

The coalition's plans for 2026–2027 are incorporated into the Capability Coalitions Road maps. In January 2025, the leaders of eight capability coalitions approved road maps for developing Ukraine's defense forces through 2027 [16]. Within the Armor and Maneuverability Coalition, the priorities are clear: maintaining the existing fleet, delivering new batches of IFVs, APCs, and MRAPs, expanding repair capacity inside Ukraine, training crews, procuring spare parts, and gradually transitioning to Western operating standards.

Several major areas have been confirmed for 2026. The first is the Canadian package of approximately \$1.4 billion, including 449 LAV 6 and Senator armored vehicles [6]. The second is the continuation of Canada's \$455 million ACSV program, involving the delivery of 50 vehicles [7]. The third is pending German deliveries: 25 Marders, 22 Leopard 1A5s, 131 MRAPs, nine AiTO30 FDCs, and ammunition for the Leopard and Marder [4]. The fourth is the CV90 industrial framework: the Netherlands' \$455 million investment, a BAE Systems contract worth approximately \$2.49 billion, and additional vehicles for Ukraine financed by Denmark and Sweden [9; 10]. The fifth is the expansion of repair capacity in Ukraine, including British repair facilities and the Rheinmetall service center [13; 14].

For 2027, the key task is to turn the diverse deliveries of 2022–2025 into a manageable mechanized fleet. This requires adequate stocks of components, repair capacity in Ukraine and neighboring countries, the training of technical personnel, standardization of ammunition, and continued production of CV90, Marder, Leopard, LAV, Senator, ACSV, and other platforms. The main risk is not a lack of vehicles already delivered, but the fleet's high degree of diversification. The more types of armored vehicles Ukraine receives, the more difficult it becomes to keep them operational.

Thus, by 2026, the coalition had shifted from the logic of “delivering armored vehicles” to that of “maintaining a mechanized army.” In 2022–2023, the decisive factor was the number of tanks, IFVs, and APCs. In 2026–2027, the focus has shifted to repair, spare parts, recovery assets, bridge-laying systems, armored medical vehicles, crew training, and production contracts.

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DRONE COALITION

In December 2023, Latvia initiated the creation of the so-called Drone Coalition [1]. The initiative received broad support from European countries, and the UK was invited to co-found the coalition [2]. On February 14, eight members of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the “Ramstein” format) signed a letter of intent to join. Alongside the UK and Latvia, the initiative was joined by the Netherlands, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany [3].

On February 17, 2024, the Drone Coalition officially commenced operations. Its main tasks include ensuring Ukraine’s superiority in the UAV domain through stable drone supplies, establishing a secure supply chain for drone components in the West, sustaining drone production, and developing the allies’ UAV capabilities [4].

In July 2024, coalition members signed a memorandum of understanding outlining the framework for the coalition’s core activities, governance structure, and procurement mechanisms. A UK-led Joint Drone Coalition Fund was established to enable joint UAV procurement. The initial \$48.8 million for the fund was provided by the UK, Latvia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Additionally, coalition members committed to supplying Ukraine with 1 million FPV drones and providing other types of UAVs, including reconnaissance, strike, and AI-enabled systems, as well as counter-drone capabilities [5].

As of July 2026, the coalition comprises Ukraine, the UK, Latvia, Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Estonia, Italy, New Zealand, Canada, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Germany, and Sweden. Finland became the latest country to join, announcing its decision in April 2026 [6]. Earlier, in September 2025, Croatian leadership also expressed its intention to join the initiative [7].

Total support for Ukraine from all Drone Coalition member states reached \$2.05 billion in 2024 and \$3.12 billion in 2025 [8; 9]. According to Ukrainian sources, the Contact Group committed

an additional \$1.6 billion for UAV procurement in April 2026 [10]. Separately, in June 2026, the European Commission allocated \$4.43 billion for drones as part of a \$102 billion loan to support Ukraine [11]. According to the UK Ministry of Defense, more than 215,000 UAVs have been delivered to Ukraine through the coalition, including 150,000 interceptor drones, 45,000 FPV drones, and 20,000 long-range strike UAVs [12].

Additionally, the coalition's Joint Fund conducts tenders for the supply and development of new UAVs. Three major tenders have been held to date. Following the first competition in summer 2024, five FPV drone suppliers were selected and tasked with delivering approximately 30,000 drones to Ukraine over the following six months [13]. The second tender, held in autumn 2024, focused on supplying improved FPV drones and interceptors [14]. For the first time, Ukrainian manufacturers were eligible to participate, and nearly 20 Ukrainian companies were selected. The third tender, held in spring 2025, focused primarily on supplying multirotor tactical UAVs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [15].

Notably, Latvian companies have won coalition tenders twice [16]. Key suppliers of Latvian UAVs to Ukraine include Atlas Aerospace [17], Teters [18], New 21 [19], Origin Robotics [20], Ardelta [21], UAV Factory Ltd. Europe (owned by US-based Edge Autonomy) [22], and several others. Latvia has also allocated more than \$46.6 million for the coalition's needs and established the Sēlija drone training range, an integral part of the coalition's ecosystem. The range also hosted the Baltic Zenith 2024 military exercise, which was attended by the Ukrainian Air Force [23].

Collectively, the Baltic states form one of the most cohesive and active blocs within the coalition, making substantial contributions to supplies, infrastructure, and production development. Latvia and Lithuania were among the first to conclude additional 10-year agreements with Ukraine to join the Drone Deal program, a new format of cooperation on the export and development of unmanned systems that includes joint production. For example, in late June 2026, Latvia announced plans to launch joint UAV production with

Ukraine in the Latgale border region [24].

The UK, in turn, serves as the coalition's principal financial and technological donor. London not only coordinates the Joint Fund but also provides the largest volume of supplies. In 2026, the UK announced a record package of up to 150,000 drones of various types [25]. British companies are actively involved in the development and production of FPV drones, interceptors, and long-range strike UAVs, many of which are already being supplied to Ukraine through coalition mechanisms. A notable example of close Ukrainian-British cooperation was the opening of a production and testing center in Suffolk in February 2026, operated by the defense company UkrspecsysteMS to produce PD-2 and Shark reconnaissance UAVs [26]. The UK is also supplying Ukraine with Octopus interceptor drones, based on a Ukrainian design further developed by British engineers [27].

An important complement to the coalition's efforts is the parallel Ukrainian initiative, Build with Ukraine, unveiled by Kiev in June 2025. The program aims at establishing production lines in Ukraine's partner countries, exporting manufacturing technologies, and implementing joint projects with Ukrainian companies [28]. Denmark, in particular, became the first country to join the Build with Ukraine program, allocating more than \$76 million to establish Ukrainian defense-industry production facilities on Danish soil for long-range UAVs and interceptor drones. In late February 2026, the Ukrainian company SkyFall, manufacturer of Vampire UAVs, began negotiations with the Danish government on opening plants in Denmark [29].

In Germany, meanwhile, the joint defense company Quantum Frontline Industries was established in December 2025 by the Ukrainian company Frontline Robotics and the German company Quantum Systems to produce the Linza 3.0, Zoom, and Vector drone models [30]. On April 15, 2026, the Ukrainian defense company TAF Industries and the German company THYRA signed an agreement to establish a joint venture for the production of Kolibri-i10 UAVs [31]. In addition, in June 2026, the German company Airbus Defence and Space and SkyFall signed a

memorandum of understanding to launch a strategic partnership [32]. Notably, in May, Germany announced plans for the joint production of strike UAVs with a range of up to 1,500 km with Ukraine [33]. The deployment of interceptor drone production was also included in the February 2026 declaration on strategic defense cooperation between Ukraine and France. Additionally, French companies Renault and Turgis Gaillard plan to organize the production of long-range UAVs for Ukraine under the auspices of the French Ministry of Defense [34].

Joint production of Baton and K4 drones is expected to be established in the Netherlands [35]. In spring 2026, production was launched in Norway, with a Krush Tech facility located at Hønefoss Airport in Eggemoen, Buskerud County [36]. In February 2026, the Finnish technology company Insta and the Ukrainian robotic-platform supplier Tencore signed a memorandum of understanding to localize the production of TerMIT unmanned systems in Finland [37]. A similar agreement was signed in April 2026 between TAF Industries and the Finnish company Summa Defence [38].

Thus, the Drone Coalition has become one of the most effective mechanisms of multilateral support for Ukraine amid the protracted conflict. It has facilitated the delivery of hundreds of thousands of unmanned systems, launched a series of national programs, and initiated the relocation of production to European countries. The initiative has demonstrated the potential to shift from a model of one-off military assistance toward deeper military-technological cooperation involving joint development, production localization, and the exchange of expertise. The participation of Ukraine's allies in programs such as Build with Ukraine and Drone Deal indicates a gradual shift from supplying finished products to integrating Ukrainian companies into the European defense industry.

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INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COALITION

The Integrated Air and Missile Defense Coalition has emerged as one of the specialized mechanisms for long-term military assistance to Ukraine within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group known as the “Ramstein” format. The coalition was established on February 14, 2024. It was formed in response to Ukraine’s sustained need for layered protection against cruise and ballistic missiles, strike UAVs, guided aerial bombs, aircraft, helicopters, and airborne reconnaissance assets.

France and Germany serve as the coalition’s co-chairs. Upon its establishment, Belgium, Denmark, the UK, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the US joined the initiative. This diverse membership brings together nations possessing various air and missile defense systems, missile stockpiles, production capabilities, crew training centers, and financial instruments for weapons procurement [1].

The coalition operates in three main areas. The first involves developing Ukraine’s integrated air and missile defense system, encompassing command posts, automated control systems, radars, data links, and air situation awareness and target allocation capabilities. The second focuses on the transfer of air defense systems, launchers, interceptor missiles, radars, spare parts, and maintenance equipment. The third centers on training AFU personnel, repairing equipment, organizing component supplies, creating missile stockpiles, and maintaining the operational readiness of systems already transferred [2].

The coalition operates across several layers of air and missile defense. The combined inventory includes Patriot, SAMP/T, NASAMS, IRIS-T SLM, IRIS-T SLS, HAWK, Crotale, Gepard, and Skynex systems, as well as Mistral and Stinger man-portable systems and other short-, medium-, and long-range capabilities [3]. This diverse mix allows tasks to be distributed among different systems. Patriot and SAMP/T systems engage ballistic and

aerodynamic targets at significant ranges. IRIS-T, NASAMS, HAWK, and Crotale protect cities, energy facilities, military infrastructure, and troop concentrations [4]. Gepard, Skynex, Mistral, and man-portable air defense systems counter low-flying UAVs, helicopters, cruise missiles, and individual aircraft.

An important element of the coalition is the integration of Western air defense capabilities with Soviet-origin systems remaining in Ukrainian service. Under the FrankenSAM program, US RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles have been integrated into Buk-M1 systems. This solution enables the use of existing Ukrainian launchers and command systems while expanding the range of available munitions. The program gained practical significance amid shortages of standard Soviet 9M38 missiles and the need to extend the service life of Ukrainian Buk systems [5].

Germany has emerged as the leading European supplier of air and missile defense systems to Ukraine. Berlin's support effort began in 2022 and by 2025–2026 had evolved into one of the key components of Ukrainian air defense. Berlin has financed deliveries through its own military stocks, partner assistance programs, industrial contracts, and international procurement mechanisms.

As of April 17, 2025, Germany had supplied Ukraine with three Patriot systems along with spare parts, four additional Patriot launchers, Patriot interceptor missiles, six IRIS-T systems of the SLM and SLS variants, 16 TRML-4D radars, two Skynex systems with ammunition, 60 Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, 330,000 rounds for the Gepard, 500 Stinger missiles, and 2,700 Strela MANPADS. Additionally, the country transferred IRIS-T SLM and IRIS-T SLS missiles, AIM-9L/I-1 Sidewinder and Sea Sparrow missiles, as well as 16 Kinetic Defence Vehicle systems manufactured by Diehl Defence. [6].

Patriot deliveries have constituted the upper tier of the defense for Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. Germany has provided Ukraine with both complete Patriot systems and individual launchers, missiles, and spare parts. This approach has enabled the sustainment of deployed batteries, the replacement of

losses, an increase in the number of launchers, and the buildup of missile stocks to counter massed attacks.

In June 2024, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, as part of the German Immediate Action on Air Defence initiative, facilitated the transfer of 100 Patriot missiles to Ukraine. Approximately one-third of these missiles were delivered in the first weeks after the decision was announced. The remaining missiles were delivered later [7]. This financing exemplified joint cost-sharing among European states with limited stocks of Patriot missiles and production capabilities for rapidly replenishing them.

IRIS-T systems have played a distinct role in Germany's support effort. The IRIS-T SLM system is designed to engage airborne targets at medium range, while IRIS-T SLS provides protection at shorter ranges. The system comprises a command post, TRML-4D radar, launchers, and missiles. According to the German government, as of April 2025, Ukraine had received six IRIS-T SLM and SLS systems. Another 10 systems were in preparation, production, or in the process of transfer. Additional deliveries of IRIS-T SLM and SLS missiles were also planned [8].

TRML-4D radars provide detection, tracking, and classification of airborne targets. The 16 systems transferred to Ukraine have expanded radar coverage around cities, energy facilities, military bases, and troop concentration areas. The German aid program also includes 123 ground-based radars, 49 UAV detection systems, 88 sensors and drone electronic suppression systems, 200 mobile UAV jammers, and 180 RF 360 Fieldkit systems for detecting unmanned systems in its aid program [9]. These capabilities fall under the lower tier of air defense and counter mass attacks by small drones.

Germany has simultaneously built an anti-aircraft artillery component. Ukraine received 60 Gepard systems along with spare parts and 330,000 rounds. The Gepard is a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun based on the Leopard 1 tank chassis and equipped with two 35mm automatic cannons and radar-based target tracking systems. In Ukraine's operational environment, these systems are deployed primarily against strike UAVs, cruise missiles, and low-

flying targets [10]. Germany has also provided two Skynex systems with ammunition. Skynex is a short-range system designed to engage UAVs, helicopters, cruise missiles, and aircraft.

In May 2024, Germany established a separate financial mechanism to support Ukrainian air defense. Named the German Air Defence Support Initiative for Ukraine, the initiative aims to attract partner funding for the procurement of air defense systems, missiles, spare parts, radars, and equipment from German and European manufacturers. By mid-2024, it had secured nearly \$1.1 billion. By May 2026, total partner contributions to the initiative had reached approximately \$2.2 billion [11].

A new phase of German support was formalized in April 2026. Germany financed a \$3.5 billion contract with Raytheon to supply Ukraine with several hundred missiles for Patriot systems. An additional project worth approximately \$200 million was agreed upon for the transfer of IRIS-T launchers. These decisions ensure the continuation of air defense deliveries beyond 2026 and create conditions for expanding Ukraine's stockpile of interceptor missiles.

Germany's approach has gradually shifted beyond the transfer of finished equipment. It includes financing missile production, supplying launchers, developing repair infrastructure, procuring radars, supporting Ukrainian specialists, and implementing joint industrial projects. In May 2026, Germany also brought its cumulative contribution to the PURL mechanism to nearly \$1 billion [12]. Through PURL, allies finance the procurement of US weapons based on a list of Ukraine's most urgent requirements. In the air defense domain, the mechanism is used primarily to acquire Patriot missiles and other US-made systems.

France's support for Ukraine in the air defense domain encompasses short- and medium-range systems, radar equipment, interceptor missiles, military training, and technical support for transferred equipment. France has supplied Ukraine with Crotale NG systems, Mistral-family systems, a CM200 radar, and an SAMP/T system supplied jointly with Italy. These deliveries have

strengthened Ukraine's ability to counter aircraft, cruise missiles, and UAVs [13].

The French military assistance list published on March 4, 2024, detailing deliveries through December 31, 2023, included two Crotale NG systems, one CM200 radar, six Mistral systems, one SAMP/T system, and Mistral missiles. SAMP/T, known within the French Armed Forces as MAMBA, is a mobile air and missile defense system. It uses Aster missiles and can engage aircraft, UAVs, cruise missiles, and certain types of tactical ballistic missiles. One SAMP/T system was jointly transferred by France and Italy [14].

Crotale NG is a short-range system deployed against UAVs, cruise missiles, and other low-flying airborne targets. Mistral-family systems form the short-range layer of air defense; their missiles can be launched from man-portable, ground-based, vehicle-mounted, and naval launchers. France has also supported training of Ukrainian military personnel and provided technical support for delivered equipment.

In November 2025, France and Ukraine signed a declaration of intent regarding the procurement of weapons and military equipment. The document outlined Ukraine's potential procurement of up to eight SAMP/T systems, French radar equipment, and other systems under a 10-year period of cooperation. The declaration does not constitute a contract for the immediate delivery of eight systems: implementing these plans depends on subsequent agreements, the identification of funding sources, production schedules, and infrastructure preparation [15].

In February 2026, France announced its intention to provide Ukraine with an additional radar for the SAMP/T system to cover for existing equipment undergoing repairs. In June 2026, Ukrainian and French representatives discussed accelerating the procurement of radar equipment, deliveries of Aster 30 missiles, and prospects for the further provision of SAMP/T NG systems. These decisions aim at maintaining the operational readiness of air defense capabilities already in service and expanding Ukraine's air surveillance capabilities [16].

French-Ukrainian cooperation in air defense is gradually taking on an industrial dimension. In June 2026, both sides also discussed projects to localize French production in Ukraine and develop joint industrial initiatives. As of that time, there were no publicly confirmed agreements to establish production facilities for Aster 30, SAMP/T NG, or their components in Ukraine [17].

The coalition faces several practical challenges. First is the high cost of interceptor missiles. A single massed attack may require dozens of Patriots, Aster, NASAMS, or IRIS-T missiles. Second is production lead times. The manufacture of systems, radars, and missiles requires lengthy production cycles, while European industry is expanding capacity gradually. Third is Ukraine's simultaneous operation of diverse Soviet, US, German, French, Norwegian, and other systems that differ in their missiles, radars, communications, software, and maintenance procedures.

The coalition is working to address these issues through joint planning. At a meeting of coalition leaders in January 2025, participating states agreed upon road maps for developing Ukraine's capabilities. For air defense, this entails shifting from individual emergency packages toward multi-year planning for the delivery of systems, munitions, training, repairs, and technical support. This framework is designed to protect cities, energy facilities, transport infrastructure, military bases, airfields, industrial enterprises, and troop concentration areas [18].

Thus, the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Coalition encompasses four interconnected areas of assistance to Ukraine. The first covers the supply of systems and munitions: three Patriot systems, six IRIS-T systems, two Skynex systems, 60 Gepard systems, one SAMP/T, two Crotale NG systems, six Mistral systems, and Patriot, IRIS-T, Aster, Sea Sparrow, Sidewinder, Stinger, and other missiles. The second addresses radar and information capabilities: 16 TRML-4D systems, one CM200, UAV detection systems, electronic suppression systems, and ground-based radars. The third focuses on training Ukrainian air defense crews, repairs, maintenance, spare parts, and the development of infrastructure for operating Western air defense

systems. The fourth centers on long-term financing and production: the German air defense initiative with approximately \$2.2 billion in contributions, the approximately \$3.5 billion contract for several hundred Patriot missiles, the approximately \$200 million IRIS-T launcher project, and French programs involving radars, Aster 30 missiles, and prospective SAMP/T systems.

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE COALITION

The Electronic Warfare Coalition has emerged as the ninth pillar within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group's capability coalition framework (the Ramstein format). Its launch reflects the changing nature of hostilities in Ukraine: decisive factors on the battlefield now extend beyond artillery, armored vehicles, and air defense, to also include control of the electromagnetic spectrum, drone suppression, communications protection, electronic intelligence, and countering satellite navigation. Unlike the artillery or armor coalitions, this format remains much more opaque. Member states disclose virtually no information on EW system models, frequency ranges, individual contract values, or precise delivery volumes, since disclosing such data could rapidly compromise the effectiveness of these systems on the battlefield.

The Electronic Warfare Coalition was officially launched on April 11, 2025, in Brussels at a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. The coalition was announced by former Ukrainian Defense Minister R. Umerov and German Defense Minister B. Pistorius. Initially, 10 countries, including Ukraine, signed a joint letter of intent [1]. The coalition's official mandate includes procuring EW equipment, training personnel, and developing the relevant regulatory and legal framework [1]. From Kiev's perspective, its purpose is to meet the current EW needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine while simultaneously creating a long-term foundation for developing these capabilities.

Germany has emerged as the coalition's primary leader. According to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, Germany coordinates participant activities and is establishing a financial mechanism for procuring EW equipment and services for subsequent transfer to the Armed Forces of Ukraine [2]. The exact size of this financial mechanism remains undisclosed in open sources. During the April 2025 meeting, Germany also announced additional commitments to support Ukraine through 2029 worth \$12.5 billion, though this figure encompasses not just EW, but also air defense, Leopard 1 tanks, Marder IFVs, and artillery

ammunition [3].

The coalition expanded on June 5, 2025, when Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Turkey, and Estonia officially joined the initiative [2]. Sweden subsequently assumed the role of co-chair of the coalition alongside Germany. According to the Swedish government, Stockholm and Berlin have jointly led the coalition in the development of electronic warfare capabilities [4]. In March 2026, the Swedish government directed its armed forces, the Defence Materiel Administration, and the Defence Research Agency to strengthen their participation in managing and developing the coalition [4]. This signals that the framework is gradually transitioning from a political launch toward bureaucratic and industrial institutionalization.

The material foundation of Germany's participation is evident in the official list of military assistance to Ukraine. By April 17, 2025, Germany had supplied Ukraine with 200 mobile drone jammers, 88 anti-drone sensors and jammers, 70 frequency-range extenders for anti-drone devices, 180 RF 360 drone-detection systems, 93 drone sensors, 49 UAV detection systems, 10 anti-drone rifles, and 12 electronic anti-drone devices [5]. Additionally, the special equipment section lists 10 radio jammers, 123 ground surveillance radars, 52 mobile antenna mast systems, 331 satellite communications terminals, three satellite surveillance systems, and 10 HMMWVs, two of which are equipped with electronic suppression and anti-drone capabilities [5]. While these figures do not imply that every listed item was procured specifically through the Electronic Warfare Coalition, as some deliveries began earlier, they nonetheless demonstrate the material base of the coalition's leading state and the scale of Germany's well-established anti-drone and electronic warfare capabilities.

The UK represents the second major source of verifiable data on EW-related systems and counter-drone capabilities. In December 2024, London announced a \$300 million military support package. Channeled through the International Fund for Ukraine, this included a \$250 million component, of which \$90 million was allocated to air defense equipment, radars, decoy targets, and

electronic counter-drone systems [6]. Separately, the UK separately allocated \$51.8 million to supply more than 1,000 electronic counter-drone systems and jointly procure protective equipment [6].

The International Fund for Ukraine (IFU), managed by the UK, serves as another crucial source of EW and related systems. By June 2026, more than \$2.66 billion in support for Ukraine had been channeled through the fund [7]. In December 2024, the IFU announced a \$227 million package that included air defense systems, radars, decoys, counter-drone EW systems, naval drones, reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions, and spare parts [6; 7].

Ukraine's domestic EW sector is developing in parallel with the coalition's efforts. In August 2025, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported the approval of nine new EW and electronic intelligence systems for operational use in July, 90% of which were produced by Ukraine's defense industry [9]. Over the first seven months of 2025, nearly 80 EW, electronic intelligence, and electronic support systems were approved for service, compared with more than 150 systems in 2024 [9]. Virtually all of these were developed by Ukrainian manufacturers [9]. These figures demonstrate that Ukraine is not only receiving EW systems from its partners but is simultaneously building its own production base.

Another distinct area involves the protection of critical infrastructure. In December 2025, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry launched a pilot mechanism allowing operators of energy and defense infrastructure to procure and install EW systems to protect their facilities [10]. This equipment is provided to the Ukrainian military for operational use, integrated into the national air defense system, and used to cover specific facilities [10]. While the corporate operator retains ownership of the system, it cannot independently operate powerful EW equipment, since such systems are classified as weapons and could disrupt the operation of other equipment [10]. This model diversifies EW financing by leveraging private businesses rather than relying solely on the state budget and donors.

In 2026–2027, the Electronic Warfare Coalition is expected to

evolve along three primary trajectories. The first involves the procurement and delivery of mass-produced counter-drone systems: mobile jammers, trench-based FPV suppression systems, detection sensors, electronic warfare scanners, and facility protection systems. The second focuses on the integration of EW into air defense and critical infrastructure protection. Ukraine's pilot project involving energy and defense-industry operators demonstrates that EW will be used not only at the front but also to protect rear-area facilities [10]. The third centers on the development of Ukrainian production, since electronic warfare requires constant adaptation to new command, navigation, and communications channels [9].

Thus, the Electronic Warfare Coalition addresses one of the most rapidly evolving domains of the war. Just as the artillery coalition ensures firepower and the armor coalition provides mechanized mobility, the Electronic Warfare Coalition guarantees the resilience of Ukrainian forces in the electromagnetic environment. Its material foundation already encompasses hundreds of German anti-drone and electronic warfare systems, more than 1,000 British counter-drone systems, multilateral IFU procurements, Ukrainian-developed systems, and pilot models for infrastructure protection. The primary challenge is the adversary's rapid adaptation of frequencies, communications channels, and navigation methods. Consequently, EW demands not merely one-off equipment deliveries, but a continuous cycle of development, procurement, testing, modernization, and operator training.

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MARITIME COALITION

One of the key mechanisms of Western assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine is the Maritime Coalition for Building Up the Capabilities of the Ukrainian Navy, established in December 2023 under the joint leadership of the UK and Norway. The coalition brings together more than 20 countries, and aims to transform the Ukrainian Navy over the long term while ensuring its interoperability with NATO standards [1].

According to various estimates, the UK is one of the largest sources of military assistance to Ukraine, having allocated more than \$9.25 billion to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine since February 2022 [2]. As part of its naval support, the UK has provided the Kiev regime with a loan of up to \$2.2 billion at an annual interest rate of 2.6% to modernize the Ukrainian fleet under the “Framework Agreement between the Governments of the UK and Ukraine on Official Credit Support for the Development of the Capabilities of the Ukrainian Navy” [3]. Furthermore, since 2025, London has committed to providing Kiev with at least \$4 billion in military assistance annually through the end of fiscal year 2030 [4].

Norway, for its part, is implementing the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine for 2023–2030, with a total value of nearly \$27 billion. The 2026 budget allocates \$8.3 billion for assistance to Kiev, of which \$6.85 billion is designated for military assistance [5]. Notably, Oslo allocated approximately \$660 million as early as 2025 [6].

One of the main areas of Norwegian support for the Ukrainian Navy is the development of its unmanned component. In 2026, Norway plans to allocate more than \$120 million for the development and procurement of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) for Kiev. This funding is provided under the Nansen Programme and envisions deliveries from both Norwegian and Ukrainian defense industries [7]. A key development was the signing of an agreement worth approximately \$127 million between the Norwegian company Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace and a Ukrainian partner for the joint development and production of

unmanned surface vessels in Ukraine. Norwegian Prime Minister J. Gahr Støre has emphasized that the Ukrainian side uses this type of drone for reconnaissance, defensive, and offensive operations. Oslo expects the total number of unmanned vessels delivered to Kiev to reach approximately 200 by the end of 2026 [8]. Norway also plans to play an active role in establishing a naval flotilla and training Ukrainian servicemen to conduct riverine operations.

The UK's support for the Ukrainian Navy is focused on developing fundamentally new unmanned maritime systems. In early 2025, London published information on the development of the Wasp and Snapper naval USV programs to enhance the Ukrainian Navy's combat capabilities in the Black Sea [9]. Kiev is expected to begin testing these new weapons as early as 2026. The development of fundamentally new USVs within such a short timeframe indicates the UK's intention to continue using the conflict to test its weapons and military equipment under combat conditions and to adapt its defense technologies to modern warfare.

A notable example that clearly demonstrates British naval assistance to the Kiev regime was the transfer by the UK of two Sandown-class minehunters, HMS Shoreham and HMS Grimsby, which were subsequently renamed UNS Cherkassy and UNS Chernigov by the Kiev authorities. This transfer was carried out under the UK Export Finance initiative. Additionally, by 2025, the British Navy had trained around 180 Ukrainian sailors to operate the transferred vessels in accordance with the standards of NATO member states [10].

British intelligence plays a leading role in providing Ukraine with intelligence on the activities of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The UK is the “central architect” of Ukrainian military operations targeting the Russian Black Sea Fleet. These plans have included not only conventional military methods but also unconventional tactics, such as the use of underwater sabotage vehicles and the deployment of decoys to obtain intelligence [11].

London actively involves Kiev in operational and combat training activities. The annual multinational Sea Breeze military exercises are conducted under US leadership off the southern coast

of the UK. One of their primary objectives is to improve the operational interoperability and combat readiness of participating countries, particularly Ukraine [12].

The Kiev regime identifies ensuring safe navigation from Ukrainian ports as a key area of maritime assistance from the UK and Norway. In September 2023, a maritime corridor was established running westward along the coast to Romania. According to a US news outlet specializing in maritime logistics, as of June 2026, 200 million tons of cargo had been transported through the corridor, of which approximately 118 million tons consisted of Ukrainian grain. A total of 7,800 vessels had used the corridor [13]. It is highly likely that the Kiev regime also uses the corridor to replenish shortages of weapons and equipment.

In January 2025, London and Kiev signed a 100-year partnership agreement. Article 3 of the agreement establishes a maritime partnership to ensure freedom of navigation in the Black, Azov, and Baltic seas [14]. Subsequently, February 2025, the UK and Norway signed a Joint Statement on Enhanced Defense Cooperation [15].

Simultaneously, the UK helped launch the Unity Facility initiative. The creation of this mechanism was announced in November 2023 following a meeting between Ukrainian President V. Zelensky and former British Prime Minister R. Sunak. The initiative operates with the support of the British government, international insurance broker Marsh McLennan, and a number of British insurance companies. The Ukrainian government provided approximately \$20 million as a compensation fund, while insurance is provided through letters of credit issued by Ukrainian banks and confirmed by Germany's DZ Bank. Thanks to the Unity Facility, insurance rates were reduced by more than half compared to the commercial market, while the cost of grain insurance fell by approximately 2.5 percentage points. This resulted in significant savings and enabled the export of around \$20 billion worth of goods, equivalent to approximately 6% of Ukraine's GDP. Since February 2024, the mechanism has been expanded to all vessels carrying any non-military cargo [16].

The activities of the UK and Norway demonstrate the formation of a multifaceted system of naval support for Ukraine. The Maritime Coalition has gone far beyond declarative statements, becoming an instrument for the systematic transformation of the Ukrainian Navy in line with NATO standards. An analysis of financial commitments shows that this assistance is not episodic but sustained. The scale of British lending and annual allocations indicates a systematic buildup of Ukraine's military capabilities. The technological component of British-Norwegian assistance is particularly noteworthy. Financial investments in the development of USVs, as well as programs to create fundamentally new systems, demonstrate not only an intention to strengthen the Ukrainian Navy but also a desire to use the conflict as a testing ground for developing and adapting their own military technologies. Notably, the assistance is not limited to deliveries of weapons and financial support. The extensive provision of intelligence significantly increases the threat to the Russian Federation in the Black Sea. It can be assumed that British and Norwegian assistance will continue to be provided at the planned levels and, over the long term, may expand in line with Kiev 's needs and the results of new technological developments.

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